

UNCLE SAM:

A Short History of the United States of
America, with some interpretations

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CONTENTS

CHAP	PAGE
I UNCLE SAM	1
II ANCESTRY AND BEGINNINGS	3
III AN INFANT IS BORN (1689-1783)	9
IV SAM IN THE CRADLE (1783-1789)	19
V A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY	25
VI LITTLE SAMMIE LEARNS TO WALK ALONE (1789-1829)	33
VII GROWING PAINS	53
VIII YOUNG SAM'S ILLNESS AND CONVALESCENCE (1860-1877)	76
IX SAMUEL COMES OF AGE (1877-1900)	94
X APPROACHING INTERNAL MATURITY	124
XI UNCLE SAM RESISTS FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES	158
XII UNCLE SAM LOOKS AT THE FUTURE	193

PREFACE

THIS little book is designed primarily to try to point out to the man in the battered European street the high spots in the dramatic story of the evolution of a young nation across the seas—a vigorous new personage in the family of nations which came to manhood in the first half of the twentieth century. It is the hope of publishers and author that it will in part explain the background of the young men in uniform who find themselves guests in foreign lands. It attempts to show in broad outline some of the great problems which the United States has met. It seeks to show how some were solved, how some are yet unsolved. It tries to present the ideals, the accomplishments, the decency, the strength, as well as the ugly shortcomings and perplexities of the United States of America. It strives to present Uncle Sam as one member of an intimately associated household of nations who are crying out in pain, seeking, striving, grasping for solutions to intertwining problems—problems produced by the simple fact that the physical sciences have outstripped the social sciences.

This is not a completely objective book. It is written by a young American who admits that he cannot quite reach a detached and serene perspective. He has been torn away from the academic and quiet domestic environment of his choice to serve the Allied cause as best he can. He has tried hard here to give the facts based upon scientific research, but he admits that here and there he has preached a few little sermons. He admits that he is one of the school of historians which holds that history is a waste of time unless its lessons are pointed up for the purpose of application.

No apology for its brevity, its rather naïve organic metaphor, or its lack of objectivity is extended, but it is hoped that the reader will condone its other errors and accept the excuse that the author wrote it in snatches of time stolen at night when military duties would allow.

Chapter I

UNCLE SAM

IT was in 1852 that the cartoonist Bellew drew the first caricature of Uncle Sam. It is quite doubtful whether the United States deserved then to be portrayed as an elderly gentleman with a greying goatee. Indeed, one has difficulty now in visualizing America as an elderly or even a fully matured nation, nor is the personality of its people that of a dignified individual wearing a high-hat. Of course, one may as well quarrel with the characterization of Britain as a fat, self-satisfied John Bull. And France is hardly a sweet and lovely Marianne; she is not now, nor was she before her beer-drinking neighbour proceeded about his usual brutal escapades.

Cartoonists, however, must have some germination point of departure for their pencils. The initials U.S. offered the starting-point for the name "Uncle Sam." Historians may accept the popularization and continue to call the United States Uncle Sam, but only with mental reservations. Perhaps the United States some day may be correctly likened to Bellew's imaginary figure, but the twentieth-century United States of America is more like a tremendous young man, neither blond nor brunette, neither handsome nor ugly, neither overbearingly selfish nor free from self-interest; vigorous, strong, ambitious; loving fun, luxury, and freedom; hating war, dishonesty and oppression.

This young fellow is a little perplexed. He has many internal problems crying for solution. He lives in a new world moving at an accelerating speed. He is in the very centre of that new world, but he does not like his new position. He has suddenly realized his power and responsibilities in a new age of science. He wants the power but not the responsibilities. He would like to share those responsibilities, but he is not sure whom he may trust. Yet, he knows that if he and his neighbours do not find the means for preserving law and order, for promoting international commerce and wider individual opportunity, his own democracy stands endangered. The vicious spiral of depression, war, debt, depression, war, debt, may easily become a

whirlpool which will carry away the foundation stones of his freedom. He is searching deeply now for the answer to his queries. That answer must be provided as a result of solid thinking based upon intellect as well as moral stamina. Mature judgment is required. Whether or not the young man, and his neighbours too for that matter, have reached the necessary degree of intellectual maturity may be open to speculation, but no one may with wisdom doubt any longer that Uncle Sam has reached physical maturity.

The United States in territory is more than thirty-two times the size of the United Kingdom. Its eastern mountain range, the Appalachians, covers an area into which the Scotch Highlands, the Pennines, and the hills of Wales would fit several times; and the Rockies of the western states would swallow the Appalachians, the Alps, and the Pyrenees and then have enough space left to hide away in any one of the several of its valleys all of the hill country of Ireland.

America has a desert in the south-west which covers an area as large as Italy, but the great open prairie country between the Appalachians and the Rockies is as large as all Western Europe combined.

From its great mouth the great Mississippi River pours forth eighteen times as much water as would come from the Rhine, the Seine, the Thames, the Severn, and the Humber were they combined. Among America's hundreds of rivers, thirteen of them are each over a thousand miles long. The Mississippi system is 25,000 miles long, one hundred times the length of the Shannon, the longest in the British Isles.

In the Appalachians there is a superabundance of coal, iron, and limestone. In the Rockies there are nearly all the other type minerals. The oil fields of the South and Mid-west and California produce more petroleum than do all those of the other continents combined. America can produce enough food and textiles to support a population at least ten times its own 134,000,000 people.

The climate, except in the arid south-west and a few scattered spots in the far west, is healthful and pleasant. Naturally it varies from the semi-tropics of Florida and Southern California to the dry colder climes of the Dakotas and Maine, but

nearly every state knows a cold season and a warm one. Many Americans have known blizzards, floods, droughts, and cyclones, but these things are exceptional, and so is fog, except in coastal regions.

God has blessed Uncle Sam, and Americans know it. But the soil and forests and hills do not just pour forth their abundance. Americans have fought and toiled and sacrificed and died to bring forth the fruits of their land. Nowhere has the loafer been held in greater contempt. It is not strange that they love their country, their institutions, and their rugged individualism. They have carried their frontier fearlessness into their industrialization and their international relations. It has been an ugly quirk of fate that some nations have mistaken Uncle Sam's love of overstuffed furniture for indolence.

Chapter II

ANCESTRY AND BEGINNINGS

FOR countless centuries the great American expanse lay unknown to white men. How many types of humans have roved its plains, hunted its forests, or crossed its mountains and rivers still an argument among scientists. The copper-coloured men whom Columbus mistakenly named "Indians" in 1492 seem to have arrived from Asia via Alaska. By the end of the fifteenth century they were divided into dozens of races and hundreds of tribes. They inhabited the whole of the Western Hemisphere from the Arctic of the Eskimos to Cape Horn of the Patagonians. Already gone by then were the North American Cliff Dwellers of the Rockies and perhaps also the Mound Builders of the eastern river valleys. Just emerging as distinct tribes were the wild Comanches and Apaches of the South-west and the Dakotas and other buffalo-hunting tribes of the great North American Plains. The Creeks and Iroquois were among those dozens of tribes living east of the Mississippi.

All these inhabitants of the expanse one day to be called the United States were more or less primitive. While their

women farmed and carried their babies strapped to their backs, the men hunted and fished, traded and fought. Here and there some excelled others in making stone utensils or in moulding pottery or in weaving rough baskets or in colouring animal skins. They lived mostly in dirty villages of tents (wigwams). When the white man came to North America there was not an advanced Indian culture north of the Rio Grande. Here was a factor of great importance in the course of things to come.

To the south, however, sandwiched among backward peoples, were the Aztecs and Mayas of Mexico and Central America and the Incas of Peru. These peoples had approached cultures of some advancement. They had begun to leave the Neolithic for the Age of Metals. Calendars, elementary mathematics, irrigation and other engineering projects, besides a belief in one god, community undertakings, and nationalism, had already arrived. These peoples knew the value of gold. Here was another factor of great importance in the course of things to come.

Why was Uncle Sam destined to speak English instead of Spanish or French or even Dutch or Swedish or German? The answer is contained in a combination of considerations—considerations which might easily be developed into a long discourse. Suffice it here to point out a few large factors. It has just been noted that the Indians of Central and South America knew fully the value of gold, but those of the north did not. Spain and Portugal were a few generations ahead of England in catching the spirit of imperialism, and by that time North America did not greatly interest the Spaniard. He was already as busy as could be looting gold-ornamented temples of the Aztecs and Mayas and Incas. These poor people were easily overpowered and eventually forced to work their mines for the King of Spain. Within a few generations, so firmly was the Spaniard entrenched in Spanish America that despite the swift decline of Spain after 1588, the British could not have dislodged him had he tried. Englishmen had to seek other fields of colonization.

Despite the fact that the Cabots and Henry Hudson discovered North America for England, Frenchmen and Dutch-

men and Swedes in the 1600's were elbowing their way into His Majesty's territory. The earliest white explorers found the northern Indian tribes of the St. Lawrence and Ohio valleys good at trapping fur-bearing animals. It was not long, therefore, before French-speaking white men bringing metal utensils, firearms, glass beads, and Catholicism were penetrating deep into the forests and taking unto themselves buxom, high-cheeked squaws. Needless to say, these French traders had not left France and lovely Paris to build homes in this wilderness. Later some Frenchmen did send back to Europe for their women, and thus the pure French stamp upon Canada remains to this day, but only near New Orleans on the Gulf of Mexico did it remain strong in the land between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande.

The Spaniards found little of interest in what one day was to be the United States and the Frenchmen found hot competition, for there was another breed of white men quite early abroad in the land. Among this ambitious race, over a score of decades, were Raleighs and Drakes, John Smiths and Roger Williamses, Penns and Baltimores, and a great throng who crossed the seas for stern and solid reasons.

It is the male of the species which has built most empires, but that is only partially true in the case of the British. In the settlement of America, Englishmen with the first attempt at colonization took their women along and counted it beneath their code to marry Indian maids. There was no set formula involving Gospel, Gold, and Glory as there was among the Spaniards; for Englishmen there was little thought of ever turning back to engage in Old World pursuits as there was among the French. English and Scottish colonials, Dutch and Swedes and Germans too, took with them their women—went out to a new world, a New World in which to build homes.

The most significant fact, then, in the colonization of America is that in Latin America (except in Argentina and Uruguay) new mixed races were to emerge—mixtures of Mediterranean whites and Indians and Negroes—while in North America, north of the Rio Grande, the old north European stock was simply being transplanted to a New World, there to continue the process of fusion among whites

and whites alone. The latter race was bound to prove itself the most enlightened, the most vigorous, the most completely civilized and politically stable of the Western Hemisphere.

Why did the north Europeans with their women leave the British Isles and the Continent to set sail for the wild country of the West? When the *Goodspeed*, the *Sarah Constant*, and the *Discovery* brought the first permanent settlers to Jamestown, Virginia, in early 1607, when the *Mayflower* carried the Pilgrim Puritans to Massachusetts thirteen years later, England was heading toward civil war. The mother country was not happy. There was religious intolerance; there were social discontent and depression; there was a stiff-necked autocrat on the throne who had promised in 1604 to make dissenters "conform themselves" or else he would "harry them out of the land." Meantime on the Continent there were the wars and persecutions among Protestants and Catholics and between rival Bourbons and Hapsburgs and their alliances of princes. The common folk of Europe, caught up in these struggles, were heart-sick and tired and impoverished. They sought refuge. They sought opportunity. They sought freedom—freedom of worship, freedom of thought and speech, freedom from want and fear.

Eyes were cast across the great Atlantic, where beckoning were tremendous expanses of land waiting to be cleared, where none of the old-established restrictions existed, where free men might build on virgin soil a new clean-cut social and political order. It would take brave men and women to leave the old family ties, to strike out into the wilderness, to toil with axe and plough, to face prospective death from hostile Indians. Would the returns from these sufferings and sacrifices be justified? Would the exchange of things European for the things American be a fair one? Would the dangers to self and family, would the hardships of colonial life be worth accepting—just to get away from old restrictions? A man had but one life to live, but he also had a family dependent upon him. What should he do? The answer, "I am going to America," was given only by the adventurous, the financially oppressed, or the ones whose religious urge dictated sacrifice. Many thousands of Englishmen, Scots, Welshmen, and Irishmen made this

answer. Many hundreds of Continentals made a similar decision.

Meantime there were also other forces at play which took settlers across the sea. Some of these forces were good and wholesome; others were not. Uncle Sam was not to be born perfect. Into his make-up were to go some of the ugliness that is Man as well as the good. Royalty and the ruling families were quite interested in populating American possessions. Virginia and Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and the Carolinas all knew imperial promotion schemes. Royal debts and obligations were soon being paid in virgin lands. Stock companies were formed to secure lumber and naval stores and tobacco. Other commission agencies provided the great land-owners with much-needed labour. They would finance the passage from England. The immigrant bound himself to work for a period of about five years, after which he was free to move at least to the position of a tenant farmer if not to that of farm owner. These so-called indentured servants plus later prison-freed debtors were shipped off to America by the thousand; and when these failed to fill a demand for hired labour, thousands of tan and black Africans were captured by agents of British slave-trading companies, herded into holds, and something like two-thirds of these poor captives reached the American slave mart alive.

It had been hard for Englishmen to leave the homeland. A few gave up and returned to the Old World, but only a few. It took courage for those who remained to drive back the red man; it took strength to build log cabins miles away from the nearest neighbour or midwife. But those Britishers were made of stern stuff, and so were other folks who followed.

In time, on the eastern seaboard, little towns began to appear. There were not so many in the South, where the tobacco plantation with slave labour was self-sufficient, but from the beginning the New Englanders in the North had clung together for protection and economic co-operation. So had the Dutch at New Amsterdam (New York after 1664), and Penn's Quakers in the City of Brotherly Love (Philadelphia).

By 1733 there were thirteen American colonies. Economically and socially they fell into three distinct geographical units:

the South, the Middle Atlantic, and New England. Some roads, formerly Indian trails, connected them all, but communication was poor and each section had its own individuality.

Already the South was satisfied with an agrarian economy. Virginia was large and becoming wealthy. Even the backwoods frontiersmen, many of whom had served a period as indentured servants, were working now to clear land for themselves, to plant tobacco, to buy slaves, and to become untitled lords. So it was in North and South Carolina. Georgia had just that year been founded by James Oglethorpe and his band of economic unfortunates, most of whom had been freed from debtors' prisons.* Maryland, to the north-east of Virginia, belonged to Lord Baltimore's heirs and assigns. Here was the American refuge for oppressed European Catholics. Most Marylanders, though, were Protestants, but religious freedom was the rule. Though her economy was closely akin to that of Virginia, her frontier early disappeared. And when it had gone, Maryland assumed characteristics more like the Middle Atlantic colonies than others of the South.

Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were also proprietary colonies as Maryland was. They with New York (taken from the Dutch by the Duke of York, who later became James II) comprised the Middle Atlantic group. All these colonies were essentially agricultural, but the farther north they were, the more closely knit were their society and commerce.

The New England colonies in the far North-east—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire—were small and unable to expand to the west. Furthermore, a rocky soil, longer winters, and hostile Indians filled the stern Puritan colonists from the beginning with an intense determination to fight their environment in close co-operation, one family with another. Theirs was to be a community development. As elsewhere, farming was basic in their economy, but

* Certainly one impelling motive in thus freeing these debtors lay in the fact that Georgia was needed as a buffer state against Spanish activities in Florida. One-time prisoners could be expected to fight to maintain their freedom—a principle of psychology soon to be conveniently forgotten.

they became known chiefly as fishermen and shrewd and far-ranging traders.*

Religion played a dominant role in New England community development, in political evolution, and in educational progress. The Puritan preacher was far more important in New England than were the Anglican, Presbyterian, or Catholic prelates in the more open spaces to the south.

The early decades, then, saw sectional differences arising in America, but they saw common grievances and common aspirations as well, and these latter ties were to prove of greater importance in the ensuing years. There were differences in religion, differences in physical environment, differences in the methods of pursuit of happiness, and racially the colonists were not all Englishmen.

Scots, Welshmen, Dutchmen, Swedes, Irishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, and Negro slaves were all present by the opening decades of the 1700's; but the laws were English and English was the definite stamp all along the eastern seaboard north of Florida. Before this motley group of settlers lay a gigantic expanse of unsettled western territory. But already there were the Spaniards pushing up into Florida, California, and the South-west, and French missionaries and traders were pushing down from the Great Lakes, down the great Ohio-Mississippi river system. Even so, it was pretty definite now that Uncle Sam was going to speak English; but there were wars to be fought and won before this would be assured.

Chapter III

AN INFANT IS BORN (1689-1783)

BETWEEN 1689, when Parliament drove from the throne King James II, and 1763, when the French gave up their American forts and trading posts and surrendered their holds

* It was to them that the name "Yankees" was first applied perhaps by the West Indies half-breeds. The term seems to have been derived from *Jon* and *qui*, meaning perhaps "John who comes to trade." During the War between the States (1861-1865) Southerners applied the term to all people of the North, but the expression "damned Yankees" was used as early as the 1820's in the South when reference was made to New England peddlers.

in India, England fought France almost continuously. There were also wars with Spain, one of which was the War of Jenkins' Ear to force the Spaniards to continue to give to English trading companies a monopoly in the slave traffic to the New World and to open their Spanish American ports to English commerce. These were the great days of mercantilism.

England was rapidly moving from a nation of farmers toward "a nation of shop-keepers." Her internal welfare henceforth was to depend upon commerce. That meant the preservation of a balance of power on the Continent; it meant that Englishmen must achieve and maintain a "favourable" balance of trade. There might be a Spanish Empire, but England must become Mistress of the Seas and all that that implied. There must be sources of raw materials; there must be purchasers of English finished products. Colonies there would be, though it would be costly to procure them. They should exist for the benefit of the mother country. They should hardly be allowed to enter competition in the economic world.

In the four big wars with France during this period American colonials fought beside the hired soldiers of the crown, but they were not fighting for monarch or mercantilism. They were fighting to rid their continent of the French who were stirring the Indians to kill and scalp English-speaking colonists. Those Frenchmen, determined to block British expansion to the west, must be eliminated as a political force. European Englishmen had their ideas about how to get along in a survival-of-the-fittest world; American Englishmen had theirs too—and those two sets of ideas were not the same, though the enemy was.

A new nation of English-speaking people was taking shape in the imperial womb. The embryo showed signs of individuality when conflict arose over economic position. That conflict reached an emotional stage when young George III came to the throne in 1760 and decided to adopt his mother's admonition to "Be a King." Englishmen at home might tolerate the "King's Friends" and allow their constitutional rights to be dissipated, but not frontiersmen who had early learned to fear naught, whether it be the forces of nature or the whoop of painted red men on the war-path. There were

AN INFANT IS BORN (1689-1783)

wise Englishmen who urged toleration and conciliation. But the elder Pitt was old and gouty and discredited; and Edmund Burke was soon to become so long-winded that bored M.P.s called him the "dinner-bell" and left the House almost deserted while he held forth by the hour.

The Treaty of Paris of 1763, after the last of the four big colonial wars, eliminated the French as an enemy to westward expansion. Americans drew a sigh of relief. They knew now that nothing could stop their movement across the Appalachians. They knew too that they were no longer dependent upon the mother country for protection against the old enemy, France. Suddenly the joy of victory was dampened. The colonists learned that the Tories intended to make them help pay for that victory—pay for it in money, despite the fact that they had already paid heavily in blood.

There is no doubt that there were good arguments behind the Tory decision to tax their American colonists, but subsequent events proved that it was strategically unwise. The British temperament of the hour was naturally that of exasperation and impatience. The Americans on their part were equally exasperated. All during the preceding two centuries they had been constantly growing in strength and self-reliance and dignity. There were new generations of native Americans now, Americans to whom England was a far-away place. The day when their fathers had been willing to be treated as impotent subjects was gone. But this was not fully realized in England. The Americans objected to paying the war debt, they objected still more to the programme to pay the expenses of crown-appointed governors. They objected loudest, though, to the failure of England to give them representation in Parliament. They wanted direct representation. But this was a principle not even followed in England. Virginians wanted a Virginian to represent Virginia in Parliament, not a Scotchman; New York wanted a New Yorker to represent New York in Parliament, not a Yorkshireman or an Irish Lord. Englishmen living in a compact island kingdom did not understand this idea—and made no effort to do so. Had the Tories seen fit to find the means to ease the strain, Uncle Sam could have been born with a minimum of pain and he might today still render loyal

lip-service to His Majesty exactly as do the Dominions. But tempers were rising, and King George's attitude was that his impudent colonists should be coerced. A violent birth and complete estrangement was the result.

Such an event was not the desire of the vast majority of the Americans. Probably not more than a fourth of them really favoured the Declaration of Independence when it was written in 1776; even when the Revolutionary War was over in 1783, nearly a third of the Americans were still proud to be known as Loyalists.

Britain's imperial policy and the refusal to recognize any logic in the colonists' desire for representation in Parliament eventually led to smuggling, then to reprisals, and eventually to riots and bloodshed. Full-scale war was to follow.

The Boston Tea Party was just one of the earlier disorders. It was on the night of December 16, 1773, that a group of Bostonians dressed themselves as Indians, proceeded to the dock, and boarded a ship loaded with tea belonging to the East India Company. They threw overboard about 350 chests of the tea and then faded into the night. England retaliated by closing the Boston harbour, suspending the Massachusetts charter, refusing home jury trial for rioters, and quartering troops within the province.

The Quebec Act was also passed at this time. This extended the boundary of French-speaking Quebec from Canada down across the Great Lakes all the way to the Ohio River. This act was not a repressive measure, but was surely a psychological blunder. The colonials had fought alongside the British soldiers to rid that very country of French influence, and though the people of Quebec were British subjects, they were still French-speaking; hence, the Americans had considered it fully established that they themselves, as Englishmen, had the sole right to move westward with their families. Questions in their minds were not answered by His Majesty. Whether this was gross negligence on the part of King George's Ministers or whether it was royal opposition to any form of appeasement, even verbal, its effect may be likened to that of sprinkling salt into several open wounds.

The American Revolution or War of Independence really

was not much of a war as British wars go. It probably should be called the Rebellion. England had had enough of war for one century, but she was in for fifty years more of it before she emerged after Waterloo as the unchallenged imperial power of modern times. Meantime, she lost her thirteen American colonies and largely because her imperial rival France took the embarrassing moment of 1778 to take revenge; Spain and Holland also joined the anti-British alliance. Even then the British Navy, after reverses, finally whipped the European adversaries, and the United Kingdom could have turned the spotlight full on the Americans had it been considered worth while. But the prevailing Tory attitude was that if impudent colonists were going to be a constant thorn in the side and a drain on England's finances it was better to let them go. It was argued that England was bound to have the lion's share of American commerce, anyway—and that was of paramount importance. This attitude King George refused to accept, but he was never given the full support of his people—even of the Tories. Many Whigs, moreover, were silently of the belief that should the King lose this war his hold on politics would be broken. In this half-hearted frame of mind England fought a war and lost.

It is true, the British did not prosecute the war vigorously, but then neither did the Americans throw their full weight into the struggle. There were some 2,700,000 colonials in the thirteen American colonies in 1775. Less than 70 per cent of them were British in origin. There were half a million Negroes and a scattering of Indians.* When these coloured elements plus some 700,000 white Loyalists plus another half million colonials who were indifferent are subtracted from the total population, it left only about 1,600,000 Americans determined to establish a new nation.

But apathy did not characterize the small segment of the population which provided the leadership—and this segment contained the bulk of the wealthy and a majority of the in-

* The Indians east of the Mississippi numbered about 200,000. Nearly all of them were quietly farming along the frontier. There were in 1940 about half a million Indians in the United States, more than there were when the English first appeared. Most of them live on lands reserved for them by the Government.

fluent and educated. As so often happens in history a minority, well-knit and determined, forced its will upon a majority and emerged triumphant. In that process they overcame large obstacles.

When the Revolution broke in America there was no central government, there was no treasury, there was no army or navy. But there were colonial legislatures, and it was an easy step to oust royal governors and elect state officials. Fortunately for the Americans, England was three thousand miles away and transportation was laborious. This gave the Americans time to bring about a semblance of national unity. A weak Continental Congress was formed in 1774. The Second Continental Congress in 1775 appointed George Washington of Virginia as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army. The colonial assemblies voted to contribute men and supplies and gradually granted more powers to Congress.

In 1774 the first Continental Congress had sent a rather mild Declaration of Rights to His Majesty, but at the same time the members had decided to boycott British commerce until the colonies should have received redress of their grievances. Parliament had retaliated by cutting off trade with anyone else. New York, North Carolina, and Georgia for a time were granted a few trade concessions, but Massachusetts was absolutely blockaded, and all the colonies found themselves facing financial chaos. It was then that Patrick Henry had cried out in the halls of the Virginia Convention: "I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death." Virginia had joined Massachusetts in war. So, too, had the other eleven colonies.

The war, as such, actually had started in Massachusetts when in 1775 British Redcoats had been dispatched to seize supplies said to have been concealed at Concord. American scouts of the "Minute-men," personified by Paul Revere, had ridden through the night informing the excited colonists of the British intent. A fight in the environs of Lexington had resulted in American bloodshed. The war thus had begun on April 19, 1775.

The first year of the conflict went to the Americans. At first they besieged in Boston 5,000 Redcoats (mostly German

professionals). On June 17, 1775, after suffering casualties estimated at 20 per cent, the British General Gage forced the Americans to lift the siege. In this action, the Battle of Bunker Hill, the Americans lost 449 men, killed or wounded, and used up nearly all their ammunition in that immediate vicinity. It was here that Colonel William Prescott is supposed to have said: "Do not shoot until you see the whites of their eyes." Gage broke the siege, but was too weakened to do more. The Americans would sell him nothing. He had to retire to Boston and await supplies and reinforcements from overseas. Now it was incumbent upon Washington to drive Gage from Boston. After capturing a British supply vessel he got enough powder to do that job, and the Redcoats were driven down towards New York, where some 18,000 hired Germans and some English regulars had landed. These latter were under command of General Sir William Howe.

The second year went to the British. The American forces were now split, part in New England and the Hudson River valley north of New York City, the others west of the Delaware River. Meantime more hired "Hessians" were coming. Before long there were thirty thousand of them.

It was this sending of German "mercenaries" (the money went to their beer-baron princes) that infuriated the Americans and did most toward inspiring in them a high morale. It took away much thought of disloyalty to the mother country, for it seemed but an insult that the mother should hire someone else to chastise the rebellious youngster. That foreigners should be employed by Englishmen to fight against their own blood relatives who happened to live beyond the bounds of England could never be forgiven. Nor did it inspire loyalty when the argument presented itself that George III was himself of almost pure German extraction. The Revolutionists were gaining in numbers and strength. Many Loyalists were restrained from active support of the crown. Many others were truly torn in loyalty. Families were split.

Had His Majesty shown any inclination to conciliate, the Revolution as late as the spring of 1776 might have died from lack of popular support. Instead the King determined upon punishment. In 1775 the second Continental Congress had

sent the King the "Olive Branch Petition," which demanded the repeal of "such statutes as more immediately distress any of your Majesty's colonies." To this King George had replied by proclamation that the colonists were "dangerous and ill-designing men." It was then, for the first time, that talk of independence began. That talk had grown louder with the landing of every new boat-load of Hessians.

George Washington in 1776 wrote: "When I took command of the army [in July, 1775], I abhorred the idea of independence; now, I am convinced, nothing else will save us." That sentiment was rapidly spreading.

It was on July 4, 1776, in Philadelphia, that Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson, a scholarly frontiersman of Virginia, was the author. He purposely lifted many phrases from John Locke's essays on government treatises, then widely accepted by Englishmen.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident," wrote Jefferson, "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. . . ."

The Declaration of Independence concludes by proclaiming: ". . . for the support of this Declaration, and with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honour."

The third year of the war went to the Americans. Though the British with their Germans held New York and occupied Philadelphia and forced Washington to retire from New Jersey, they lost the Campaign of 1777. General Burgoyne, pushing down from Canada with a new British army, ran into

a motley American force under General Gates. Burgoyne was beaten and forced at Saratoga (New York) to surrender his whole army with its arms and supplies.

Washington meantime had retired to Valley Forge in southeastern Pennsylvania. The winter which followed was critical. His army was hungry, ill-clad, and poorly housed. But the men were being well drilled by "Baron" Steuben, a Prussian soldier of fortune.

Suddenly France, after being exposed to the charms of Dr. Benjamin Franklin, of Philadelphia, and noting Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, acknowledged the independence of the United States. Great Britain declared war on France, and the major British attention was turned away from the Americans.

The year 1778 was a draw. The Americans now had the help of the gallant Frenchman, Lafayette. There were a few successes for both sides. The British were driven from Philadelphia back to New York, but the Americans lost the Georgia seaport, Savannah, and saw a large force of Britishers under the able Cornwallis assembled in the far South.

The fifth year saw little fighting except in South Carolina and Virginia. It was another indecisive year. The British were turning the spotlight again on the Americans. More men and supplies were being piled into Savannah, and the French fleet was unable to interfere. But the Americans on their part were also becoming stronger, more men were joining the army, and the central government was becoming quite effective. Moreover, French help was on the way.

The year 1780 and most of 1781 witnessed several small but important battles. The war was mounting to a climax. The British captured the important seaport city of Charleston, South Carolina, and almost wiped out General Gates' 3,000 men at Camden, South Carolina. But the Americans came back in the Battle of King's Mountain in North Carolina, and three months later, on January 17, 1781, in the Battle of Cowpens, almost broke the British stranglehold on South Carolina. Then came the Battle of Guilford Court House (North Carolina), when Nathanael Green, the American victor at King's Mountain, and Lord Cornwallis battled it out for hours until both sides were exhausted. Green retired and Cornwallis re-

ported a victory to Parliament. Here Charles James Fox stated that "another such victory would destroy the British Army." Other fighting in this seventh year found the Americans gradually gaining the upper hand in the Carolinas, while in the North things were pretty well stalemated.

The autumn of 1781 brought the Americans a series of good breaks, and Washington proved himself to be a first-rate general. Cornwallis decided to take Virginia. A small British force from New York joined him, but they drew behind them Lafayette and his small but efficient body of Light Infantry trained by experienced French officers. Cornwallis decided not to fight until General Sir Henry Clinton should send him more men from New York. Since they were supposed to come by sea, Cornwallis retired to Yorktown, Virginia, which is situated on a peninsula. There he waited for his reinforcements. They never came.

Meantime the British Admiral Rodney was busy plundering French possessions in the Caribbean area. The French fleet under de Grasse was afraid to meet him in battle. Furthermore, the West Indies hurricane season was at hand, and de Grasse decided to get out of the Caribbean. He sent word to Washington that he had a few weeks to spare, that he would arrive in the Chesapeake Bay in September, and hoped he might be of some service.

General Washington all this time had been besieging Clinton in New York. He had hoped that de Grasse would help him against Clinton, but now de Grasse had refused to come farther north than the Chesapeake in Virginia. Meantime up at Newport, Rhode Island, there were 7,000 Frenchmen under Marshal Rochambeau. Washington now ordered them to join him near New York. They did, and Clinton, thinking the Americans and Frenchmen were going to attack New York, withheld his reinforcements from Cornwallis.

Suddenly Washington struck out cross-country for Virginia with his whole army, including Rochambeau's Frenchmen. When Clinton realized how he had been tricked, he made ready to sent his transports southward toward Yorktown; but it was too late. Part of his New York fleet was out chasing Rochambeau's Newport fleet, and the latter was drawing the

British straight toward the Chesapeake, where de Grasse was due any day. Happily for the American cause de Grasse appeared at the precise moment, and the Clinton fleet was beaten. It retired to New York, where it loaded 7,000 Redcoats on board, picked up naval reinforcements, and headed back toward Yorktown.

All of this action gave Washington's men time to march the 375 miles from New York to Yorktown and then to close in on Cornwallis. Bottled up on the peninsula, blockaded by de Grasse on water, and outnumbered two to one on land, the British were in a hopeless position. Cornwallis surrendered his army on October 19, 1781, and the fighting on land was over.

England continued the war on sea, and eventually Rodney took sweet revenge over de Grasse in the Caribbean; but by that time the Fox-Shelbourne Ministry had already decided to let the Americans go their own way.

The Definitive Treaty, signed in Paris, September 3, 1783, recognized the independence of the United States of America and established its territorial extent as containing that country south of Canada, east of the Mississippi River, and north of Spanish Florida.

An infant nation had been born.

Chapter IV

SAM IN THE CRADLE (1783-1789)

THE Treaty of Paris, 1783, recognized the United States as an independent nation. Actually it was no such thing. It was still utterly dependent upon the commerce and the good-will and the financial backing of the adult countries across the sea.

Little Sam's bones were soft, and his muscles were not coordinated in 1783. He had been christened the United States of America. As a matter of fact, the states were not united. The central government which had prosecuted the war was weak and unrespected. The currency of the Continental Congress was "not worth a Continental." The Congress was looked upon as being entitled to no more powers than King George

had been accorded in relation to the proud and independent state legislative bodies. Moreover, each elected state governor was extremely jealous of his own prerogatives.

In 1781, after four years of debate, the thirteen state legislatures had adopted the loose Articles of Confederation. In this document the Congress had been given certain powers which a successful prosecution of war had demanded, but no more. Congress then could wage war and sign a peace treaty. It could maintain an army and a navy, but it could not conscript men or money, nor even command obedience from state or citizen. When the war was over, there was strong prospect that the union would be dissolved.

At this point something very important happened—something which indicated quite strongly that though each state intended to guard jealously its own internal prerogatives, there was abroad in the land a subconscious understanding that the United States was a solid nation with a stable future. The state of New York had already transferred to the Confederation its claims to western lands. Virginia now followed suit in 1784. Massachusetts agreed to do the same in 1785. So did Connecticut in 1786, and South Carolina in 1787. Congress forthwith passed the Ordinance of 1787, proclaiming that out of this Federal territory new states would be formed and admitted as free and equal members of the Union. Their citizens were not to be treated as colonists, but would be given the same rights and privileges as other Americans. Here was a strong move in which the States expressed willingness to discard any imperialistic desires and to place its full confidence in the Federal Government. That Government was quick to accept its responsibility.

All the while, though, there had been at work other forces—forces of decentralization. Congress had to have the unanimous consent of the thirteen state governments before it could assume any new powers. There were rivalries and jealousies among the states. Several of these differences almost led to armed conflict. Something drastic had to be done and done quickly or the American states would soon start tearing each other to pieces, and Uncle Sam as one solid living being might have died in infancy.

The close of the Revolution had found the Americans in a terrible financial state. Heavy debts had been incurred; money was owed to France, Holland, and Spain, money was owed to British individuals and firms. Internal finances were going from bad to worse. State governments were issuing unsound paper money. As for handling foreign affairs, it was quite obvious that some powerful central authority must be created. The Treaty of 1783 had assured England that no obstacles would be placed in the way of collection of debts, but the Continental Congress had no power to forbid states from erecting those obstacles. When this was done, despite the remonstrances of Congress, the British naturally refused to keep their end of the contract, one provision of which called for the evacuation of several old forts of the Ohio country across the Alleghenies. There was a series of disputes, too, with Spain over the boundary of Florida and navigation of the Mississippi River.

Baby Sam needed a strong central government, capable of handling foreign affairs, capable of backing a strong national currency, strong enough to umpire inter-state disputes, and powerful enough to enforce decisions. The United States of America was in dire need of a Federal Constitution.

The opportunity to fill that need came about almost by accident as a result of arbitration of a dispute between Virginia and Maryland over trade in Chesapeake Bay. Those two states had appointed commissioners to meet and settle the dispute amicably. So successful was the meeting that they decided to meet every two years to consider other problems. The Maryland Assembly invited Pennsylvania and Delaware to appoint commissioners for similar meetings with Marylanders. Virginia then suggested that it would be a good idea for all four states to send commissioners to a convention. It was an easy step to adopt the idea that other states, too, might send delegates.

In 1786 at the Annapolis (Maryland) Convention the question of amending the Articles of Confederation arose. It was decided that such should be done, and the result was that all states except little Rhode Island sent delegates in 1787 to the Federal Convention held in Philadelphia.

Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York. Little Delaware was the first to accept, and by a unanimous vote (December 7, 1787). Pennsylvania ratified, 43 to 23. Then followed New Jersey and Georgia, unanimously. Connecticut's vote was 128 to 40. Massachusetts, after a hot debate, adopted the plan by the narrow vote, 187 to 168. Maryland's vote was 69 to 11; South Carolina's 149 to 73.

When, on June 21, 1788, the New Hampshire convention ratified the Constitution by a vote of 57 to 46, the Union, at least in name, had been formed. Actually, such was not yet true, for Virginia, the largest of the states, was still outside; and it was quite doubtful that New York, the fifth in size, would ratify the organ. Geographically these states separated the Union into segments. North Carolina, the third largest state, actually refused to ratify, and Rhode Island, the smallest, still was not even interested enough to call a convention.

In the Old Dominion, as Virginia still calls herself, a vehement debate was in progress. The patriot Patrick Henry was leading the opposition. Why should self-sufficient Virginia surrender her nationalism to "one great, consolidated national government of all the people of the states"? The Anti-Federalists appeared headed for victory when suddenly a vote was called for, taken, and counted. With mingled feelings the Virginians heard the result. The convention had ratified the Constitution by a vote of 89 to 79!

In New York the fight was bitter. It brought forth floods of vituperation against the framers. Even Franklin and Washington felt the heat of invective. An avalanche of scathing pamphlets and caricatures poured from the printing presses, while stump speeches and more dignified orations greeted the ears of thousands. It was here that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay decided to organize a counter-propaganda campaign. The result was the series of excellent political essays published in various New York newspapers above the pseudonym "Publius." These essays or letters were gathered and then published in book form under the title *The Federalist*. The calm logic and obvious patriotism of these writings had already had a profound effect upon other state conventions. Publius's influence doubtless carried the day in

New York, though perhaps of equal importance was the consideration that ten states had already ratified when on July 26, 1788, the New York convention voted. The result: 30 aye, 27 nay.

North Carolina reversed her stand and ratified, 194 to 77, on November 21, 1789, nearly seven months after George Washington had been inaugurated President. Little Rhode Island, by May 29, 1790, at last tired of being left out in the cold, voted to come in by the narrowest margin, 34 to 32.

Baby Sam had pulled herself up in his crib and had learned to stand alone.

Chapter V

A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

WHAT was this Constitution whose adoption had at last united the United States? It seems wise to break stride here in this narrative and, in the cold perspective of a later age, examine that document and note how it operates in practice. Little did its framers contemplate in 1787, nor did those elected delegates to thirteen ratifying conventions dream, that the day might come when delegates to another great convention—a convention of the United Nations—might weigh the necessity for lifting the best and most practical features from a great unwritten English Constitution and a Federal Constitution of the United States of America to create an organ of decent government for two billion human animals and their progeny.

Many of those early Americans did live to see France become a republic with a president and senate and lower house. Some lived to learn that one after another of the Latin-American republics patterned their governments after those two Anglo-Saxon systems. Their children and grandchildren watched the idea of written constitutions sweep central and eastern Europe in 1830, in 1848, and in the years which followed. The British North America Act of 1867 created the Dominion of Canada and initiated the Commonwealth of Nations. The next generations saw the principles of Anglo-

American democracy as the ideals toward which to strive spread even to Asia and the Middle East. Some nations reached the constitution stage earlier than others did. Nearly all found themselves embroiled deeply in the death struggles of the twentieth century to make the world safe for the Four Freedoms.

In the course of evolution nearly every democratic people has known a period of totalitarianism. It was true of the Greeks when they produced their tyrants and Alexander the Great, but kept their city assemblies. It was true of the Romans when Cæsar established himself as a dictator, but the Senate was never destroyed. It was true of the English-speaking people when Cromwell made himself "The Protector," but Parliament did not die. It was true of the French when Napoleon made himself Emperor, but the French Assembly outlived him. It has been so with every Latin-American state without exception; all twenty of them have had their totalitarian eras, but not one of the dozens of dictators has dared to abolish Congress or Parliament. So it has been in recent years in the cases of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Poland, Germany, Russia, Japan, and others. Not a dictator since Alexander has dared to abolish the people's legislature, even though most of them have manipulated these "representative" bodies, and in the end, in all cases closed to date, Democracy has come forth stronger than before.

The persistence of the inherent idea of "Social Contract" is the most outstanding feature of history. Nearly all modern states have seen fit to reduce that contract to writing.

England's constitution does not exist as one separate document, but the law is written. Henry I's Charter of Liberties (A.D. 1100), John's Magna Carta (1215), the Bill of Rights (1689), the various Reform Bills, and other Parliamentary pronouncements, together with church law, common law, and decisions of the courts, all have made up a magnificent English Constitution. This great body is being put together over the centuries. There never has been any moment when it has been found necessary to write it out in one document and adopt it as an organ of government. Perhaps one reason for this lies in the fact that England, a closely knit geographic and

economic entity, has always had a royal family—a crown in which reposes a mystical yet tangible focal point for all that England has been and hopes to achieve, for all that is solid and decent and just. The Union Jack is but a supplementary symbol.

The framers of the Constitution of the United States did not necessarily realize that there was a great yawning lack of such a mystical yet tangible focal-point in America after the revolution against Tory George III. Those who ratified that Constitution did not know that they were actually filling that vacancy. That psychological something was not present at first, else George Washington and his grandiose concept of the Presidency would not have been hailed with such enthusiasm as they received. There were a few—just a few—who actually advocated election of Washington as King of America. But such an idea got nowhere, certainly not with Washington himself. Even so, he considered the Presidency to be an office of exalted dignity. In time—indeed, in a short time—as soon as it was recognized that the Presidency must be held by a mere politician, the Constitution began to receive an increasing reverence closely akin to that tendered the crown in Britain. That reverence as years went by became almost a fetish. The Stars and Stripes became a supplementary symbol.

Few Americans maintain that the Constitution is perfect. Most close observers will admit that it has some obvious weaknesses which are crying for correction. But all concede that it has stood the strain of a century and a half, during which the United States increased in population from four millions in 1790 to 135,000,000 in 1944, during which the area was expanded from 892,135 square miles to 3,738,393, including Alaska and a few islands, during which the states increased in number from thirteen to forty-eight, and during which the nation evolved from an isolated rural people to become a dominant world power—the greatest technological nation in a mechanical age. During that transformation the Constitution grew in stature because it stood the strain of national change.

In recent decades the Federal Government has grown in

power at the expense of the states. The reasons for this are wrapped up in the industrial revolution, inter-state and international commerce, national—even world-wide—economic depressions and world wars. States' rights was for a long time a great political issue, but a new compact age, in which the remotest farmer's livelihood depends upon national, even international policies, has forced the American citizen to focus his first attention upon the Federal rather than the State Government.

The Constitution created three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. Each was given power to defend itself against the ambitions of the other two.

The British Cabinet system, with a prime minister and other ministers depending upon a majority will, as expressed in the House of Commons, is entirely different from the executive branch of the American system. The President of the United States and his cabinet are not members of Congress.* The British Government resign when they lose their Parliamentary leadership. The American President is elected for one or more terms of four years each. The President is supposed to rise above party and execute the laws of the land as a president of the whole people. Actually few Presidents have been able to rise to this high degree of statesmanship. As long as there is a chance of being re-elected, or of dictating the succeeding party choice, or of carrying out the platform of the party, the temptation—indeed the necessity—to "play politics" is tremendous. The President is, like the Prime Minister, the titular head of his party.

The American Cabinet is not mentioned in the Constitution and is cloaked with just that amount of authority which the President gives it. Its members are the heads of executive departments and occasionally the Vice-President (who by constitutional provision is president of the Senate).

The President once a year reads or sends a message to Congress on "the state of the Union." He, of course, is not entitled

* No President since 1900 has ever been a member of Congress. In President Roosevelt's cabinet only one member, Mr. Cordell Hull, has ever been a Congressman, and, of course, he is not a member of Congress now.

to debate. He may send or read special messages expressing his convictions and desires at any time he deems it wise to do so, and thus he may call special sessions when he chooses; but he cannot call for special elections. He is not supposed to interfere in the regular elections, but as party leader his wishes always bear heavy weight. Even a highly popular President, though, will find it in bad political taste to try directly to impose his will upon the electorate in state politics, such as openly opposing the candidacy of certain men for Congress.

The President then does have some legislative power, though theoretically he has none. His messages often set the pattern of legislation. He indirectly imposes his will on Congress when behind the scene he tells his party leaders of each House what he wants enacted.

In England, His Majesty has the constitutional right to veto a bill adopted by both Houses of Parliament, but no monarch since Queen Anne has exercised that prerogative. Not so in the United States, where the chief executive has the right of veto. In that country a President may or may not sign a bill into law. If he does not sign it within ten days after its delivery to him, and if he does not send it back to Congress with a veto message, it becomes law. If he does veto it, the bill may be passed over his veto, but it must then receive a two-thirds majority in both houses, whereas the original adoption required only a majority approval in both houses. The President is then, as the constitutional executive, bound to enforce the law.

Should he violate the Constitution or in other ways prove himself unfit for his position, he may be impeached by the House of Representatives, tried before the Senate sitting as a court (as the Lords sometimes do), and dismissed from office; however, no President has ever been dismissed, and likewise no President has ever resigned from office.

In case of dismissal, resignation, impotence, or death, the President is succeeded by the Vice-President. The order of succession after that was established by an Act of 1887 as being: Secretary of State, and then "according to the seniority of the department," i.e., the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, etc.

In 1787 it was decided at the Constitution Convention that every state might maintain a militia. These organizations are composed of civilians who drill at night-time and go to camp for periodic training. The militia exists for emergency purposes, to back up the police in case of an internal riot or to aid in catastrophes. It is significant that they in time came to be known as "The National Guard," even though under command of individual states' governors. The militia never leaves its own state unless it is ordered out by the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the United States. That individual is the President.

The greatest compromise in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was in relation to representation in Congress. In this matter it was decided to have two Houses such as the mother country had. Each state, no matter what its size or population, would send two Senators to the upper House. The lower House, or House of Representatives, would be composed of the people's delegates, though of course they would represent their states as well. The Constitution stated specifically that the "number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but that each state shall have at least one Representative." It then stated that there should be held a census enumeration within three years of the meeting of the first Congress and that every ten years thereafter a new enumeration should be held. The first census was taken in 1790.

The Constitution further provided that Virginia, the largest state, should have ten Representatives; Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, eight each; New York and Maryland, six each; the Carolinas and Connecticut, five each; New Jersey, four; New Hampshire and Georgia, three each; and Delaware and "Rhode Island and Providence Plantations," the two smallest states, one each.

From a membership of 65 in 1789 the House of Representatives has grown in number to 435; but instead of having one member for each 30,000, there is now one for each 305,000, apportioned among the states according to the population as shown in the returns of the Census of 1940. The states are divided into Congressional Districts. The qualified voters of

each such District go to the polls every two years to elect their Representatives.

Senators hold office for terms of six years each. Every two years one-third of the Senators retire. They may, of course, meantime have run for re-election.

The annual salary of Congressmen, Senators or Representatives is \$10,000. They receive at government expense nicely furnished offices, secretarial help, travel expenses, postage, office supplies, and publication and distribution of speeches.*

The Constitution vested Congress with eighteen specific legislative powers. Among the expressed powers are those to regulate inter-state commerce, to provide currency, to tax, and to borrow. Congress regulates immigration and naturalization. It regulates the postal service, as well as the patent and copyright protective agencies. It provides for building cross-country highways. In matters of international law, or of punishment for crimes on the high seas Congress has a strong voice. Before any treaty is binding upon the U.S.A. it must be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. This provision of the Constitution is one of the few great mistakes made by the framers in 1787. The House of Representatives originates revenue bills, including expenses for the armed forces and the executive departments, and thus by "holding the purse-strings" is in a strong position to check any President who should proceed along unpopular lines.

In addition to the expressed powers Congress has many *implied* powers. The Constitution states that Congress may "make all laws necessary and proper" for carrying into operation the expressed powers. Interpretation of just what this means has resulted in Congressional attempts to go far beyond the popular concept of the authority of Congress.

The makers of the Constitution perhaps did not foresee that this temptation would arise, but they had created what later became a check upon Congress when they provided for the Federal judiciary. Quite early it was established that when

* The President receives an annual salary of \$75,000, plus \$25,000 incidental expenses and use of the White House. His base salary and other private income are, of course, subject to a highly graduated income tax.

the Supreme Court rules that an act of Congress or of a state legislature is unconstitutional, that act immediately becomes null and void and only an amendment to the Constitution or a reversal of court opinion may allow that legislation to return to the body of statute law. If an inferior Federal Court declares an act unconstitutional and the Supreme Court refuses an appeal to reverse the decision, the act is null and void. Thus the courts, in a sense, exercise a negative legislative function which may in effect represent a very positive influence.

The judiciary also exercises other functions. Before the Federal Courts there are tried cases arising out of treaties, or those of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; cases affecting all foreign interests, or those arising between states or citizens of different states. The Eleventh Amendment, added to the Constitution in 1798, stated, though, that no citizen of a different state or nation might bring suit in a Federal Court against a state.

The Constitution provides for amendments to itself. Proposals for amendments may originate by two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress or by action of two-thirds of the states. Such proposed amendments must be adopted by three-fourths of the states before the Constitution is changed. This conservative provision has allowed adoption of only those amendments which a good majority enthusiastically have desired.

There have been twenty-one amendments to the Constitution. The first ten are often spoken of as the "Bill of Rights." They are restrictions upon the national government in the same sense as their predecessors, the famous English statutes of 1689, were restrictions upon the British monarchy. They form a clear statement of the rights of the people, including freedom of expression and worship, the right to petition and to have jury trial. Article X provides that "powers not delegated to the United States . . . nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people."*

* Here is the Federal idea, well summarized in the American motto *E pluribus unum* [one created from many]. It is this Federal idea which originated in the Swiss Confederation which reached greater proportions in the case of the United States and which holds far greater possibilities for the United Nations.

Perhaps the framers of the Constitution thought it superfluous to incorporate the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Surely everyone took it for granted that English-speaking people would forever champion those rights. Even so, the fact that those first ten amendments were not a part of the original Constitution almost wrecked the whole programme. Quickly its champions explained to the people and their legislatures and the ratifying conventions that the ten amendments would be presented for incorporation immediately after the Constitution should be ratified by the nine states necessary to put it into operation. That promise was kept.

Here, then, is a brief résumé of the Constitution of the United States. In succeeding chapters the stories of other amendments and those of political parties, their fights, failures, and accomplishments under that Constitution, will be unfolded. Therein lies the drama of how a baby constitutional democracy thrived and developed until one day it should become the arsenal of democracy in a world striving to achieve a status in which John Locke's "natural rights" could be realized. Uncle Sam was to produce his Jeffersons and Jacksons, his Lincolns and Wilsons and Roosevelts while the mother country gave birth to her Mills and Bentham's, her Peels and Gladstones and Churchills. And one day together, with others, they should hold forth to a struggling mankind at large the prospects of International Constitutional Democracy.

Chapter VI

LITTLE SAMMIE LEARNS TO WALK ALONE (1789-1829)

GEORGE WASHINGTON is called the Father of His Country. The statement that he was "first in war, first in peace, first in the hearts of his countrymen" needs qualification, but it is quite true that his powerful hand was as influential in setting the course of peaceful internal development as it had been strong in prosecuting the War for Independence. In 1788 he had been elected by a unanimous vote. No other

President has been given that honour. He took the oath of office in New York, the first capital, on April 30, 1789.

The problems confronting President Washington and the first Congress were many. The nation had survived a very critical period, but discords and disagreements were everywhere in existence. Before there could be a real government, flesh and blood and muscle had to be added to the skeleton which was the Constitution. There were no moneys yet gathered on which to run the administration; there was no Federal court system yet established; in short, a new, revolutionary type of government had to establish itself, establish itself in the eyes of its own people and in those of the elder nations abroad. Baby Sam would have to learn to crawl before daring to stand and toddle alone.

It was necessary for the President and Congress to work out many details. Most of the members of the first Congress were Federalists who had worked for approval of the Constitution and could be expected to support the new government. But ever present were those who did not want a strong central government. They were the Anti-Federalists, soon to call themselves Republicans. The rich, aristocratic, and somewhat regal President Washington was not a party man in the modern sense of the word, but he did believe in a strong central government. He is thus identified with the Federalists. He had no "Cabinet," but the advisers whom he and his successors appointed soon came to be known as Cabinet members. The two most important advisers to the first President were the Federalist Alexander Hamilton of New York, Secretary of the Treasury, and the cultured Virginia Republican, Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State (for foreign affairs). The Vice-President was the polished John Adams, of Massachusetts, who in 1797 was to succeed Washington as President. The first "government" of the United States, then, was a sort of national coalition, but made up of wealthy gentlemen.

The first great problem of the new government was financial. Washington turned to Hamilton and Congress for its solution. The result was a tariff on incoming goods and an excise tax on distilled liquor. As important as procuring money was the establishment of the credit of the United States. This was

done first by redeeming, dollar for dollar, the notes already held against the government, by assuming the state debts, and by setting up the first Bank of the United States. Each of these steps brought a good deal of criticism, but they had the desired effect of drawing the more well-to-do classes to strong support of the government. Thus the new nation received its first solid food required to set in motion its vital organs. It was not a varied diet, and therefore not sufficient, but it did provide an important initial stimulus.

The most serious opposition to Hamilton's measures came as a result of the excise tax law. Many of the farmers of the western districts did not understand why they should pay a tax on their liquor when they could see little or no benefits from this tax. As had been the case two decades before, they now refused to be taxed by a distant government and rose in "rebellion." Washington immediately went into action and the so-called Whisky Rebellion of 1794 was put down without bloodshed. Suddenly the people had learned that they had a government—a national government which had the power to levy taxes and to collect moneys voted. It was a government of strength and citizens of the seaboard raised an approving eyebrow, but slave-owners and small farmers wrinkled theirs.

All this action brought clearly to the fore the political issue of Federalists v. Republicans. The Constitution had said nothing of political parties, and many people hoped that they would not develop. That hope was ill-founded. Political parties were destined to become an essential feature of American political life. The supporters of Hamilton's measures fell into a distinct group who believed that the Constitution was to be interpreted broadly—that is, that it provided for a very powerful Federal government which had been established largely in the interest of the wealthier seaboard classes. The opponents of the Hamilton theory believed in less national government. They placed first emphasis on the powers reserved to the states. They championed, first of all, the farmers' interests. Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, the leader of the latter, seeing the President relying almost wholly upon Hamilton, even in foreign affairs, resigned his portfolio on

January 1, 1794, and placed himself in opposition to Washington and the Federalists.

Domestic problems had been uppermost during Washington's first administration, but at the beginning of his second term (1793-1797) the new nation was faced with a most vital international decision. The French Revolution had broken out in 1789 and had become more and more radical. A European conflict had resulted by 1793, and the sympathy of the people of the United States was torn between support of England and support of France. Hamilton and the Federalists supported England, while Jefferson and the Republicans favoured the cause of the French Revolutionists. As long as George Washington was President, the United States remained neutral. John Adams, a Federalist, became President in 1794 after Washington had refused a third term. He and Hamilton were not personal friends. They were political opponents within the same party, but in foreign affairs they were both pro-British. The extreme radicalism of the French Revolution was abhorred by conservative men everywhere.

Then came the "XYZ Affair" in 1798. In one of the most brazen undertakings in diplomatic history (prior to the twentieth century), France attempted to make the United States pay an actual cash price for continued diplomatic respect and courtesy. It was flatly stated by three henchmen of Talleyrand (whom Adams simply called Messieurs X, Y, and Z) that if the French officials were not given \$250,000, then existing treaty obligations would be ignored and American ambassadors would not be accepted in Paris and war might result. In disgust the American diplomats returned home.

This incident provoked extreme anger in America. Not only was the infant nation's dignity hurt, but the insinuation that the United States had no honour was an insult which could not be tolerated. Perhaps it was impudence in the eyes of the older states for little Sam to show any temper at all. Even so, Adams sent his tiny fleet into action to enforce recognition of American integrity. The undeclared naval warfare was not ended until 1800, when Napoleon reversed the French policy. At that time the little Corsican had enough on his hands fight-

ing England and the Younger Pitt's coalition. Instead of having the Americans against him he would attempt to swing them into his camp. In this effort he failed, until England in 1812 made the effort of ignoring the rights of American seamen. By that time little Sam was learning to walk alone.

In the stress of foreign affairs the Federalists adopted the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. These laws increased the residence requirements for American citizenship and provided heavy penalties for criticism of the President and government. The Federalists said that these acts were necessary war measures. Actually they were not. They were obviously designed to try to stop the growing strength of the Republicans. Most immigrants were agrarians and therefore were not inclined to vote for Federalist candidates, who represented commercial and financial interests. By lengthening the time of residence in the United States before an immigrant could become an American citizen, and also by making it unlawful to criticize the government, the Federalists were guilty of playing a gross political game.

When several outspoken Republicans were convicted under the Sedition Act, the Republicans howled. The most important outcome was the adoption of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. These documents, sponsored by such prominent farmers as Madison and Jefferson, declared that the government had exceeded the powers that had been granted to it. According to these documents, each state, therefore, had the right "to judge the action it should take." Here was an ugly insinuation. Here was a rebellious spirit which might have led to the death of Uncle Sam in his infancy. Paradoxically, the very existence of the political party system saved the nation from disunion.

An impartial political observer looking at young America at the end of the eighteenth century could very easily have noted some basic principles at work. He could have felt a discontent even within the old Federalist party which had been the guiding spirit in the Revolution and in the formulation of the first workable government. He might easily have recognized that there had to be an increase in the powers of the central government, but that at the same time there was a

rising determination that the government should not be run exclusively by the moneyed classes. These factors, plus a new and rapid development of the agrarian West, were now combining to produce a reaction against the Federalists.

In November 1800 the Federalist President John Adams stood for re-election, but the Republican Thomas Jefferson decisively defeated him. Jefferson perhaps correctly termed this election the "revolution of 1800." Certainly it marks an important step forward in democracy. Jefferson's inauguration in 1801 in the new capital city of Washington brought in a new era of American political development. This brilliant Virginian was quite informal in public life. By breeding, education, and marriage Jefferson was of the upper class. By thought, word, and deed he had become the champion of the common man.

The legislative and executive branches of the government were now in the hands of the new party; but the judiciary, headed by John Marshall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, remained in the control of the Federalists. The conflict between the two parties, then, was not over; it was yet to lead to many complications. The threat of disunion was to stalk the land for years to come. Here was a childhood disease which one day was destined to carry young Sam nearly to his grave.

The early years of the nineteenth century saw foreign affairs once more assume prime importance. The Barbary pirates of the northern coasts of Africa for decades had exacted tribute from the commerce of all nations in the Mediterranean. This toll the United States refused to pay. Violence resulted and little Sam was found not wanting in courage. Between 1801 and 1805, while Europe was engaging in larger affairs centring around Napoleon, the young United States appointed itself an international constabulary and put a definite end to piracy off the coast of North Africa. Uncle Sam believed in freedom of the seas.

More significant was the effect of the European situation on the United States. The Napoleonic wars had recessed in 1802-1803. Meanwhile, the little Corsican was expanding his plans for empire to include the New World. In 1800 he had tricked Spain into relinquishing Louisiana to France. The fact that

the farmers of the new western states of Tennessee and Kentucky and the frontiersmen of the Ohio Valley did not have good roads across the Alleghenies and thus easy transportation to the markets of the East made these western producers dependent upon river transportation. The Ohio and the Tennessee river systems empty into the Mississippi, which flows southward to New Orleans and the high seas. Louisiana was at that time all that tremendous expanse immediately west of the Mississippi. It also included the Gulf port of New Orleans. Jefferson realized that these western people must have a transportation outlet or they would be lost to the United States. He knew, too, Napoleon's insatiable ambition. But the French Emperor's efforts in Santo Domingo had just then met with failure; the war with England was about to be renewed; and France was in need of money. Suddenly in 1803 Napoleon sold all the 828,000 square miles of expanse known as Louisiana Territory to the United States for \$15,000,000! Uncle Sam thus acquired complete control of the great Mississippi River, the "Father of Waters," and in the same transaction almost doubled his size. The people of the West not only drew a sigh of relief but glowed with a new pride in their nation. Before long this tremendous region of the West was crossed for the first time by English-speaking white men. Americans under commission of the Federal Government in 1804-1806 blazed a trail all the way to the Pacific. The vast trans-Mississippi was soon part of the gigantic stage of one of the world's great dramas—the American Westward Movement.

The wars growing out of the French Revolution had been going on for more than a decade, but the United States had participated only to the extent of the undeclared naval warfare with France in 1798-1800. As the war lines were drawn more tightly, however, the new American republic moved closer to the catastrophe. Thomas Jefferson, the great liberal philosopher, had at first championed the ideas of "liberty, equality, fraternity." The bloodshed of Paris and the international entanglements he deplored. Then, when the ambitious Napoleon turned the struggle into one for world power for reasons of his own, Jefferson recoiled. He was no longer pro-French. Neither was he pro-English. He was just pro-

American and thus was truly desirous of keeping his little nation at peace. When the older nations, engaging in a death struggle, ignored completely the rights of little Sam, Jefferson resorted to the weak policy of trying to keep American ships at home. The lucrative trade with the belligerents, though, was too great a force. Jefferson managed to steer a neutral course, but his successor, James Madison (1809-1817), could not.

European wars are highly contagious diseases, and try as he will, Uncle Sam has never been able to quarantine himself. So it was in the early nineteenth century. Napoleon was trying to starve England into submission by his "Continental System," that is by forbidding any continental nation to trade with Englishmen. Britain had retaliated by blockading all continental ports to anybody's trade. Both sides were violating—indeed had discarded—the whole concept of freedom of the seas. The atmosphere of the whole Atlantic world was charged.

Before Jefferson's second administration was half over, an anti-British sentiment was growing—anti-British rather than anti-French because it was British naval power rather than French land strength which was wrecking American commerce.

France after Trafalgar had been driven from the seas and England was left as the only sea power to interfere with trans-oceanic trade. War commerce had been so lucrative that American shipowners were able to hire English sailors at better wages than warring British concerns could pay. This would have been tolerable had the Americans confined their trade to British ports, but the Americans loudly shouted "Freedom of the seas!" This was most exasperating to hard-pressed Britain, whose man-power shortage was acute. The order was given to stop and search American ships, and when a sailor looked like an Englishman to haul him on board the British vessel. Naturally, many American seamen were thus pressed into English service despite howls of protest. The British Government ignored American demands that the impressment cease. President Madison was in turn exasperated. The British seized more Americans. At this point, when another protest was lodged, the British ambassador to Washington foolishly in-

sulted President Madison. He was sent home. Violence was not long delayed.

Violation of neutral rights was not, however, the only cause of the war of 1812. Another factor in bringing on the war was a belligerent spirit of a group of young Congressmen from New York, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee. They were beginning to talk loudly of taking Canada from England and Florida from Spain. The British had never fully withdrawn from the region south of the Great Lakes and now were suspected of being in full intrigue with the Indians of that region. This suspicion gave strength to the arguments of the young "War Hawks" in Congress. By 1812 the Tennessee-Ohio-Great Lakes region had grown remarkably, so much, in fact, that the section held the balance of political power. These frontiersmen were a tough, uncompromising, and now extremely nationalistic lot. They lost no time in pushing the nation into war against Britain in June, 1812.

The new country was ill-prepared for her "second war of independence." The army and navy had not been greatly strengthened because Jefferson had stressed economy for eight years. Madison, likewise, was a man of peace. The declaration of war was not greeted with a unifying enthusiasm. Some sections were bitterly opposed to the war. The National Bank had ceased to exist in 1811, and the raising of money was a difficult matter. The mercantile class, which had the money, was against the war, and the loss of foreign trade reduced the revenue. Finally, the leadership of the American land forces was, in the main, old and incompetent. Had the young nation made a childish mistake?

The war began rather favourably for the United States on the sea, with a small and daring navy winning many victories. The British Navy, however, supreme since Trafalgar in 1805, was too powerful. American naval and commercial vessels were practically driven from the seas before the end of the conflict, but not until some 2,500 British merchant vessels had been sunk or captured and marine insurance rates had risen to almost prohibitive figures. Privateers alone captured over 1,300 British ships. The convoy system was established, but not until 1814 did it prove to be effective. On land the British were victorious

in America until the summer of 1813. Then, under the leadership of William Henry Harrison, the Americans began to win back some of the territory they had lost in the north. Several attempts to invade Canada had failed because of poor military co-ordination and the refusal of many of the troops to leave the United States. On the other hand, British invasions from Canada had also failed.

After the initial defeat of Napoleon in 1814 the British dispatched two strong expeditions—one to take the eastern seaboard, the other to take the Gulf coast. The former met with some success. The city of Washington was captured temporarily; the Capitol, the President's mansion, and other public buildings were set on fire. The government, of course, had retired from Washington. When this British force attempted to take the near-by city of Baltimore, it was repulsed with heavy losses.* Meantime, the force sent to attack from the south was meeting stiff resistance. It was disastrously defeated by Andrew Jackson of Tennessee at the Battle of New Orleans two weeks after peace had been declared.

This whole conflict was most unpopular in England, and surely was regretted widely in America. The British historian T. F. Tout expressed the opinion of both sides later when he wrote: "It was a wasteful and unnecessary war, which might have been avoided had both parties shown more tact and good sense." Peace negotiations had been in spasmodic progress almost from the outset. The basic arguments of the negotiators never were settled, yet both sides wanted peace. Finally, the Czar of Russia (who wanted all Britain's energy to be directed against Napoleon) pointed out how utterly ridiculous the whole conflict was and persuaded London and Washington to end the foolish struggle. Commissioners met in Holland and signed the Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814. The treaty provided for cessation of hostilities, but failed even to mention the issues which had led to war.

The War of 1812 did, however, have some definite results.

* Francis Scott Key, a witness to the engagement "in the dawn's early light" of September 13, 1814, scribbled the words which later, when sung to an old German tune, became "The Star-Spangled Banner." Still later, in 1931, Congress adopted this song as the national anthem.

The British had learned that it was unwise to ignore the young kicking brat across the Atlantic. He had an annoying way of commanding respect. Other European nations recognized this fact too. The Americans on their part learned a few hard-earned lessons. They succeeded during this period (immediately after the war) in taking Florida from Spain (which they paid for in 1819), but the idea of adding Canada to their territorial expanse was now definitely out. Having blown off some steam in international affairs, the young republic then turned its whole attention toward internal development.

A new nationalism was the theme of the administration of James Monroe, who came to the Presidency in 1817, the fourth and last of the so-called "Virginia Dynasty." During the preceding fifteen years, the New England area had made considerable advances in manufacturing. So important had commerce become that many New England merchants were traitorous to the United States during the War of 1812 and had actually launched a strong secession movement. This move died with the end of the war, but the Massachusetts politicians did not cease their efforts to turn the new nationalist spirit to the advantage of their sectional interests. In Congress they preached that this new manufacturing development could be of great importance to the country as a whole, but that the infant industries, unless protected by a heavy import tax, would be destroyed by Britain's "dumping" of goods on the western shores of the Atlantic. The result was the Tariff of 1816. This act added a heavy duty to the sales price of imported articles and thus gave the home manufacturers protection against the very low prices which the British could afford to charge temporarily, in order to keep the market for themselves. This "protection" idea, already advanced first in Hamilton's tariff of 1789, was to become a deep-rooted principle in the American concept of nationalism. It could not be foreseen in the early years that the "favourable balance of trade" theories whereby each nation tried to sell more than it bought were to contribute one day to world-wide depressions and conflict.

In order to carry their tariff progress through Congress, the New England representatives made a bargain with Western politicians. The National Bank, which might provide easy

credits for expansion, was re-chartered in 1816 as a prospective aid to national prosperity. Also a system of roads and canals in the West and South was begun. Henry Clay, of Kentucky, the leader of the West, combined the protective tariff principle, internal improvements at Federal expense, the bank, and distribution of money derived from the sale of public lands into what was known as the "American System." The Republican party, which had defeated the Federalists and driven them from the political field, seemed to be on its way to becoming as strongly Federal as had been the followers of Hamilton. The South watched all this with quizzical eyes—maybe it was a good thing, maybe it was not. Southerners were willing to give it a try.

The chief reason for this so-called "era of good feeling" (1817-1825), in which there was no great two-party battle, is not hard to understand. The war had been a costly thing, especially in blood, and the whole nation had suffered.* Only New England had failed to give unstinted support to the government. The patriotism thus engendered was carried over into the post-war era. To be sure there were still great sectional interests which for a while had supplanted class struggles. But now each section looked to the Federal Government for aid in its economic programme. New England and the Middle Atlantic states were turning to manufacturing and trade, and wanted protective tariffs and strong national finances. The new western states were looking for transportation for their wheat and other agricultural produce and therefore championed Federal roads and canals. The South was willing to purchase manufactured articles elsewhere as long as it could sell its cotton, tobacco, and naval stores to England and the North. Each of these sections looked to the Federal Government for support and, for a while, seemed willing to forget sectional rivalries. At least these rivalries were for the moment not of major importance, for in reality the differing economies tended to complement each other. All the while the nation was growing as a whole. Each year saw a great influx of immigrants from war-weary Europe. Large families, too, were the rule; in-

* War costs: \$200,000,000; and 30,000 killed or about two per cent of the white adult male population.

deed, half the increase in population between 1790 and 1828 was purely American. In 1790 there were less than 4,000,000 inhabitants. Thirty-eight years later there were three times as many. The states had grown in number from thirteen to twenty-four.

The Constitution left to Congress the details of procedure whereby new states would be admitted to the Union. The only restriction it places is this: ". . . no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress." The states are as different in size and population in relation to each other as are the shires of England, but before the law they are equal. Not one of the forty-eight states, whether one of the original thirteen or those three admitted in recent years (Oklahoma, 1907, New Mexico and Arizona, 1912), has any special privilege. When the people of a territory believe that their country has reached a stage of such importance as to warrant statehood, and when certain minimum requirements have been met, a petition is submitted to Congress. An Enabling Act is then presented to Congress and if adopted the territory is "enabled" to elect delegates to a state constitutional convention. When the people have adopted that constitution it is submitted to Congress for approval. A resolution is adopted whereby the territory is declared to be a state and whereby there are admitted to Congress the new state's two Senators and its one or more Representatives. Thus there is created one more member of the United States.

By 1821 eleven new states had been admitted to the Union. Except for Vermont (1791) and Maine (1820), both in New England, and Missouri (1821), west of the Mississippi, all of these were in the country between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. Louisiana, through which the Mississippi passes as it empties into the Gulf of Mexico, was admitted to statehood in 1812. Kentucky (admitted in 1792) by 1829 had a population of 564,317. It was larger than any of the older states except New York (1,372,812), Virginia (1,065,366), Pennsylvania (1,049,458), and North Carolina (638,829). Ohio

(1803), just north of Kentucky, was even larger. Its population was 581,434. Tennessee, just south of Kentucky and west of Virginia, had been admitted to the Union in 1796. By 1820 its frontier population numbered 422,823. The other new states were: Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819).

President James Monroe was almost unanimously re-elected in 1820. His second term saw continued progress at home, a foreign policy of strength, but the beginnings of internal discord. In the course of the Napoleonic wars the South American colonies, under the leadership of José San Martín and Simón Bolívar, had revolted from Spain. New republican forms of government patterned after the American Constitution sprang up from Patagonia to Louisiana, much to the satisfaction of Great Britain, whose manufacturers at last had free access to a great Spanish American market. When the wars were over and Europe fell under the repressive heel of Metternich and his "Concert," the reactionaries on the Continent began secretly to consider the restoration of the Latin American colonies to the Spanish crown. Noting possible European intervention, Monroe, beginning on March 8, 1822, recognized the independence of the Latin American republics. Already George Canning, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was doing the same thing. When he learned of a definite plan of the Holy Alliance to restore the Indies to Spain and thus perhaps once more to curtail free trade, he sprang into action. Immediately he informed President Monroe of the scheme and suggested an Anglo-American pronouncement designed to prevent such. At the suggestion of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, with old Thomas Jefferson's concurrence, Monroe declined Canning's offer and proceeded on his own responsibility to promulgate an ambitious hemispheric policy which remains to this day a keystone in American international commitments. It is called the Monroe Doctrine. In his message to Congress in December, 1823, the President stated to all the world that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open for European colonization and that any such attempt would be looked upon as "an act unfriendly to us." Years later when Bismarck, in looking for fields of German expansion, ran head

on into this Monroe Doctrine, he pronounced it the world's greatest example of "international impertinence." As for the far-sighted George Canning in the 1820's, all he could do was to acquiesce. He had already told Parliament: "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

The internal issue which was to disturb the relative quiet of the period was that of slavery. Indeed the Negro question has always presented extreme difficulties. During the Revolutionary War period there was strong opposition to slavery and a desire to see the importation of Africans stopped. Thomas Jefferson and other northern slave owners decried the whole system and sought means to bring it to an end. Then came the invention of the cotton gin in 1793. From that date forward the production of cotton became the chief industry of the South. Only in the cotton-producing South did slavery remain economically feasible. The great cotton boom in the early nineteenth century came as a result of the development of the Midlands textile industry in England and of the ability of English merchants to sell all the cotton cloth which could be manufactured—these factors saddled slavery upon the South and the fate of a nation was sealed. The influence of the mother country for many decades to come was to remain a potent force in the history of Uncle Sam.

As the young nation grew in strength, as new states entered the Union, the older states felt their positions becoming relatively less important. If a common economy should cause the formation of political blocs in Congress, the older northern states and also Virginia might lose their political dominance. The South, living largely by agriculture, already was opposed to protective tariffs. The northern states spoke out loudly against admitting any more slave states. This opposition had long been present, but burst into the open when Missouri in 1819 had asked to come in as a slave state. After nearly two years of political bickering, a compromise was finally reached whereby Missouri was admitted with slavery and Maine came in as a free state. It was provided also that no other states in the Louisiana Purchase north of 36° 30', the southern border of Missouri, should have slaves. This "Missouri Compromise" did not settle the great issue. It was too big for that. It was

easily recognized that here was a problem which actually might one day lead to bloodshed and even disunion.

As the various peoples moved to the West, they came into contact with a life entirely different from that of the older regions. They were on the frontier, that edge of civilization which moved ever forward with brave and tough pioneers and their wives and children.

It seems worth while to pause here and note that there is an important school of American historians which holds that the frontier in American history was far more important as a creative and moulding process than it was as a geographical entity. Certainly it may not be denied that the process of winning a new area for civilization brought great changes in the people involved, changes which were reflected to the whole nation. It placed rich and poor on almost the same level; it created and promoted resourcefulness and adaptability; it moulded Irishmen, Germans, Scotsmen, Dutchmen, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and others into Americans. It began in 1607 and ended only with the last decade of the nineteenth century. Here over a span of eighty-three per cent of the years since Jamestown was founded the forces of freedom and individual initiative were at work. Here at least one great phase of democracy was in action. At the same time here was a people generally familiar with the niceties of civilization geographically separated from cultured centres and now faced with the rudimentary business of wrestling with Nature—Nature in the raw. The conquest of almost limitless bountiful forests and plains and valleys and hills gave an exuberance and swashbuckling devil-may-care flavour to the pioneer. It also promoted wastefulness, boastfulness, and a certain dislike of governmental restraint. The frontier had a mighty influence for good; it also had its evil influence. In short, for nearly three centuries it was a dominant force in America. It is gone now, but the character of the people it helped mould remains—for good or evil—a potent force in the history of mankind at large.

Land was, of course, always a great problem to the new settler. The government had first established its land policies in 1785 and 1787. Even before the adoption of the Constitution the states had voluntarily surrendered their western land

claims (based on royal grants) to become a part of the great national land reserve. There was then plenty of land to be settled. It could be sold to frontiersmen at a nominal price. But even the small sum of \$2 per acre was found to be too expensive when it was required that cash be paid. In 1800 a change was made by which credit was allowed and the price was decreased. This law was satisfactory until after the War of 1812, when the new national spirit, land hunger, and the "wildcat" banks brought about a buying spree that helped produce the "Panic of 1819."

The result was that land purchase was again placed on a cash basis, but an individual could now purchase eighty acres for one hundred dollars. This new law allowed thousands to join the Westward Movement. Many others found it still less expensive simply to move across the Louisiana border into the Mexican state of Texas.

Manufacturing interests, high tariffs, cotton culture, slavery, land prices, new states, and the frontier—all these new factors with their complications caused many rifts in the Republican party. The election of 1824 found five candidates for President, all Republicans in name. No candidate received a majority of the electoral votes; thus, as the Constitution provided, it fell to the House of Representatives to make the selection. In that voting the westerner Henry Clay rather unwillingly supported the scholarly and cultured New Englander, John Quincy Adams, whose nationalist principles were akin to those of Clay himself. This support brought about the defeat of the rough frontier hero, Andrew Jackson, who had polled the largest original vote of any of the candidates. When Clay was appointed Secretary of State, the followers of Jackson felt that there had been a "corrupt bargain." Tennessee had sent Jackson to the Senate, but the General resigned to conduct a three-year campaign for the presidential nomination.

The positive philosophy of America that there should be no restrictions to personal advancement did not go unchallenged in the early decades of American history. The Federalists, indeed perhaps a majority of the framers of the Constitution, were at heart quite class-conscious. They believed in aristocracy. They felt that the young nation needed a ruling

electd Vice-President. Shortly afterwards the defeated Adams astonished the nation by getting himself elected to the House of Representatives, where he was destined to finish a distinguished career many years later. He died in the House chamber in 1848 at the age of eighty.

The full significance of the election of Jackson was not realized in 1828. The issues were not at all clear-cut. Some voters cast their ballots for him simply because they thought he had been cheated out of the Presidency in 1824. These people felt that they themselves had thus been cheated and they determined to prove that they had political rights and strength. Men of all shades of opinion voted for the popular hero—high protectionists and free traders, Missourians and New Yorkers, States' Rights men and nationalists. In regard to this situation the American historian Channing appropriately wrote:

Most of them would have been entirely unable to give any reason for their position, except a desire for change and a feeling that, with Jackson's election, there would be an end to the traditions which up to that time had guided the government—an expectation in which they were abundantly justified by the events. . . . The victory, such as it was, was undoubtedly a triumph of the new forces of unrest in political and social life.

It was a strange new crowd that trooped into the village of Washington to witness the inauguration of Jackson on March 4, 1829. As usual, there were ladies and gentlemen bedecked in all their early nineteenth-century finery; there were southern planters, New England manufacturers, eastern bankers, and foreign diplomats strutting in all their dignity. But the capital witnessed something bewildering and strange. For the first time Pennsylvania Avenue saw throngs of noisy, tobacco-chewing frontiersmen carrying long-barrelled squirrel rifles, and wearing caps made of raccoon skins with the tails dangling down behind. Many of them had brought full jugs of western "moonshine" along with them. They intended to see Andy "inaugurated correct."

The President's Mansion was now called the White House.

It had been renovated and painted white so as to hide some of the smoke stains left after the British had set it afire in 1814. Immediately after Chief Justice Marshall had administered the inaugural oath the whooping crowd followed the new President into the White House for the reception. It was a riot. Well-"spiked" punch was served. In the jam it could hardly be told whether the noisy mass had come to partake of the punch and food or to pump the hand of the General. Things finally got so bad, with men actually mounting satin settees with their muddy boots and others ramming the President back into a corner, that Andy yelled to someone to move the punch-bowls outdoors. The Chief Executive extricated himself by adroitly climbing from a window. Whether the crowd was following him or the alcohol is not definitely known. At any rate, the White House furniture was thus saved for use on future, more sedate occasions. Editorial comment later was that if the celebrants had ruined the furniture they would have been exercising a prerogative, for, after all, it was their property and this at last was their government.

When the news of this astounding spectacle reached the staid courts of Europe, an utterly false and long-lasting impression was made. All Americans were immediately catalogued as loud, uncouth ruffians. Casual observers could not see in 1829, beneath all of this, the great internal forces of a new exuberant Democracy at work.

After 1812 the adult nations across the sea had learned to proffer respect to the young nation in external affairs. Had there been possible a more penetrating examination in 1829 it might well have been noted abroad that little Sammie in several considerations since 1783 had learned to walk alone.

Chapter VII

GROWING PAINS

THE man who came to the White House in 1829 had been a successful lawyer, planter, Indian fighter, Senator, and general in the United States army. Andrew Jackson felt that

he was one of the people and that the government should be run for and by the people. To him one man was as good as another. Office-holders did not need special training. In fact, he believed more might be lost by keeping a man in office a long time than would be gained by retaining him because of his experience. The new President, a professional soldier of long standing, also believed fully in the philosophy: "To the victor belong the spoils." Immediately, therefore, upon inauguration he dismissed a large proportion of the public officials, appointed his own supporters, and then proceeded to rotate them in office. It did not bother him much that he was accused of being a "spoils" politician. Nor were his accumulated enemies strong enough to deny him a second term.

Jackson's first administration was a stormy one. He was one of the most dynamic presidents in American history. He made changes, right and left. The new democracy with its spirit of unrest was in the driver's seat. That unrest, though, was not just the fruition of pent-up emotion. There was something sinister in it.

The basic spirit which produced Jackson was a healthy thing, but the accompanying sectional animosity was not. Sectionalism had become more and more pronounced as the varying types of economy had become increasingly distinctive. The first serious trouble had come over the Tariff of Abominations of 1828. Very soon after this measure had been passed, John C. Calhoun had protested in the "South Carolina Exposition" against the actions of the central government. Calhoun had been a strong nationalist, but was fast becoming the champion of sectionalism or State Rights. His southern state, strictly agricultural, slave-holding, cotton-producing, was composed of fearless Anglo-Saxon planters and farmers with a touch of French Huguenot blood. They already had no love for "Damn Yankees," as New Englanders were even then called.

In 1829 Calhoun had become Vice-President, but this did not keep him from supporting his state against the central government. South Carolina was the first state to experience a relative economic decline. Some of its land was already being

worn out from constant one-crop cultivation and the West was now beckoning to its younger generations. The tariff was hated with a passion, for it only added to the cost of living for the people of a state in which little manufacturing existed. There was, of course, no tariff on agricultural produce; indeed, no "protection" was needed, for there was no foreign producer of cotton, or rice, or forest products which could "dump" such goods on South Carolina. Southerners everywhere felt that the protective tariff was a burden placed squarely upon their shoulders—and there was no compensating good which the Federal Government could offer. It served to revive the constitutional argument over which was more important, a state's rights or the Federal authority. New England had been on the edge of secession in 1814, but that section had been appeased with a monetary consideration which the South was paying in large part, and without compensation. What good was the Union to the South if it should occupy a position closely akin to that of a colonial holding for the New England manufacturers? So argued the South.

Suddenly the legislature of South Carolina brought the issue into bold relief when it passed an act declaring the 1828 tariff null and void and threatened to secede from the Union unless it were repealed. After a considerable length of time, Congress passed an act which lowered the tariff, but at the same time Congress, in the "Force Bill," gave the President authority to force a state to obey Federal laws. South Carolina forthwith repealed its law which had declared the Tariff of 1828 null and void, but immediately passed another act nullifying the "Force Bill." Each side claimed the victory; but the issue was not settled. Here was the basis of a terrible constitutional argument which one day was to bring Uncle Sam close to death.

Andrew Jackson believed in democracy. He believed in majority rights first of all. Minorities, whether they be sections or classes, he damned. That, at least, was the game he played so long as it did not interfere with his own politics, and it usually enhanced his prestige. After his re-election in 1832 he destroyed the National Bank because the debtor classes hated it, and he proceeded to make war on all moneyed interests. He was opposed, too, to internal improvements at Federal expense,

but this was largely a political move—aimed at Henry Clay—rather than one based upon conviction. During his two administrations he continued to champion the rights of the common man. He vetoed a few bills desired by the seaboard interests. Easterners, therefore, mockingly dubbed him “King Andrew of the Royal Veto.” To satisfy the demands of the frontiersmen the Federal Government undertook to remove all Indian tribesmen to lands beyond the Mississippi River. Two new states were admitted to the Union during Jackson’s second administration, one slave (Arkansas, 1836), one free (Michigan, 1837). They both adopted liberal constitutions, and older states removed many restrictions. Meantime, many more offices were being made elective rather than appointive; terms of office were being shortened; property qualifications for voters were being lessened or abolished; and other undemocratic features were being abandoned. Democracy was rapidly becoming a reality.

Jackson’s party changed its name from Republican to Democratic. The old Federalists had disappeared. Their political descendants and other anti-Jackson men, led by the Kentuckian Henry Clay, took the liberal term Whig as the name of their party.

Both parties now adopted the convention method of nominating candidates for President. Delegates from all the states were elected by party members to attend the nominating conventions. In each convention a separate candidate for President was nominated. Thus the people henceforth were to have more choice in selecting the candidates than they had known under the former plan of allowing state legislatures the privilege of nominating candidates.*

* Once having selected their man, all good party men work for the election, some months later, of their particular party standard-bearer. This political custom is still used in America. The excitement at these party conventions sometimes reaches almost ridiculous proportions. It is a feature of American politics which foreigners often find bewildering. The shouting, carrying of banners, speech-making, and inebriation here show the old game of party politics carried to hilarious extremes. Even so, it is serious business and every American knows it. The nominating conventions are held in the spring and summer of the leap year; the national election is on the first Tuesday of November, and until 1937 the inauguration was on March 4 of the following year. The lapse of time had been necessary in the days of poor transportation and communica-

Jackson left office in 1837 in a blaze of glory. He was so powerful that he easily dictated the choice for his successor. That man, strangely enough, was not a champion of the frontiersmen, but the New Yorker Martin Van Buren, who had been Vice-President from 1833 to 1837. The new President was destined to fall heir to misfortunes for which he was not responsible.

In the process of destroying the National Bank, Jackson had removed Federal moneys to many smaller financial concerns generally known as the "pet banks." This, and other measures, immediately produced an inflation which seemed for a while to be real prosperity. Actually, there was prosperity, but it was not necessarily the result of Jackson's loose financial measures. The whole era was one of speculation and over-expansion. Many people had borrowed money to buy land because they felt that great profits could be reaped from the rising prices. Many canals and railroads were being built. Local banks had increased from about 300 in 1829 to nearly 800 in 1837. There was little or no real money to back the notes issued by these banks, and more than 600 of them closed their doors in 1837. Prices fell, people were thrown out of work, credit no longer existed, and the country's economic system almost came to a halt. The special session of Congress did very little to help the people. The depression eventually just "wore itself out."

The Whigs won the election of 1840, but the new President, William Henry Harrison, died a month after his inauguration. The Vice-President, John Tyler, who now in 1841 succeeded to the Presidency, was of the Jeffersonian (conservative liberal) stamp rather than the Jacksonian. Tyler's administration is to be remembered more for its foreign policy than for social legislation.

Texas, that great expanse of territory lying west of the southern state of Louisiana and north-west of the Gulf of Mexico, is three times the size of the United Kingdom. It was a part of Spanish-owned Mexico in all the early centuries

tion. The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, generally known as the "Lame Duck Amendment," adopted in 1933, provides for inaugurations to take place at noon on January 20, the New Congress having assembled on the third day of January.

of American colonization. Just before Mexico became independent, in 1821, many Anglo-Saxon Americans were moving into the Texas area. The first of these of great importance were Moses and Stephen Austin of north-eastern origin. The Mexican government had formulated a very liberal land policy whereby large tracts of land were given to "empresarios" who would bring two hundred families to the region. These "empresarios" charged only about twelve and one-half cents per acre for land. (The cheapest price in the United States was \$1.25.) Thousands of Americans poured into the region; most of them were from the South and were accompanied by their slaves. Cotton culture and cattle-raising became the chief pursuits.

There in Texas large numbers of Anglo-Americans were coming face to face with people of a different race (mixed Spanish and Indian). The Americans refused to amalgamate and settled in separate societies. Different ideals, different habits, different religions, and different ideas of government naturally led to a growing friction between these two peoples. A clash was inevitable. In 1827 and 1829 efforts to purchase the area had been made, but Mexico had refused to sell. The Mexicans had suspected Jackson of encouraging a revolution. In 1830 they had placed many restrictions on the Americans already there, had prohibited slavery, and had refused to allow any more Americans to come into Texas. Feelings mounted; conditions grew worse. Suddenly in 1835 Texas revolted against Mexican rule. On March 2, 1836, the "Lone Star Republic" declared its independence.

In the early part of the war about one hundred and fifty Texans were trapped in a fort called the Alamo. The last few men surrendered and were shot in cold blood. This terrible action aroused the Texans to fury. They soon used "Remember the Alamo" as their battle-cry. The tide of battle changed in favour of the Texans. They got their revenge under the leadership of Sam Houston in the battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. Nearly every member of the Mexican force was killed or captured. The leader, Santa Anna, was taken prisoner and forced to agree to Texan independence.

Texas then was a nation and chose Sam Houston as presi-

dent. Soon afterwards a petition was sent to Congress asking that Texans, as a slave state, be annexed to the United States. President Jackson avoided the issue for fear of splitting his party. President Van Buren was opposed to extending slavery for several reasons. In particular he did not want to face the political question of giving the South two more votes in the Senate, which admission of a new southern state would entail. He purposely showed little interest in Texas' request. President Harrison had almost the same attitude as Van Buren had held, but President Tyler (a southerner) was an expansionist. Even so, he hated to champion a measure which would force into the open the sectional issues involved; then too, he knew, annexation might easily lead to war with Mexico. Thus the problem stood unsolved from 1836 until 1844.

At this juncture old Mother England made a tactical blunder. Sir Robert Peel, quite conscious of the potentials of Uncle Sam and also of the "balance of power," was definitely opposed to American expansion either into the South-West or into the North-West. England claimed the Oregon country and was interested also in California. Negotiations of favoured nation commercial relations between the Republic of Texas and the United Kingdom were quietly undertaken. Such, of course, could not be kept secret. When Secretary of State Calhoun proclaimed the British designs in 1844, instantly nationalism rose to supersede all obstacles of sectionalism.

Meantime, there was a national election coming. James K. Polk, a Democrat, was "stumping" the country on the catch slogan of "reannexation of Texas and the reoccupation of Oregon." Henry Clay, the Whig candidate for the Presidency, took a rather indefinite stand on the Texas issue and thus lost the election of 1844. President Tyler, during the last months of his administration, considered the election of Polk as a vote for taking Texas in. A joint resolution enabling Texas to join the Union was adopted by Congress on March 3, 1845, the last day of the Tyler administration. Texas soon afterward became one of the states.

Mexico still considered Texas as her territory, even though for nine years no effort had been made to reconquer the young English-speaking republic. Immediately upon the admission

of Texas as one of the United States, Mexico recalled her minister to Washington and broke diplomatic relations with the offending nation. Arguments over settlement of citizens' claims and over whether the Rio Grande should be the border led to armed conflict. In much of this the United States was definitely to blame. No real effort at arbitration was made by either side. The United States did offer to buy one strip of disputed territory, but Mexico did more than refuse. Many Mexicans believed that Uncle Sam was so divided over the slavery issue that he could easily be defeated. Misconception, bravery, anger, and disappointment combined to lead the Mexican government to order its artillery into action. After two battles had been fought, Congress declared war against Mexico early in May, 1846.

The Latin American state was no match for the thriving young nation to the north. Three successful campaigns launched against her proved her undoing. General Zachary Taylor crossed into Mexico and soon won great victories at Monterey and Buena Vista. Meanwhile, California, away out on the Pacific coast, long neglected and struggling under obsolete laws, had revolted from Mexico and then had sent an expedition eastward toward Texas to seize, in the name of the United States, all the intervening country from which in time five tremendous western states were to be formed. Early the next spring General Winfield Scott landed an invasion force at Vera Cruz on the Gulf shore of Mexico. After a series of sharp engagements this army captured Mexico City.

With the fall of the capital the Mexican General Santa Anna sued for peace. The result was the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848. Therein, the Rio Grande was set as the boundary between Mexico and the United States. California and the land to the east of it—about 500,000 square miles—were ceded to the United States. In return Mexico received \$15,000,000, and Uncle Sam assumed the claims of Americans which Mexico had not paid. These amounted to about \$3,000,000 more.

It was the Democratic party which had fought the Mexican War of 1846-48, and its belligerent southern members had supplied the steam. It would be a mistake, though, to con-

clude that the desire for expansion was solely the result of a determination to extend slavery. Immediately upon cessation of hostilities the southerners, thinking in terms of strong nationalism, joined the northerners in a firm position on the Oregon issue. There was never a chance, of course, that slavery and cotton culture, which were inseparable, would be extended into the far North-West.

Soon after the purchase of the vast Louisiana territory from Napoleon in 1803 two intrepid Virginians, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, had led an exploring expedition from St. Louis, a frontier post on the west bank of the Mississippi, up the Missouri River, across the upper prairies and the wild Rocky Mountains and thence down the great Columbia River to the Pacific Ocean. When they had returned after long months of hardship and recounted the wonders they had seen, the thinking men of America had accepted with no reservation that Uncle Sam's western border would be only the sea. Soon the fur-traders of John Jacob Astor, son of a German butcher, were pushing into the North-West. Almost immediately they found themselves in competition with British fur interests. A quarrel over territorial possession resulted.

In 1819 the Oregon country had been claimed by England, Spain, Russia, and the United States. Spain had renounced her claims in that year and Russia withdrew in 1824—soon after the Monroe Doctrine had been announced. Prior to this in 1818 the two English-speaking nations had recognized that the final disposition of the territory would be either British or American. Since neither side in 1818 had felt strong enough in the region to bring conclusive pressure to bear, an agreement of joint occupation for ten years had been signed. This agreement was renewed in 1828, but with a proviso that either nation could end it on a one-year notice. For some years after that Oregon went rather unnoticed. Then came the Panic of 1837. Depression caused restlessness and the frontier lured the adventurous. The "Oregon Trail" in the 1840's became one of the most travelled "roads" of America.

As greater numbers of Americans moved into the Oregon country with their intention to establish permanent homes for themselves and their children, they naturally determined upon

an existence of law and order. They wanted and demanded a government of their own. They expected soon to apply for statehood. But Congress was reticent and President Tyler, knowing the British attitude, did little toward solution of the Oregon question. Meantime, public opinion was demanding action. Moreover, there was a dispute over the northern boundary of Maine. Tyler was forced to undertake negotiations with Great Britain. The Maine boundary was eventually settled by the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842, and at that time it was suggested to Great Britain that the 49th Parallel be set as the boundary between American and British Oregon. The British preferred to continue joint occupation, but Americans pushing into the North-West did not like the arrangement. They would wait no longer. They established a provisional government of their own in 1843 and demanded a settlement of the international problem. The next year was an election year, and the Texas question was tied in with that of Oregon. By then (1844) the Americans in Oregon were not satisfied with a prospective boundary at the 49th Parallel.

The Democratic candidate, James K. Polk, found it politically expedient to adopt the spirit of the current slogans: "re-occupation of Oregon" and "fifty-four forty or fight," 54°40' being the northern boundary now demanded by the Oregonians. Soon after his inauguration President Polk informed Her Majesty that the United States wished to end the joint occupation agreement. Queen Victoria's Government was very much enmeshed in domestic affairs, and the United States realized that war with Mexico was imminent. With these restraining factors, Britain became more willing to compromise, and the U.S. was less willing to fight for all of Oregon. The result was that the 49th Parallel became the northern boundary of the United States, except that Britain received all of Vancouver Island. The border on the north was at last in 1846 established from ocean to ocean. Oregon, with its vast extent of 286,541 square miles, was created a Territory in 1848. The north-western third was to be admitted to the Union in 1859 as the state of Oregon.

The present southern boundary of the United States was

established finally by the Gadsden Purchase of 1853. The United States paid to Mexico \$10,000,000 for about 30,000 square miles in what are now Arizona and New Mexico. The continental expansion programme, or "Manifest Destiny," had been fulfilled.

Uncle Sam had almost overnight reached his full six feet of height. But the boy was not strong. Internally, something was wrong—seriously wrong. A terrible malady was gnawing at his vitals. It was a complicated disease—economic first of all, constitutional and political, and now exhibiting a moral symptom.

The South was not developing industrially as the North was. European immigrants were not moving into the southern states. The reason—Negro slave labour. Negroes were poor workmen in industrial areas. Economically they were not worth the price to factory owners. It cost too much to feed, clothe, and house a slave and his family, to pay for medical care, and provide for him in his childhood and old age. Industrialists found it much less expensive to pay a low wage to a European immigrant in his prime and let him shift for his family and old age as best he could. Most northerners sold their slaves to the southerners and then abolished slavery as a legal institution in nearly every northern state.

All the while in the warmer country of the South where cotton would grow without skilled labour, where south-western lands were tempting the farmer to expand his investment, Negro slavery could be made to pay for itself. As long as there was a frontier cotton country to be developed as older lands were worn out, as long as English and northern industrialists were proportionately increasing their production of cotton cloth, and as long as no other section of the world entered into competition in the production of raw cotton, slavery in the South would be economically feasible. But as soon as any one of these conditions should cease to obtain—either no more frontier, or a decreasing demand for cotton, or a greater supply from elsewhere to drive downward the price of cotton—then slavery would become unprofitable and would die. The Negro as well as his former owner suddenly then would be faced with a drastic economic and social revolution.

But the frontier did not disappear in the early part of the nineteenth century and the textile industry of the Midlands and of New England advanced by leaps and bounds, while every southern farmer strove to invest his money in cotton lands and slaves. As long as cotton could be sold at about eleven cents a pound, a first-class cotton-producing Negro slave male or female, was worth about nine hundred dollars. But the price of cotton and the value of a slave were constantly fluctuating. The southern slave-owner, as well as the poor whites who produced their own cotton and feared the possibility of competition some day in a free labour market, all lived and worked and dreamed in a precarious economic world. It could be easily upset by any one of a number of outside influences. Protective tariffs, for instance, not only would advance the cost of farm tools, clothes, and household goods and thus overhead costs, but could and did disturb the international cotton market.

Cotton was king in the south. A great section of the United States had become the slave of a one-crop system. A strong position in national politics was absolutely essential to its whole economic life. Should that economic life be threatened by political defeat, then the very reason for supporting the Federal Constitution would disappear. The South would secede from the Union and set up a separate national government.

The moral issue of slavery was in time to become tremendous, or at least tremendously loud. The Quakers in Pennsylvania in the early decades had denounced slavery as contrary to Christianity. The Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian churches each in time were to split into separate northern and southern organizations as a result of quarrels over the issue and its political counterparts. As early as 1816 the American Colonization Society tried to send the Negroes back to Africa, but the little republic of Liberia was the only tangible result of its efforts. Thomas Jefferson had opposed slavery, but like most southerners who condemned the institution, he found himself, to his death, a slave-owner. Apparently all other alternatives at that time were economically and socially unsound. In 1827 the number of southerners who were members of anti-

slavery societies was far in excess of the number above the Mason-Dixon line.

Meantime slavery in the British Empire was gradually being abolished. Naturally that spirit of abolition was reflected in America. Philosophically thousands of southerners were opposed to slavery, but they just did not know what to do about it. Should the multitude of uneducated Negro men, women, and children living in the same communities with the whites suddenly find themselves without guidance and care, they themselves would suffer a horrible transition period. The envisaged economic chaos in the closely knit structure of the "Cotton Kingdom" would carry with it untold suffering to white and black alike. When the southern white began to think in terms of possible economic, political, and social equality with the blacks, he recoiled. The combination of these thoughts plus the consideration of billions of dollars invested in slaves by the 1830's had caused the majority of southerners to build up counter-arguments to the moral issue now rising higher and higher from northern pulpits. The abolition crusade began in earnest in the 1830's. The pulpit was soon augmented by the press. The coals burst into flames when William Lloyd Garrison in his paper, *The Liberator*, wrote: "I do not wish to think, or speak, or write with moderation."

During the 1840's and 1850's an increasingly large group of radical abolitionists pictured the South as a land of great planters, "poor whites," and ill-treated, beaten, bruised, and degraded slaves. The slave-owner was described as a sinner, a brute, a heartless individual who beat his slaves for the pleasure it afforded him. Slavery was attacked from every angle. The slave-owner was denounced as unfit for society and unworthy of continued life. The women of the region were accused of frequent relations with the members of the slave race, while the men were slandered as flogging the female Negroes to prostitution. Incendiary "literature" urging the slaves to rise in rebellion was sent into the South by the mails. At no time in the history of any nation has one section of a country so indicted another area of the same country.

The southerners would have been spineless indeed to have accepted these invectives lying down. Naturally, they denied

the charges levelled against them. They fired counter-charges at the North, striking especially at the employer-employee relationships then existing. The "wage slave" of the North was portrayed as being worse off than the Negro slave, since he had neither security in old age nor care when ill. Southerners next turned to a defence of slavery. Some held it to be a positive good rather than a necessary evil. It was pointed out that the Bible sanctioned slavery, that it had existed in practically every nation, and argued that the Negro was inferior, that some men were fit only for hard toil, that the climate of the South demanded slavery, and that the present conditions were better than any other solution, in view of the circumstances.

Neither the accusers nor the defenders drew a true picture of the South. Indeed, the arguments advanced in white-heat were so erroneous that only recently has scientific research begun to reveal the facts of the case. In the 1850's, when the population of the United States was equal to that of the British Isles (27,000,000), slaves numbered nearly four millions. The majority of these Negroes lived in those valleys and the sea-board plain where cotton was most easily cultivated. There was one broad belt (often called the Black Belt) swinging to the South-West from Virginia toward the Mississippi. In this Black Belt the Negroes outnumbered the whites—in some places the proportion was eight and nine to one. Here is where the great plantations existed and planter culture reached a high plane. There were a few slave-owners who owned more than 100 slaves each, but such owners were very few indeed. It was an easy deduction that these planters dominated politics and carried the South into war to protect their slavery. Such, actually, was not the case. In local politics the planters (mostly Whigs) very seldom carried through their political programmes, but in national politics the non-slave-owning whites (three-fourths of the electorate) voted with the planters for three very good reasons: one, they feared free Negro labour, which might even approach social as well as economic equality; two, they hoped some day to become planters themselves and did not want the possibilities destroyed; and three, they firmly believed in states' rights under the Constitution. Most of these so-called "poor whites" were actually not poor at all. Their homes

were not luxurious and they did not own slaves. But they did own their homes and land and live-stock, and they seldom, if ever, went hungry. The impression that they were oppressed by the feudal barons of the South is completely false. As for mistreatment of Negro slaves, that too is a false conception. There were a few harsh masters and overseers, it is true, but for the most part slaves were well fed, well clothed, and reasonably housed. They were given excellent medical care, if for no other reason than that the owner had his money invested in them. The Negroes, in most cases, were allowed full religious freedom. Their moral life was fairly well regulated—the laws against selling intoxicants to Negroes were strictly enforced. On plantations the slaves were usually allowed to till plots of land for themselves and to make money on the side, so long as it did not interfere with their regularly scheduled duties.

Even so, the arguments against slavery were many and strong. The Negro was not a free agent, he was not being educated, and here and there there were masters incapable of meeting their responsibilities. It is true that only in isolated cases were man and wife separated by sale of one or the other, but the possibility did exist. It was an evil against which no argument may prevail. No amount of arguments advanced by southerners, whether they be constitutional, economic, or moral, could possibly have stopped the forward march of events. It was inevitable, in the growth of the democratic ideal of equality of all men, that slavery should be abolished. It was unfortunate that the South should have had this problem; it was too bad that the problem was being poorly handled—too bad that emotion was rising to fever heat. Some cool, logical solution to the problem was badly needed. That which was presenting itself was fraught with presentiment of tragedy.

The first serious effect of the abolition crusade was seen, by the South, in the Nat Turner uprising in 1831. Turner, a Negro religious fanatic, led an insurrection against the whites in Southampton County, Virginia. About sixty whites were killed. Needless to say, there were reprisals and disregard of law for several days. Almost immediately the southern states passed laws that restricted the movement of the slaves and free Negroes, provided severe penalties for attempting to stir the

Negroes to revolt, and forbade the circulation of abolitionist "literature."

Many northerners at first disliked the abolitionists as much as southerners did. The office of *The Liberator* in Boston was destroyed and editor Garrison dragged through the streets. In turn, rewards were offered for violence committed against the abolitionists. In 1837 Elijah P. Lovejoy, an abolitionist editor, was murdered at Alton, Illinois. This incident played directly into the hands of the abolitionists and they exploited it to the fullest. Also, in 1836, Congress had passed a "gag" rule which said that all petitions concerning slavery would be placed on the table without discussion. This was not done by a pro-slavery Congress; such a rule had been dictated by necessity, if Congress were to get any other work done. Petitions had been circulated by hundreds of individuals and would have consumed all the time of the Congress if debated. It is easy to see how each petition would have opened the whole slavery issue and the gentlemen, once started, would likely have continued to attack or defend for a long time. The anti-slavery men, however, said that this "gag" rule denied the freedom of petition and that the slave-owners sought to destroy other liberties. The leader of this particular part of the anti-slavery movement was the venerated John Quincy Adams, who fought until his death in the House for freedom of petition. Many individuals who had been against the abolitionists began to favour them when freedom of petition and other liberties were linked with the anti-slavery crusade.

Henceforth the North and South became increasingly antagonistic. The slavery question became involved in almost every debate. Even before the annexation of Texas in 1845 the fear was expressed in the North that several slave states would be set up, each to have two pro-slavery Senators. During the Mexican War (1846-1848) it became evident that territory in the South-West also would be added to the national domain. The abolitionists immediately moved to prevent slavery from being extended into this new region.

Soon after this new issue was injected, David Wilmot, a Pennsylvania Democrat, introduced an amendment to an appropriation bill to the effect that no slavery should exist—

except for crime—in any territory that might be acquired from Mexico. This so-called “Wilmot Proviso” did not pass, but it reopened the bitter verbal conflict between the two groups. The slavery issue was now breaking down party lines. Sectional fealty was rapidly replacing party loyalties.

Suddenly in 1848 gold was discovered at Sutter’s Mill, California, and the great gold rush of 1849 followed. From north, south, east, and west, from South America, Canada, Europe, and Asia, gold-mad men and adventurous women struggled to reach California. They moved on foot, in covered wagons, on horseback, across the prairies and the Rockies, up the river valleys and along Indian trails. Many went by sail-boat all the way around Cape Horn. Others travelled by steamboat to the Isthmus of Panama, thence through the jungles, and again by boat out into the Pacific, one day to cheer as they entered the Golden Gate of San Francisco Bay. They brought their picks and shovels and pans, their tents and blankets and shoes. Some “fetched” their razors. Few left behind rifles or pistols or knives. In one year over 75,000 of these “Forty-niners” somehow reached far-away California. Needless to say, this motley crowd needed government, and since Congress could not reach an agreement they found their own. Before 1849 had run its course California asked to be admitted into the Union as a free state.

How would the Senate vote on this petition? There were thirty Senators from fifteen slave states and thirty Senators from fifteen free states. Two more Senators from “free” California would upset the balance. The debate dragged on for seven long months.

President Tyler died in July, 1850, and was succeeded by Millard Fillmore, a northerner. At this juncture Henry Clay introduced his famous Compromise of 1850. It was eventually adopted. This “compromise” had five provisions. The first was that California should be admitted as a free state. The second was that the remaining area acquired from Mexico should be organized into two territories, Utah and New Mexico. No decision was made at that time as to whether or not slavery should be allowed in them, but it was pretty well recognized that those semi-arid territories would not sup-

port a cotton economy and thus slavery could not be profitable there. The third provision was that the slave trade should be abolished in the District of Columbia, an area which had been donated by Virginia and Maryland to the Government as the site of the nation's capital, the city of Washington. The abolition of slavery in Washington was especially desired by northerners, who would thus not have to make embarrassing explanations to European visitors to the capital. These three points were definitely victories for the North. The South may or may not have gained a small point in the fourth provision, whereby Texas received \$10,000,000 for giving up her claims to the New Mexico region. Texas was satisfied only from a pecuniary standpoint. The rest of the South joined the North in paying this bill. It was in the fifth provision that the North made its one real concession. It agreed to aid in returning runaway slaves to their owners. Should this new fugitive slave law be violated, the South should then have lost in essence the whole "compromise." Realizing this, several southern states went on record as favouring secession should the North not keep its bargain. For a while there was a genuine effort above the Ohio to keep that agreement. But it was no easy thing to capture a poor Negro, haul him back in chains, and turn him over to his master to be punished perhaps for having sought his freedom. This whole fugitive slave business turned the stomachs of northerners. It provided excellent fuel for the abolition crusade.

The South had made a bad bargain in the Compromise of 1850. It had not only lost its balance of power in Congress; it had laid itself wide open to an attack which it could not combat save by physical force—that is, unless it should withdraw from the Union before the North should become strong enough and determined enough to force its majority will upon the minority. The South, however, was not prepared for secession from the Union in 1850. It, therefore, entered the ugly ten-year period 1851-1861, waging a losing battle in the realm of national politics, all the while buying slaves and in its turn being enslaved by the one-crop economy. It spent the proceeds of its sales of cotton (to Liverpool as well as to New England) for the tariff-protected manufactured products of the

North and thus provided much of the capital of Wall Street. During this decade of sectional strife and economic expansion the South saw millions of freedom-loving immigrants join the ranks of northern labour in the mounting tide of the Industrial Revolution in the North, these immigrants providing easy prey for the propaganda of fanatical abolitionists.

In the election year, 1852, when Franklin Pierce, a New England Democrat, was elected President, Harriet Beecher Stowe published *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. This book, an amateurish story of the vicissitudes of a lovable Negro character, was accepted by most of its northern readers as a true picture of the southern slave system. It enjoyed a phenomenal circulation; for years it was second only to the Bible in sales. Mrs. Stowe, the sister of the abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher, had written a story which served a propaganda end as no combination of orations and editorials could have done.

Two years later, in 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act opened still wider the festering wounds. This act, advocated by Senator Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, provided for the organization of Kansas and Nebraska as territories without prohibiting slavery even though they were north of the Missouri Compromise line. The settlers themselves were to decide whether or not they should have slaves. This procedure involved what was popularly called "squatter sovereignty." Douglas, who preferred the term "popular sovereignty," pointed out that this method of leaving the slavery issue to be decided by the residents was very democratic and that the slavery question would be taken out of national politics. Instead, it brought the issue squarely to the front in national politics. The anti-slavery men felt that they must fight to retain the dominant position of the free states in national politics. Southerners, hurt that they had reaped no real reward from the Compromise of 1850, were glad to have the region opened—willing to accept this last chance to achieve the lost balance. And so the day of secession was hopefully postponed.

The United States in the 1850's stood in sad need of strong leadership. It is a pathetic chapter in the history of that democracy that no great statesman stepped forward in this hour of need. The Whig party was dying on its feet and the

Democrats were blindly floundering in confusion. Young Sam's body was being wracked by fever mounting higher and higher.

At this juncture a new political party came into existence. Many voters who had been dissatisfied with the crumbling Whig party and many others, disgusted with the incompetence of the Democratic party, formed a new organization. They took the former name of the Democrats and called themselves Republicans. This group, though, was not bent upon a careful diagnosis. It immediately called for surgery to stop the spread of the disease. It was a brave but foolhardy approach. Actually, it was a disease more like pneumonia or tuberculosis, perhaps, and the surgeon's knife was not necessary. It never occurred to many that the British Empire had suffered the same disease and had found a cure in gradual emancipation of slaves and some financial aid to the former owners. In America of the 1850's, though, there was too much emotion for quiet reason. Such a proposal would have met a flat refusal from the Republicans, who would hardly have been willing to purchase reform. Southerners, as long as slavery was profitable, would never have listened to any proposal of gradual emancipation and part payment for former slaves; northerners were equally determined that the South should bow to the majority will, whether it be right or wrong. The Republicans called for an end to pussyfoot methods. They called for action and thus in the space of six years they bounded from a third party status to national political ascendancy.

During this period Douglas's "squatter sovereignty" was having its trial. Settlers and sojourners were rushing into the new territories. Only a few slave-owners were taking their slaves with them; this was no cotton country, but pro-slavery southerners were arriving in some numbers. Meantime abolitionists were arriving in great caravans. Societies in North and South were formed to encourage migration, and almost everyone who set out for the prairie country west of Missouri went armed. The more opulent North with its more migrant population won the race. Already open conflict had broken out among early arrivals. Tension mounted month by month during 1855-56. The area soon became known as "Bleeding

Kansas." John Brown, a violent abolitionist, made several guerrilla raids on slavery settlements, while the slavery men were raiding the anti-slavery strongholds. The slavery men, many coming over from Missouri, had elected a territorial assembly that would favour them. The anti-slavery men set up their own assembly and soon two constitutions were presented to Congress. Immediately the excitement of Kansas was transmitted to Washington. Congress not only was deadlocked; there was actually reached under the Capitol's dome a stage of violence. Stephen A. Douglas's "popular sovereignty" was already a flat failure.

By then (1855) the passive violation of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 had assumed the status of active violence. Not only would the North not return runaway slaves but abolitionists were forming societies to help the Negroes to escape from their masters. These were called "underground railroads." Moreover, northern state legislatures were passing "personal liberty laws" which were in contradiction to the Federal law of 1850. These were, in essence, unconstitutional, but no one seemed to care now.

The Supreme Court finally was forced to consider the question of slavery in the territories. Dred Scott, a slave, was taken in the 1830's to Illinois and then to Minnesota, which, by the Missouri Compromise, was free territory. Later he was returned as a slave to Missouri. Backed by abolitionists, he brought suit in 1852 for his freedom on the ground that living in a free territory had made him a free man. The Missouri courts held that he was not a citizen and thus could not bring a suit. Scott, meanwhile, had been "sold" to a New Yorker. Since slave and master lived in different states, the case had to be transferred to the Federal courts. The Supreme Court in 1857 said, in part, that: (1) a slave was not a citizen of the United States and could not bring a suit in Federal Court, (2) slaves were recognized as property by the Constitution and did not become free when they moved into a non-slave state, and (3) the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, since neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could prohibit slavery in a territory belonging to the Union.

The South had won a victory. It might be wrong on moral

grounds to defend slavery, but there could never be any doubt about the legality of slave-holding. Slavery could only be abolished legally by an amendment to the Constitution. But the adoption of an amendment was impossible, since fifteen of the thirty-one states sanctioned slavery.*

A majority of the Court judges were from the South, so the Republicans refused to agree with the Dred Scott decision. They denounced the Court and wished to "reform" that body in the hope of getting the decision changed.

In 1858 a state legislature was to be chosen in Illinois. This body would then choose a United States Senator. Stephen Douglas, the "little Giant" who had framed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, was a candidate for re-election. Opposing him was the long, awkward, relatively unknown lawyer, "Honest Abe" Lincoln. Both men were extremely clever, and the seven debates in which they engaged brought large crowds to fever pitch. Perhaps the most important debate was held at Freeport, Illinois. There Lincoln asked Douglas whether or not the people of a territory could exclude slavery from that area before a state constitution had been formed. If Douglas had said "Yes" he would have been in conflict with the Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court. If he had answered "No" he would have deserted his doctrine of popular sovereignty. Douglas hedged on the answer. His compromising attitude did not please the South, and that area decided not to support him for President in 1860. Douglas won the senatorship, but the debates did much toward advancing Lincoln for President two years later.

The next year, 1859, John Brown of "Bleeding Kansas" fame decided that the time had come for the slaves to rise against their masters. He led some fanatical abolitionists against the Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. This group was successful in capturing the arsenal, but was not able to distribute the guns among the Negroes. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived promptly with some Marines. Brown was captured, convicted of treason, and hanged. Immediately he was pronounced a martyr by the abolitionists.

* The necessary three-fourths of the thirty-one states would have been twenty-four, or all the North and West plus at least seven southern states.

Once again the fear of a slave insurrection had become a reality and southerners denounced the North for inciting the activities of Brown. Actually most northerners condemned Brown.

Young Sam was sick and approaching a deadly crisis. There was a great constitutional deadlock striking pain into his heart; there was a powerful economic disease gnawing into his vitals; there was a strong moral issue tearing at his soul. The moral issue of slavery was soon to become the emotional vehicle for spurring northerners to "die to make men free." Those boys actually were to die to preserve the Union, to give their lives that Uncle Sam might live. Southerners were to die, too, not to keep men in bondage (for in the abstract they too hated slavery), but they were to die fighting as bravely for the protection of their economic firesides, for release from a Union in which they suffered the position of a thwarted minority, and for what they considered their God-given political right to regulate their own phenomenally mixed social structure without unappreciative, outside influence. That they were violating a contract in seceding from the Union was an inescapable argument. They met that charge only by hurling the counter-charge that when their ancestors had adopted the Constitution it was with the understanding that it was a Federal union which they were entering—a union in which the central government should have only certain specified powers and that the rights of states should be reserved to their citizens. The moment that that Federal union seized more powers than originally had been conferred upon it—at that moment the contract had been broken. There was one great question unanswered in early American history. It was this: "Who shall be the judge as to when that contract was broken?" At least one answer came shrieking out of the shell-burst of civil war. It was this: "Democracy involves majority rule regardless of state rights, section rights, or class rights." It is an answer which minorities will always find hard to accept.

Chapter VIII

YOUNG SAM'S ILLNESS AND CONVALESCENCE
(1860-1877)

THE Civil War and the years of "Reconstruction" which followed that bloody conflict comprise a tragic period in the youth of Uncle Sam. The illness carried him close to death, and the scars are still visible. Ligaments were so badly torn that to this day there is a recurring tendency toward adhesions. This is an internal ailment which centres in the perennial Negro question and economic differences. It is not of importance in foreign affairs.

The Civil War put a definite end to the arguments over whether or not the American nation was a loose confederation of sovereign states which singly or severally might withdraw from that Union. It was decided in blood that the Union was not dissoluble, the logical interpretation of the Constitution notwithstanding. It was decided in blood that before the law all men—no matter what their colour or status—were equal. Unfortunately, the laws of biology could not be eliminated by legislation or bloodshed. It was decided in blood that Democracy involved majority rule. This did not mean that there was to be no appreciation of the rights of minorities, but it did mean that the minority having presented its case and having received rebuff must accept that decision. There was no higher appeal than before the tribunal of the majority. So it was decreed in this one great violent test case—the American Civil War.

Economic, political, and social factors combined to bring on a war which, with the advantage of perspective, does not seem to have been "irrepressible," but it occurred, nevertheless. Sections not greatly unlike in the colonial period had pursued paths which by 1860 had created striking differences. The north-eastern section in 1860 had become largely industrial in its economy and outlook, with the business man (especially the manufacturer) enthroned as the ideal toward which the small boy might strive. The South remained rural and, insofar as

there was an ideal social figure, the cotton planter often saw himself as a transplanted English country gentleman. The southern youth, whether aristocratic or not, aimed at achieving that status some day. The North-West, those states north of the Ohio River and west of the Appalachian Mountains, like the South, derived its sustenance and points of view chiefly from agriculture and rural life, but there was not the same ideal as existed in the North-East or the South. The western youth envisaged himself in older years as the owner of large bustling farm interests and perhaps also important connections in urban areas.

The rural South and the more or less rural North-West in earlier years had had much in common. This tie had been reinforced before 1850 by close trade relations, especially down the great inland highway, the Mississippi River. But the coming of the railroads, and particularly the close linking of the North-West to the industrial North-East during the 1850's by these ties of steel running directly east and west, lessened the dependence of the North-West on the winding Mississippi as an avenue of commerce, opened up markets in the East, and linked the two northern sections much more closely. The North-West came more and more under the powerful industrialist sway.

The decades of bitter controversy over slavery also tended to split the northern and southern agricultural sections. The persistent din of abolitionism—the portrayal of slavery as a prime moral evil—eventually came to have a large number of followers throughout the North. The immigration in the late 1840's and in the 1850's of great numbers of Irish and Germans, most of them strong opponents of slavery, poured mainly into the states north of the Ohio. The stolid Germans especially, many of them refugees after an unsuccessful struggle for liberalism in their old homeland, seized the anti-slavery banner and flocked to the Republican party, which was opposed to slavery extension.

Before the Lincoln-Douglas debates southern Democrats had looked with favour upon Douglas as presidential timber. Southern "fire-eaters," however, could not stomach his contention that territorial legislatures could virtually outlaw slavery

by failure to pass laws supporting the institution. William Lowndes Yancey of Alabama, Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina, and other spokesmen of the lower South vigorously upheld the view that territorial legislatures had an obligation to protect slave-holders in their peculiar species of property. Yancey's doctrines were embodied in the "Alabama Platform" which he sought to have adopted as the official viewpoint of the national Democratic party at the Charleston Convention in 1860. Douglas flatly refused to accept this platform and the fight between the two factions reached white-heat. On the floor and off, the debate continued for several days and nights. Eventually through more skilful manipulation the Douglas adherents gained the majority of members of the platform committee at the convention. The delegates chose the Douglas doctrines; the followers of Yancey withdrew from the convention and held one of their own; the Democratic party was split. Each faction nominated a candidate for President—Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. The election of a Democratic president was now impossible.

The problems with which the Republicans had to deal were little less touchy than those which plagued the Democrats, but in the case of the former the difficulties were not insurmountable. William H. Seward of New York was considered the most likely candidate, but when the first balloting was over, it was seen that he would not receive the nomination. Suddenly the tide turned towards Douglas' old Illinois opponent, the little-known western lawyer, Abraham Lincoln. The convention's decision to nominate Lincoln seems to have been dictated mainly by the desire for the votes in the West, where Douglas had a strong personal following. The party platform championed the eastern desire for strong protective tariffs and conceded to the West the candidate and a "homestead" plank which would throw open western lands for settlement without cost. The choice of the gaunt, rustic Lincoln, though, was a bitter pill for most of the eastern Republicans.

In addition to the two Democratic candidates and Lincoln, still another party entered the presidential lists, the Constitutional Union party, formed mainly from old-line southern Whigs who were sincerely anxious for compromise, peace, and

preservation of the Union. This party's nominee was John Bell of Tennessee.

It has long been believed that had the Democratic party not split in 1860, Lincoln would have been defeated. Certainly the combined vote of Douglas and Breckinridge was greater than that cast for Lincoln. It totalled 2,223,110 to the Republican's 1,866,452. In addition to this fact, Bell polled 500,631 votes, mostly from the border slave states. It is by no means certain, though, that had there been only one Democrat in the field, Lincoln would have been defeated. But in 1860 the Southerners so believed. They felt that dirty politics had robbed them of their rights. Their own party, or at least the Northern Democrats, had deserted them. Even before the election many had stated flatly that they would not remain in a union over which presided an abolitionist. Actually Lincoln in 1860 was not an abolitionist, but this point was lost in the championing of freedom by his party. When it was seen that Lincoln had received less than forty per cent of the total vote yet had been elected, they were furious.

So much of myth has grown up around the figure of Lincoln that it is hard to decipher the man beneath the legend. An ungainly, backwoodsman, he combined in his nature a solemn, tragic pathos and a keen frontier humour. Nobody relished a good yarn more than he did, and more polished Easterners with whom he came in contact during his presidency were often shocked at his enjoyment of crude stories. They failed to understand that it was the salty wit he loved, not the crudity itself. He was gifted with a unique brand of eloquence in which he combined clever quips in frontier vein with solemn pronouncements in poetical prose reminiscent of the language of Shakespeare and the King James version of the Bible. His listeners were often puzzled; they were not sure whether he was naïve or profound. Many jumped to the former conclusion and derided him. His appearance provided excellent material for derisive cartoons. In time the nation, including the South, learned that he possessed in abundant degree the prime essentials of statesmanship—devotion to duty, largeness of heart, a well-organized mind, a mastery of political strategy, and a quiet firmness and unending patience

which wore down his enemies. He had had little political experience before entering the White House, and his education was decidedly limited. Yet withal he was a man of deep wisdom. During the war years he grew in stature and breadth of vision, meriting the mantle of statesmanship which one day martyrdom was to bequeath him.

During the Lincoln-Douglas debates, when "Honest Abe" had said that the nation could not exist "half slave, half free," he had placed himself, at least in the eyes of most southerners, at the head of the abolition crusade. Even though he was in time to assert that the war was solely for the purpose of preserving the Union, during the political campaign of 1860 he had rejected all proposed compromises. Soon after the results of the election were known, and without waiting for the inauguration of Lincoln, South Carolina seceded from the Union on December 20, 1860. Other states of the lower South soon followed their fiery sister. In February, 1861, the seven southern states which had then severed their old ties created a new government, the Confederate States of America, and drew up a constitution closely patterned after that of the old Union. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, a learned, experienced politician, somewhat austere and difficult of approach, was elected provisional president of the new nation. He was inaugurated as president at Montgomery, Alabama, the first capital of the Confederacy. Shortly afterwards the capital was removed to Richmond, Virginia.

Meantime, states of the border South yielded more reluctantly to the courting of the Confederacy, but eventually eleven states in all signified their sectional loyalty. Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland wavered, but through questionable political manipulations they were held in the Union.

For some months the South hoped that actual hostilities could be avoided, but began preparations nevertheless. Federal forts and arsenals in southern territory were seized; and President Buchanan, during his last months in office, chose to follow a middle-of-the-road course, leaving action to his successor, Lincoln, who was inaugurated in March, 1861. At this time Fort Sumter, at the entrance to Charleston's harbour, was still in Federal hands. The Confederacy demanded that it be

handed over to the new nation upon whose soil it stood. Of course, the commander refused. Preparations were made in Washington to reinforce the garrison; but the Confederate government refused to allow such reinforcements, and the result was violence. On April 12, 1861, Fort Sumter was fired upon. It quickly fell to the Confederates. One of the bloodiest wars in history had begun.

On paper the North was far better prepared for war than was the South. Twenty-two million people were arrayed against nine million, and three and one half million of the latter were Negro slaves. Industrial resources and means of transport in the North completely overbalanced the feeble industries and the few railway lines of the agricultural South. There was no Confederate navy, and Lincoln lost no time in declaring a blockade of southern ports. Despite the obvious preponderance of power, however, the southerners looked forward to a speedy, glorious victory over the North. And the northerners were confident that they would have the slave-holding braggarts yelping for mercy in short order. In weighing and magnifying their own resources for war, the southerners reminded themselves that they were a martial people, accustomed to life in the open, to the use of firearms, and to reckless dashes on horseback. The South's great "ace in the hole," however, was "King Cotton." Cotton was indispensable to the English looms. If transportation of the fibre were cut off from Liverpool, a serious depression would ensue, particularly in the Midlands. It would spread quickly to the City, and all British enterprises would suffer. Her Majesty's Government then would take up the cudgel in support of southern independence. So hoped the South. Both sections light-heartedly entered a four-year-long struggle, the nature of which soon dispelled illusions on each side about the weaknesses of the foe.

The optimists of the North had their first rude awakening on July 16, 1861, at the first battle of Bull Run in eastern Virginia. The green troops of the Union were dispersed in a mad flight back toward Washington, leaving in their wake a clutter of weary and wounded soldiers, equipment, and the picnic-baskets of Congressmen who had gone for the outing

expecting to see the hot-headed South taught a lesson. Now the North prepared in earnest for war.

Virtually all the warfare took place on southern soil, most of it east of the Mississippi River. In this large arena there were two principal theatres of conflict—Virginia and the West, that is, those states directly south of Kentucky. The Confederacy—unwisely, it would seem—concentrated its efforts on preserving the capital city, Richmond, and paid far too little attention to the pleas of western generals for men and equipment. As a consequence, the war was lost in the West. General Ulysses S. Grant, a dogged fighter capable of disregarding tremendous losses in man-power, of which the North had a surplus, continually pressed forward deeper into the heart of the Confederacy. Early in 1862 he took Forts Henry and Donelson in northern Tennessee, opening the way for the capture of the strategically important city of Nashville. From there he continued his steady advance, though suffering near disaster in the battle of Shiloh on the southern border of Tennessee. The Confederacy's hopes in the West were pinned chiefly on General Braxton Bragg, who, if not thoroughly incompetent, committed an amazing number of blunders. The principal retarding force to the Union army's western advance was the brilliant Confederate cavalry activity. General Nathan Bedford Forrest, an untutored barbarian-genius sort of man, received little support from Bragg or President Davis; but his exploits rank him with the greatest cavalry leaders of all time. He is reputed to have coined the military axiom: "Get there fustest with the mostest men!"

By mid-1863 Grant took Vicksburg, Mississippi, the last stronghold of the Confederacy on the Mississippi River. Meanwhile, the Union fleet under David S. Farragut had forced the surrender of New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi. Thus, with rail and water communication cut, the great granary of the trans-Mississippi South (Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana) was lost to the Confederacy; and the Union armies were at the back door pressing in while the Federal Army of the Potomac continued to engage the Confederates in northern Virginia.

In the theatre of operations between the two rival capitals

(only 100 miles apart) a succession of northern generals sought to break the Confederate defences around Richmond. Although within hearing distance of the Richmond church bells early in the war, the Federal forces were unable to capture the capital city until the very end of the conflict. For the most part the Confederates fought a series of brilliant defensive campaigns under the leadership of Robert E. Lee, a master of strategy who is usually held to be the greatest general of the war. Lee's combination of magnificent leadership and the highest virtues of the Christian gentleman have made him the idol and the ideal of the South. His ablest assistant was Thomas J. ("Stonewall") Jackson, who performed miracles of marching with his "foot cavalry" in the Shenandoah Valley. More than once Jackson's rapid manoeuvres turned the tide of battle. His presence in the Valley made him a constant threat to Washington; and as the Union generals never knew where Jackson would appear next, many Federal troops had to remain immobile to protect the northern capital. Unfortunately for the southern cause, however, Jackson met death on the bloody field at Chancellorsville in 1862. There were other able generals in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, but no others upon whom Lee could rely so definitely as upon the bemoaned Jackson to do the right thing at the right time.

Mainly on the defensive throughout the war, the Confederates made two attempts to carry the struggle to Union soil across the Potomac. The high tide of the Confederate advance came in 1863, when Lee's army was turned back after a strong assault on the Union forces at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. At the same time Grant was concluding the siege of Vicksburg, and Farragut was aiding in this splitting of the Confederacy in two. After the summer of 1863 the southern cause was desperate, though the dwindling "rebel" armies continued to struggle for nearly two years against a northern force continuously increasing in strength.

After the fall of Vicksburg the western Federal armies, under Grant and William T. Sherman, continued their advance, now turning to the east. After defeating an accumulation of southern troops in south-eastern Tennessee, Grant was called

to the Army of the Potomac to instill vigour into the long-languishing drive on Richmond. Sherman, meanwhile, drove south toward Atlanta, steadily pushing back the Confederates under Joseph E. Johnston. At this juncture Johnston was replaced by John B. Hood, who determined upon a bold course of action. Abandoning Atlanta, Hood went around Sherman toward Nashville, reasoning that if that important base in the Union line of supplies could be taken, Sherman's army would be doomed. Hood's army was disastrously defeated on the icy slopes of Nashville in December, 1864.

Sherman, instead of retreating from his advanced position in Georgia, made a bold advance toward the sea. When his line of supplies had been temporarily cut by the Confederates Sherman ordered his army to live off the country. They did, and for good measure cut a seared path forty to sixty miles wide from Atlanta to the sea. Every rail, every piece of rolling stock, every warehouse, every factory, every barn and outhouse in his path was looted or destroyed. Throughout the South other detachments were dispatched to loot and to burn. Possibly as attempted justification for the needlessly burned and pillaged mansions left in his wake, Sherman coined the phrase: "War is hell!" The devastation ordered by Sherman along with the employment of propaganda-fed Negro troops in carrying out the order has long remained a source of friction and a barrier to complete understanding between the North and the South.

Grant, upon taking command of the Army of the Potomac, found a tough and elusive opponent in Lee. That military genius (who had declined command of the Federal army to serve his native Virginia) anticipated every flanking move which Grant initiated. His quick shifting of troops always enabled him to get in a strong defensive position. In some engagements Grant threw his superior numbers into frontal assaults which met deadly fire from the entrenched Confederates. Losses were appalling, but Grant could afford the expenditure. The ratio was such that the southerners could have fought off the Federal troops for many months more had Lee's forces been properly supplied. But they were not. The Federal blockade, the conquest of the Mississippi and Sher-

man's cutting all rail connection in the lower South combined to weaken the Army of the Potomac. Outnumbered many times, unable to stem the northerners' tide of increasing replenishment of men and material, with their own supplies dwindling to almost nothing, the southerners slowly were beaten down. Lee had to abandon his capital. Shortly after the evacuation of Richmond, Lee surrendered his hungry and emaciated army to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. A few Confederate forces held out a short while longer but soon had to abandon the struggle.

Heart-broken southern soldiers returned to burned homes, gathered their families and some faithful Negro servants, and set about trying to rebuild a wrecked economic structure. Prospects of recovery were dismal. The South did not expect any help from the booming North, but it did hope to be left unimpeded in its attempt at reconstruction. Those hopes were in vain. The worst was yet to come. For twelve more years—"The Tragic Era"—the southern states were to remain in a position of enforced bondage to the victorious North. And the events of this so-called "Reconstruction Period" fostered a status of colonial dependency from which the South has not yet fully recovered.

Anglo-American relations during the war several times reached a critical stage. From the outset Her Majesty's Government recognized the belligerency of the Confederacy, thus refusing to acknowledge the North's contention that the southerners were rebels. The upper classes throughout the four years sympathized with the more aristocratic South. British commercial interests pointed with favour toward the South's free-trade desires. Diplomatically two American nations might have been easier to deal with than one. Both Palmerston and Russell winked at the construction and sale of naval vessels and supplied to the Confederates. British-built warships such as the *Alabama* and *Florida*, before they were sunk, had sent to the bottom dozens of U.S. cargo ships and had driven many others from the high seas. Until 1863 Lincoln had no assurance that Britain did not intend actually to enter the war on the Confederate side.

Meantime the Federal blockade of southern ports had

brought deep depression to the Midlands. Only a trickle of southern cotton was reaching Liverpool. Mills everywhere in England were closed down with little chance of their being reopened. The labouring classes were suffering. Would they add their weight to that of the upper classes and tip the balance toward war with the United States?

Suddenly Englishmen learned of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, whereby the President, as commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces, proclaimed that on January 1, 1863, all slaves in all parts of the Union which by that date had not returned to their allegiance should be declared free men. Immediately the upper classes in Britain pointed out that Lincoln had no constitutional right to set slaves free, that this proclamation said nothing about slaves outside the Confederacy, and that this was but a losing gambler's throw of the dice. But the lower classes were impressed just the same. They wanted to see the South's cotton once more unloaded at Liverpool, but they could not relish the idea of supporting a cause which now suddenly had become that of slavery. Soon public meetings in the Midlands were being held in behalf of the North. Palmerston shortly thereafter accorded to the American Ambassador, Charles Francis Adams (son of John Quincy Adams), a deference theretofore denied him.

Lincoln had achieved an important diplomatic victory, even though the Emancipation Proclamation did not prove of great consequence as a military measure. A few Negroes left their masters and took up arms with the North or entered labour gangs, but not many. Some northerners felt that such a proclamation was not only unconstitutional but rather unsporting, for it was definitely hoped that slaves in the South would rise against their masters. Still others, themselves slave owners, in the border states, resented greatly Lincoln's apparent forsaking of his stand that the war was solely for the preservation of the Union. Needless to say, the Abolitionists were overjoyed. The Proclamation had been issued on September 22nd. In the November elections the Republicans suffered several significant reverses despite Federal victories in the field of battle.

It was not until years later that Lincoln, then dead, began to receive just credit for his masterful stroke. Indeed, only then

did people in a quieter day settle down to re-reading such gems of literature as his Gettysburg address and his Second Inaugural address and studying the tremendous problems the President had faced—incompetent generals, New York draft riots (1863), hostile newspapers, inflated currency, political demagoguery, foreign opposition, and a gallant foe—only then in later years did the people fully learn that Abraham Lincoln had been a great war leader, an honest, skilful, tactful, patient, forceful, tender-hearted human being. Some of this suddenly, on the morning of April 15, 1865, less than a week after Appomattox, began to dawn upon the consciousness of the nation. The news was spreading like wild-fire that the President was dead. He had been shot the night before in the Ford Theatre while at last relaxing from his strenuous war duties—shot by a demented actor named John Wilkes Booth, a southerner by birth. Northerners were shocked and angry. Southerners were stunned and quickly wrinkled their brows. Lincoln dead! It was unthinkable. Why, Lincoln was the only friend the South had had in the North! History records no greater tribute than this. The South wept bitter tears when it realized that its conqueror had died.

Although Lincoln had prosecuted the war with vigour, he never came to feel bitterness toward the South. His chief aim had always been the preservation of the Union, and it was his intention to reclaim the allegiance of the southern states to the republic and quickly to extend pardon to the "rebels." Had he not been assassinated it is possible that he would have been able to carry out his conciliatory programme and bind up the wounds of war. Certainly, in the last two years of the war he had gained a tremendous personal following among the northern people. On the other hand, he constantly had had to contend with opposition in Congress. There a group of Republican leaders—called Radical Republicans—had long held that the South should be punished unmercifully for its crimes. The principal leaders of the group were Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania. Stevens was especially vigorous in his hatred of the South and maintained that the defeated section should be treated as conquered territory subject to the absolute authority

of Congress. The Radicals had made it clear that decisions with regard to the South were to be the province of Congress and not of the President. They had intended to fight Lincoln's lenient policy tooth and nail.

Southerners groaned when they realized the full significance of Lincoln's death. Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, had succeeded to the executive office. Johnson, a strong unionist who had refused to follow his state into secession, held views similar to those of Lincoln, although he did contend that the chief leaders of the secession movement and the planter class, whom he hated, should be punished. Almost immediately upon the assembly of Congress Johnson ran into difficulties. He had put into operation a plan of reconstruction basically like that of Lincoln, but when Congress reopened its sessions the presidential plan was overthrown. In accordance with the Radicals' plans, the South was divided into military districts, and Federal troops were stationed in the southern states to enforce Congressional dictation. They were accompanied into every state by a notorious group of "carpet-baggers," northern adventurers whose sole intent was to exploit the South for personal profit. There, too, arose a despised group of "scalawags," southern whites with "northern principles," who, with the "carpet-baggers" and illiterate Negroes, backed by the armies of occupation, quickly seized all government.

Between 1865 and 1870 Radical Republican leaders in Congress succeeded in bringing about the enactment of three amendments to the Constitution. The first of these abolished Negro slavery; the second, the Fourteenth Amendment, granted civil rights to the ex-slaves; and the Fifteenth Amendment extended to the Negro the right to vote. Of course, the southern states under "Black Republican" rule voted for these amendments, and thus with acceptance in the North there was secured the necessary three-fourths majority ratification.

Part of the motivating force behind the adoption of these amendments was a humanitarian interest in the Negro. But the Radicals, too, were aware of their political importance. It was their intention to secure to the Republican party the vote of the Negroes, prevent the southern whites from participating in elections, and thus "Republicanize" the South. The

permanent ascendancy of the Republican party might thus be attained. In the South the Negro voter was a pawn in the hands of the carpet-bagger Republicans, especially those administrators of the Freedmen's Bureau. This bureau on paper was a social and economic organization. It actually did establish much-needed bread-lines, but the sum total of its activities was directed by Radical Republicans towards political ends.

President Johnson did what he could to prevent harsh Congressional reconstruction. He did not, however, have the personal popularity of Lincoln; and though he was a man strong and fearless in principle, he had little tact and political keenness. His utterances were distorted by his Radical opponents, and he was pictured as an ignorant, drunken lout and—worst of all—at heart still a southerner. The quarrel between President and Congress ended finally in bringing impeachment proceedings against the President, the only instance in American history of an attempt to remove the Chief Executive from office. The Senate acquitted Johnson by a single vote; but he was henceforth powerless to carry through his and Lincoln's programme. The Radicals reigned supreme.

General Grant, a good soldier and a fairly good politician but no statesman, succeeded to the Presidency in 1869. For two full terms he allowed the American political scene to continue its degenerate course. He made no effort to obstruct Congressional "reconstruction." Conditions in the South went from bad to worse. The carpet-bagger-scalawag-Negro elements were completely dominant as long as they had military backing. Southern legislatures piled up enormous state debts by lavish spending for entertainment and fattening the pockets of the law-makers, many of whom were illiterate ex-slaves. Southern whites could not forget overnight the habits of a lifetime; and it was intolerable to them to see the Negro, under the lead of Freedmen's Bureau officials, proudly proclaim himself an equal to the white man. The Negro's Republican tutors overwhelmed him with impossible promises, most famous of which was that every Negro was to be given "forty acres and a mule." Because of Radical propaganda among the Negro mass, southerners found it exceed-

ingly difficult to utilize their labour supply. Slavery was replaced by various forms of tenant contracts, but Negroes had little understanding of these and, supported by Freedmen's Bureau officials, often broke them at will.

For the Negro the result of all this activity was pathetic. His lot was fully as bad as that of his former master. Something drastic had to be done. Grant offered no solution. The Federal armies in the South despised their work, but were under orders from Washington. They could do nothing to rectify the situation.

Finally the southern whites hit upon an ingenious idea. Carpet-baggers could have noted a new expression on young white faces here and there, or they could have seen whispering groups gathered in village streets. Had they noticed the dry goods counters, they might have learned that white sheeting in some stores was being bought in unusual quantities. What was happening was that mysterious societies were being formed, among them the Ku-Klux-Klan. These groups of white southerners had decided to capitalize upon the Negroes' superstitions and the cowardice of others. The members of the K.K.K., supposedly headed by General Nathan Bedford Forrest, adopted mysterious rituals and symbols, wore loose-flowing gowns and hoods, and rode cloaked horses. They usually appeared at night, sometimes riding silently through a street, sometimes conspicuously gathering on the crest of a hill, sometimes carrying flaming crosses. Needless to say, these antics struck terror into the hearts of offending Negroes, carpet-baggers, and northern "missionaries" who had come south to remould the section into another New England. The Klansmen were not always silent. Sometimes they proclaimed themselves to be the ghosts of dead Confederates returned from Hell or somewhere. A favourite device was for a group to approach a Negro shack at night, the leader would call for a bucket of water, and apparently gulp it down without pausing for breath. Actually he would pour the water into some receptacle hidden beneath the gown. Sometimes a warning note pinned to a door with a K.K.K. dagger had the desired effect of driving a carpet-bagger from the state. Their unearthly appearance and language did much to restore the traditional submissive atti-

tude among the blacks and to break the hold which northern officials had over them. At length some elements of the Klan, and certain rowdy bands who claimed to be Klansmen, went to such excesses that strong measures were taken by Congress to destroy it. The head of the "Invisible Empire" in the South himself dissolved the order in 1869, though independent units of the Klan, Knights of the White Camellia, and other societies continued their activities.

Unfortunately for the South, reports of the activities of such illegal groups were greatly distorted by the Radical press in the North, and it was made to appear that the South was still in rebellion against legitimate authority. The "southern outrages" columns in northern papers told of mass, inhuman murders of innocent Negroes and benevolent northern whites in the South. This fanning of the flame of northern opinion—"waving the bloody shirt"—played into the hands of Radicals in Congress, making it possible for them to gain public support for their harsh reconstruction programme.

Slowly, however, southern whites began to recover power. Many of the "unreconstructed" diehards refused to take the prescribed "iron-clad oath" renouncing their crime of rebellion and sworn allegiance to the Federal government, but the more practical-minded southerners realized that only through such action, by which they could have their suffrage restored, could they hope to regain the upper hand. Large numbers of Negroes soon tired of the unfulfilled promises of the carpet-baggers and began drifting back to their old plantations: The northern plunderers for a time put up stiff resistance to the recovery of political power by the southern whites. At length, however, the carpet-bagger-scalawag control could be supported only by the presence of troops, many of whom were disgusted with the Republican programme. Northern public opinion, meanwhile, was gradually cooling from the feverish desire to purge and punish the South.

The Ku Klux Klan movement was in time completely abandoned and the southern whites came out from subversive means to open championing of the White Man's Movement. Naturally the Republican party tried to beat down this programme, but in time failed—and failed so completely that to

this day the South simply will not vote the Republican ticket. It settles its political controversies by means of the Democratic primary and by left and right factions within the Democratic party. By 1876 all of the former Confederate states but three—Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida—had been “redeemed” by the native Democratic voters. Only through the presence of Federal troops were the remaining three held in the Republican column.

The presidential contest of 1876 was the most disputed election in American history. Especially in the South, where the Radicals were struggling to hold on to the remnants of their rapidly dwindling power, bitterness and violence attended the campaign and polling of votes. Contention for state offices was as keen as that for the national chief executive. While the results were being counted, it seemed certain that the Democratic nominee for President, Samuel J. Tilden of New York, had defeated his Republican opponent, Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio. In South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, however, where the Radicals were still in the saddle, there were conflicting reports. Both Democrats and Republicans claimed the victory and sent in opposite electoral votes. Fraud and intimidation had been practised on both sides. Hayes needed the electoral votes of all three of these disputed states (as well as those of Oregon) in order to gain a majority over Tilden. The issue remained long in doubt. It appeared that the date for the inauguration of a new President might arrive without a decision having been reached. Violence was widespread in the South, and there were even threats of another secession movement if justice to the Democrats did not prevail.

In the end the dilemma was solved by an unusual and unprecedented procedure. The determination as to which sets of electoral votes were valid was cast in the lap of a Congressional committee of fifteen men. Of these committeemen, seven were to the Republicans, seven Democrats, and one an independent. But, as actually constituted, the committee contained eight Republican members. Decisions were made strictly on party lines. In every instance the Republican electoral returns were selected. The presidency went to Hayes by a single electoral vote. Soon after his inauguration in 1877,

President Hayes, realizing the circumstances whereby he was elected and earnestly desiring to provide justice, decided to withdraw Federal soldiers from the South. He did and immediately the three remaining carpet-bag regimes collapsed. At long last the South had been "redeemed." "Reconstruction" was at an end.

Although the bloodshed and political bickering were over, their effects lingered long afterwards. The South was reduced to poverty and brought to a position of economic dependence upon the North. Sixty-six years later there are few bright prospects of its reaching economic parity with the North. Its position has been likened to that of a colony supplying raw materials for the mother country and importing higher-priced manufactured goods. This is perhaps an extreme view, but the fact remains that for many years there was a constant financial drain, and the South until recently knew an increasing indebtedness.

Freedom for the Negro did not bring a solution of the race problem. The "reconstruction" programme intensified that problem beyond measure. Once having regained political ascendancy in his state the southern white in the 1890's was to retrench himself to the extent that the Negro was to be practically disfranchised by legislative evasions of the Constitutional amendments, for or against which the southerner had not been given the opportunity to vote. This does not mean that the southern white was ever an enemy of the Negro. The fact is the opposite. Though it is true that some unscrupulous whites take economic advantage of the Negro, this is not generally the case. So long as the Negro does not seek social equality, the southerner is willing and anxious to help procure for him social security. Tremendous progress to this end is being made—and with a limited capital. No race in history has made greater strides than the American Negro has in the twentieth century. That progress will be continued so long as the Negro is willing to forgo an equal status in the dining-room or parlour. Beyond that formula the whites of the South will not go, for, it is argued, two races living together cannot

have social equality without amalgamation; and the southerner intends to keep his Anglo-Saxon strain untarnished by the Negroid. But certain Negro leaders, prompted by northern radicals, are demanding full equality, political, economic, and social. At this point southern tempers rise and violence again threatens. The presence of a Negro minority, a portion of a great nation ninety per cent white, presents a problem much greater to Uncle Sam, because it is a part of his organic self, than any question of imperial policy faced by other nations.

The devastating marches of the armies of Sherman and Sheridan and the invasion in their wake of the carpet-bagger, produced a psychological condition which, though changing emphasis, still remains powerful in the South. The southerner will never tolerate outsiders telling him how to solve his problems. The road to sectional reunion has been slow and hard. The North, practically untouched by invading armies and enjoying unprecedented prosperity during the long years of Reconstruction, soon forgot the rigours of war. The twentieth century found in the average northern mind only vague, romantic notions of the far-away struggle. But many a southerner thrills with pride at the mention of Robert E. Lee or the great "Stonewall," and in inter-sectional football tilts the challenge to "Whip the damn Yanks again!" provides an extra spur for pushing across southern touch-downs. The southerner has so breathed the beautiful air of romance surrounding his battle heroes that the war has become a glorious tradition of valiant victories, only ended by a final, inexplicable defeat. But "Reconstruction," too, is a vivid memory in the South, and a bitter one that perhaps never will be erased.

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Chapter IX

SAMUEL COMES OF AGE (1877-1900)

THE youthful Samuel may be said to have come of age during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This does not mean that during those years he fully matured, but he did pass from adolescence into young manhood. This

vibrant period witnessed an expansion in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, transportation, and finance which transformed a simple farm lad into an aggressive young business man. That young business man, though, was to remain dependent upon his agrarian interests.

Many factors were responsible for this amazingly rapid change. Vast areas of fertile farm land, virgin forests, immense mineral deposits of coal, iron, copper, gold, and silver, along with almost unlimited sources of petroleum and water power, were merely waiting to be used. Ten million vigorous immigrants, mostly from the British Isles, Germany, and Scandinavia, looking for the opportunity to earn a better living and to enjoy greater political and religious freedom, flocked to America, the promised land. This supply of foreign labour offset the loss of native labour moving westward, and thus made possible the expansion of factories in the east and the construction of transcontinental railroads. Meantime, there was in process the rapid transformation of the western prairies into farm communities. American inventive genius accelerated the process. McCormick's reaper, Howe's sewing machine, Hoe's steam printing press, and Edison's incandescent lamp, all of which, through rapid manufacture and wide distribution, present a few examples of the many important contributions to civilization of a vigorous, young nation just reaching its majority.

Freedom from governmental restrictions, the absence of rigid class distinctions, and the existence of unparalleled opportunities to reap huge profits, combined to produce a group of industrial giants. Vanderbilt, Harriman, and Hill are names associated with railroads; Rockefeller with oil; Armour and Swift with meat packing; Carnegie and Schwab with steel; Cooke and Morgan with banking. Because of the ruthless methods which the captains of industry often employed and because of their thirst for power, they have been compared with the feudal barons of the Middle Ages. The "Robber Barons," as one American historian has termed them, were determined to end cut-throat competition among themselves by cutting the throats of their smaller competitors, thus establishing monopolies in their respective fields. Business con-

solidation on a large scale first appeared among the railroads, the weaker lines being absorbed by the stronger ones. In the decade 1867-1877, for example, Cornelius Vanderbilt succeeded in bringing together a number of independent short lines to form the New York Central system (New York to Chicago). The movement spread rapidly to other fields. The result was the formation of such corporate giants as the Standard Oil Company, the American Tobacco Company, the Western Union Telegraph Company, and the United States Steel Company.

Despite the tendency toward "big business" thousands of smaller concerns thrived in hundreds of enterprises. The Industrial Revolution was in rapid swing. Inventions by the thousands were being produced every year. New methods and products ran older ones from the field; but, except for the short-lived Panic of 1893, no period of general unemployment resulted. Men and capital simply moved into the new fields. An eager market absorbed all types of products.

The remarkable industrial development of these years would not have been possible without the rapid improvement in methods of transportation and communication. After 1870, iron steamboats drove wooden sailing vessels from the seas. Larger and faster ships were being built, and the time required for crossing the Atlantic was steadily reduced. The steam locomotive developed in size, speed, and efficiency. Rails of iron were replaced by steel; the English standard gauge track had already been adopted; the air brake and other safety devices were invented. Uncle Sam's big, loose-jointed body was developing a rhythm of action. The Union Pacific, completed in 1869, was followed by other great transcontinental lines—the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fé, and the Northern Pacific. The railroad network increased from 30,000 miles in 1860 to 92,000 in 1880, and to 193,000 in 1900. During this same period the country was being criss-crossed with a network of telegraph and telephone wires usually running parallel with the railroads.

Young Samuel during this period was growing strong physically, but he lacked something. He was at the awkward stage, rough and dynamic, big-hearted and talkative, lacking in

polish and refined sensibilities. Those finer things would come in time when he could settle down in a comfortable chair and smoke his pipe or cigar, but in the closing years of the nineteenth century Samuel was too busy putting on muscle to be bothered with culture. Sherwood Anderson has described this era as follows:

"In the days before the coming of industry, before the time of the mad awakening, the towns of the Middle West were sleepy places devoted to the practice of the old trades, to agriculture and merchandising. In the morning the men of the towns went forth to work in the fields or to the practice of the trade of carpentry, horseshoeing, wagon-making, harness repairing, and the making of shoes and clothing. They read books and believed in a God born in the brains of men who came out of a civilization much like their own. On the farms and in the houses in the towns the men and women worked together toward the same ends in life. They lived in small frame houses set on the plains like boxes, but very substantially built. The carpenter who built a farmer's house differentiated it from the barn by putting what he called scroll-work up under the eaves and by building at the front a porch with carved posts. After one of the poor little houses had been lived in for a long time, after the children had been born and men had died, after men and women had suffered and had moments of joy together in the tiny rooms under the low roofs, a subtle change took place. The houses became almost beautiful in their old humanness. Each of the houses began vaguely to shadow forth the personality of the people who lived within its walls. . . . A sense of quiet growth awoke in sleeping minds. It was the time for art and beauty to awake in the land.

"Instead the giant, Industry, awoke. Boys, who in the schools had read of Lincoln, walking for miles through the forest to borrow his first book . . . began to read in the newspapers and magazines of men who by developing their faculty for getting and keeping money had become suddenly and overwhelmingly rich. Hired writers called these men great, and there was no maturity of mind in the people

with which to combat the force of the statement, often repeated. . . .

"Out through the coal and iron regions of Pennsylvania into Ohio and Indiana, and on westward into the States bordering on the Mississippi River, industry crept. . . .

"A vast energy seemed to come out of the breast of the earth and infect the people. . . . It was a time of hideous architecture, a time when thought and learning paused. Without music, without poetry, without beauty in their lives or impulses, a whole people, full of the native energy and strength of lives lived in a new land, rushed pell-mell into a new age."

A significant characteristic of the new economic order was the growth of cities both in size and in influence. In the period 1860 to 1900 the urban population of the United States increased from sixteen to thirty-three per cent of the whole people. Even more striking was the increase in the size of the largest cities. In the twenty years from 1880 to 1900 the population of New York City grew from a little less than two to almost three and one-half millions. Chicago's inhabitants increased in number from half a million to a million and a half, and Philadelphia fell back into third place in size. Cities like Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Omaha, and Atlanta more than doubled in population.

The rapid and unregulated growth of cities created problems of a new complex character. How should the teeming thousands who thronged into the overcrowded cities be housed and transported? How could they be protected against diseases and epidemics which resulted from impure water, inadequate sewage disposal, congestion, and poverty? What measures should be adopted to control crime and vice? How could the children of the cities be afforded proper schooling? All these questions and many others of a similar nature were suddenly thrust upon city governments that were poorly equipped to deal with them. Progress toward solution of these problems was slow in the late nineteenth century.

Paralleling the industrial development of the post-Civil War period, and somewhat overshadowed by it, was a series of

striking improvements in methods of farming which raised agriculture to the level of a science. Inventive minds turned their attention to every farm operation. Seed drills, corn planters, cultivators, threshers, mowing machines, hay loaders, and countless other useful machines appeared on the market. Horse-power largely replaced man-power in the heavier farm tasks. A little later the perfection of the petrol engine provided the farmer with a still more convenient source of power.

The Morrill Act of 1862 had first granted Federal lands for the establishment of state colleges of agriculture and the mechanical arts. Older State Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges or Polytechnic Institutes were already flourishing and many new ones were established in the latter part of the century. The Federal Bureau of Agriculture, established in 1862, was raised in 1889 to the rank of a Department with a Secretary in the President's Cabinet. Two years earlier the Hatch Act had provided Federal aid for the establishment of agricultural experiment stations in each state. The experiment stations thus established, in conjunction with state agricultural colleges and government agencies, entered into detailed studies of almost every phase of agriculture. Problems of plant and animal breeding, soil fertility and drainage, control of insect pests and plant diseases, use of fertilizers, reforestation, and proper methods of storage, marketing, and farm management, were attacked in a true scientific spirit.

The result was a complete transformation in farm life. The farm lost its character of staid self-sufficiency and became a progressive business. But all this Agricultural Revolution was accompanied by the evils of too rapid change. Increase in land value, heavy costs of machinery, and the substitution of chemical fertilizer for manure required capital. Frequently the farmer became involved in heavy debts which in turn added to his overhead. The small diversified farm of the sixties, with fields of wheat, corn, oats, and barley, its orchards, vegetable garden, and pasture, gave way to large farms specializing in staple crops which could be produced with one kind of machinery and sold for cash. Another result was an alarming increase in farm mortgages and in tenancy. By the turn of the century every third farmer was a tenant. Here was an ugly

tendency which was not checked until the days of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. Sam was not destined to grow to manhood without many cuts and bruises.

Meantime the bleeding South was struggling to its feet. It had at long last thrown off the yoke of carpet-bag government, but had been left weak and emaciated. Its capital had been wiped out by the abolition of slavery, the enforced cancellation of Confederate bonds and currency, the years of corrupt squandering of state and local finances, besides the destruction of rolling stock and factories—and all the while the drain to the North caused by the high tariff policy. The abundance of Negro labour not only caused low wages to native whites and coloured, but prevented immigration from abroad. Indeed, many ambitious young people of the South migrated to the North or West in search of better opportunities. Even so, the vast majority of the gallant people of that huge area waged a continuous fight against great odds to rebuild a more stable economic and social order. Cotton remained during the rest of the century the foundation stone upon which the whole economy rested. On one side of that centre stone, though, was a good export market bringing in fresh capital; on the other was a revival of merchandising to supply farm needs. Then came the rebuilding of railroads and re-establishment of steamboat lines by which cotton was transported to market and supplies brought in. Other stones in the structure were the necessary traffic in horses and mules, buggies and wagons, harness and blacksmith supplies. Carpenters, brick-makers, warehousemen, and stevedores in time had their counterparts in architects, engineers, contractors, and bankers. There was always an abundance of physicians and lawyers, preachers, and school teachers. Toward the end of the century the old market towns and seaports began to take on the aspect of cities. Then came the discovery of coal and iron and other mineral deposits in vast quantities, and northern capital began to move in to tap these sources of vast wealth. The end of the century saw the dawn of a New South.

No achievement of the past Civil War period was more striking than the nation's rapid conquest of the West. During the 1850's the migration from east to west had suddenly

jumped across the vast prairie country just west of the Mississippi—jumped across the Rockies to the Pacific Coast. The discovery of gold in California and the salmon runs of the far north-west, the beautiful agricultural lands of southern California and the giant timber lands of Oregon and Washington had all beckoned to youthful Americans. Then came the period in which the frontier was no longer just that country immediately to the west, but rather the fringes of that great expanse in between the Far West and the Mississippi—the Great Plains—that tremendous almost treeless region which but a few years before had been the home of wandering buffalo herds and savage Indian tribes. Within the space of thirty years—1860 to 1890—that enclosure gradually shrank and disappeared before the onrushing forces of civilization. The frontier, which had existed since Virginia was first settled, had gone.

During the fifties and sixties rich deposits of gold and silver had been discovered not only in California but also in Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana. Mining became the chief industry of the mountainous West. A typical mining town of the "wild west," Virginia City, Nevada, was thus described by M. P. Langford in his *Vigilante Days and Ways*:

"This human hive, numbering at least ten thousand people, was the product of ninety days. Into it were crowded all the elements of a rough and active civilization. Thousands of cabins and tents and brush wakiups . . . scattered at random along the banks, and in the nooks of the hills, were seen on every hand. Every foot of the gulch, under the active manipulations of the miners, was undergoing displacement. . . . Gold was abundant, and every possible device was employed by the gamblers, the traders, the vile men and women that had come in with the miners to the locality, to obtain it. Nearly every third cabin in the towns was a saloon where vile whisky was peddled out for fifty cents a drink in gold dust. Many of these places were filled with gambling tables and gamblers, and the miner who was bold enough to enter one of them with his day's earnings

in his pocket, seldom left until thoroughly fleeced. Hurdy-gurdy dance-houses were numerous, and there were plenty of camp beauties to patronize them. . . . Not a day or night passed which did not yield its full fruition of fights, quarrels, wounds or murders. The crack of the revolver was often heard above the merry notes of the violin. Street fights were frequent, and as no one knew when or where they would occur, everyone was on his guard against a random shot.

"Sunday was always a gala day. The miners then left their work and gathered about the public places in the towns. The stores were all open, the auctioneers specially eloquent on every corner in praise of their wares. Thousands of people crowded the thoroughfares, ready to rush in any direction of promised excitement. Horse-racing was among the most favoured amusements. Prize rings were formed, and brawny men engaged at fisticuffs until their sight was lost, onlookers cheered the victor . . . Pistols flashed, bowie-knives flourished, and braggart oaths filled the air, as often as men's passions triumphed over their reason. This was indeed the reign of unbridled licence, and men who at first regarded it with disgust and terror, by constant exposure soon learned to become part of it, and forgot that they had been aught else. All classes of society were represented at this general exhibition. Judges, lawyers, doctors, even clergymen, could not claim exemption. Culture and religion afforded feeble protection, where allurements and indulgence ruled the hour."

The last gold rush took place in the Black Hills region of western Dakota territory, on the reservations of the war-like Sioux Indians. In 1874 came news of the discovery of the yellow metal in this region, and the rush was on. Four thousand feverish prospectors rushed into the desolate hills between the forks of the Cheyenne. Very few made fortunes for themselves. Placer mining, carried on by individual miners, soon changed to quartz mining, and this change required the purchase of expensive machinery, the hiring of engineering skill, and the organization of mining as a big business.

Heavily capitalized companies, like the Homestead, took over the industry and the miners became day labourers working for wages. Within a few years the days of rowdy glamour were gone.

The westward thrust of the railroads encouraged cattlemen to test the possibilities of the eastern markets. During the 1870's and '80's Texan longhorns were driven in ever larger herds to the rail centres of Kansas and Nebraska for shipment. Cattlemen soon discovered the advantage of fattening their stock on the free, open ranges of the northern plains which were still part of the public domain. Colorado, Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana contained excellent pasturage. During the two decades after 1865 more than 285,000 cattle annually were fattened on the rent-free pasturage and shipped to eastern stockyards. These years marked the heyday of the "long drive," the cowboys, the open ranges, and the cattle barons still at this late date a popular favourite for second-rate cinema showings.

The dominant role in the conquest of the West, however, was reserved for humble farmers, who swarmed by the hundreds of thousands out into the high plains and into the mountain valleys, subduing the wilderness and bringing it under cultivation.

During the Civil War the demand for grain to feed the Northern armies, coupled with the failure of crops in England, had stimulated wheat production. Increasing numbers of settlers took up land in Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, and Minnesota. At the close of the war, thousands of restless ex-soldiers drifted westward to engage in prospecting or farming. Impetus was given the movement by the terms of the Homestead Act of 1862, which granted a free farm of one hundred and sixty acres to any settler who remained on the land for five years. Native Americans were by no means the only group to avail themselves of this opportunity; thousands of Germans, Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes came to the New World also to acquire land they could call their own. By 1880 almost 20,000,000 acres had been occupied by homesteaders.

The transcontinental railroad companies which had received huge grants of western land from the government were active

agents in further stimulating western settlement. They advertised the golden opportunities that awaited settlers, laid out towns, advanced credit, and frequently transported whole communities to the West without charge. Such apparent generosity was largely prompted by business considerations. As James J. Hill, president of the Great Northern Railway, put it: "We consider ourselves and the people along our lines as co-partners in the prosperity of the country we both occupy, and the prosperity of the one should mean the prosperity of both, and their adversity will be quickly followed by ours."

Under the impact of miner, soldier, cowboy, and farmer, the last great American "West" underwent a series of swift changes. The wild lawlessness of the mining camp yielded to the forces of orderly government; the lone gold prospector, with his pick, shovel, and pan, gave way before the advance of organized capital, equipped with efficient machinery. On the plains buffaloes (the American Bison) were slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands until they were almost exterminated. At the same time, the few remaining tribes of American Indians, making their last desperate stand, were thoroughly subjugated, but not without a gallant fight. In 1876 General George Armstrong Custer and a troop of regulars were wiped out to a man at the battle of Little Big Horn in the Black Hills of Dakota. By 1886 the regular Army had broken the backbone of Indian resistance and the surviving tribesmen were hemmed in on government reservations.

The brief reign of the great cattle-kings was brought to an end by the fences of the sheep-raiser and the homesteader. Factories in the East and Middle West were pouring out millions of miles of a revolutionary product, barbed wire, which brought about the end of the open range. Thus, along with the coming of the railroads there was created a division of a million square miles into hundreds of thousands of great ranches and wheat farms. Then came farm machinery and peaceful agriculture. Law and order had at last come to the land beyond the "Father of Waters."

By 1890 the supply of desirable free farm land was practically exhausted. Almost overnight the American frontier had vanished. One western geographical expanse after another had

SAMUEL COMES OF AGE (1877-1900)

sought and obtained admission to the Union, so that by the close of the century the thirty-three states of 1861 had grown in number to forty-five. The days of the Wild West were almost gone even though in fiction, in song, and, of course, in the cinema they were to endure for decades longer.

Post-war expansion in industry and in agriculture meantime had given rise to a series of complex economic and political problems. The prosperity which eastern farmers had enjoyed during and after the Civil War came to an end with the panic of 1873. The years that followed were marked by low prices for agricultural products, with hard times and discontent resulting. The factors chiefly responsible for the farmers' plight were overproduction of farm products, excessive railroad rates and unscrupulous railroad practices, the high cost of farm machinery and other manufactured products needed by the farmer, and the high rates of interest on farmers' mortgages.

These conditions, which were beyond the control of any individual farmer, gave rise to numerous protest movements. The first of these was the Granger movement. It had been organized in 1867 for fraternal and educational purposes. Here was the first important farm organization. In their association these Grangers saw the possibilities of presenting a solid front against their economic rivals. Their organization grew in numbers. They appealed to other farmers to join their cause. In time they gained control of the legislatures of several of the Middle Western states; they secured the enactment of state laws regulating railroad rates and grain elevator charges. With this turn of events, the railroads retaliated by refusing to build additional mileage in those states. Furthermore, to bring pressure to bear for repeal of the regulating legislation, the railroad companies allowed existing transportation service in the offending states to deteriorate. Naturally, their lawyers found grounds for litigation. They fought one case all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, where in 1876 they were defeated. The Court upheld the "Granger Laws" on the grounds that railroads and other public enterprises in which the public had a vital interest must submit to public regulation for "the common good." But the corporations did not stop with one defeat. Eventually, in 1886 the Supreme Court

changed its view. In the Wabash Case it practically nullified the "Granger Laws" by declaring that no state could exercise any control over inter-state commerce.

Thus the farmers failed. It was not enough to gain political control in states. They would have to enter the national arena, and in that sphere they would run into highly paid corporation lawyers and lobbyists who knew all the tricks of the trade, who had a beautiful hold on the dominant Republican party machine, and who had all the ready cash necessary to finance any political move, fair or foul.

Had the mid-western farmers been able to swing the southern farmers into the Granger movement they perhaps might have become a dominant force in the nation's capital. Such, though, was not to be. After driving the carpet-baggers and Negroes (all Republicans) out of their legislative halls, the white citizens of southern states remained solidly attached to the party which had supported them. They were Democrats, and that was that. Within their own states there might be right-wing Democrats and left-wing Democrats, but they were Democrats and not Republicans. No third party, whatever the issue, had a chance now. The woes they might suffer at the hands of railroads and other vested interests were minor to those they had known under the yoke of "Black Republicanism." They loved the party which had rescued them.

Fully cognizant of this state of mind, the northern Democrats simply accepted it as a natural course of things that they should never have to worry about the votes of the South. The political big-wigs in the North could make the platform, select the candidate, and ignore economic and social circumstances of the South, and still not fear defeat below the Ohio. Had the eastern Democrats adopted the platforms of the western farmers they would have lost the support of eastern urban interests. They chose the latter and American industry continued to thrive at the expense of the farmer—west and south. It was a bad situation and contributed greatly to the Panic of 1873 and that of 1893.

Third party movements, though, continued to show their heads. In 1876 the Greenback Party was organized with western agricultural backing. It is obvious that the farmers

as a whole did not see very deeply into the nature of their plight in the 1870's. They attributed their poor economic condition to a shortage of money in national circulation. During the Civil War the government had issued about \$450,000,000 worth of unsecured paper money, commonly called "greenbacks." The redemption of these bills was naturally causing deflation. The Greenback Party had proposed that additional paper currency be issued. Despite an impressive showing in the Congressional election of 1878, the campaign for cheap money failed.

The advocates of inflation next turned to silver. In 1873 Congress had discontinued the coinage of silver dollars. Not long before, the rich deposits of silver had been discovered in the West. Soon the metal was being produced in large quantities, with the result that its price in terms of gold declined sharply. Mine-owners seeking a wider market for their produce clamoured for a return to free and unlimited coinage of silver. They were joined by the western farmers and by the debtor class in general, who believed that the more money there was in circulation the easier it would be for them to meet their obligations. "Free silver" advocates now, with some "big business" support, succeeded in securing the passage of the Bland-Allison Act in 1878, providing that the government should purchase from \$2,000,000 to \$4,000,000 worth of silver every month. In 1890 Congress passed the still more liberal Sherman Silver Act, which increased the government's purchases to 4,500,000 ounces every month. Paper money, which was backed by silver, now began to drive the more precious gold out of circulation. The government's silver-purchase policy was regarded in the East as a wild leftist move. It seems to be a fact that this silver policy did contribute to the depression of 1893, but the fundamental causes were deeper. President Cleveland, a Democrat backed by Tammany Hall and other New York interests, finally prevailed upon Congress to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. The farmers and small townsfolk and debtors in general were disgruntled and accused Cleveland of deserting them. Actually, he did no such thing, for the Democratic Party may hardly be said to have represented those elements. The Democratic machine was being

dominated by conservatives, that of the Republicans by reactionaries.

In the meantime Silverites, Greenbackers, Grangers, and other discontented groups were uniting to form the Populist Party. The platform drawn up by the eloquent Ignatius Donnelly in 1892 condemned both major parties and painted a melancholy picture of the American scene. Specifically, it called for: (1) Abolition of the national bank system; (2) government ownership of public utilities; (3) a graduated income tax; (4) adoption of the initiative and referendum; and (5) free coinage of silver. In the election of 1892 the Populist candidate for the presidency, James B. Weaver, of Iowa, polled over a million votes. Leaders of the old, established parties—both Democrats and Republicans—viewed this outburst of “radicalism” with alarm.

The surprising rise of the Populist movement and then the Panic of 1893 forced the politicians to accept some liberal views. During the rest of the 1890's the Democrats were slowly being converted to the belief that “free silver” would cure the nation's economic ills. In 1896 they nominated for the presidency William Jennings Bryan, of Nebraska, an eloquent liberal, who swept the National party convention off its feet with his impassioned “Cross of Gold” speech, in which he cried:

“We have petitioned, and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated; and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged, and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no more, we petition no more. We defy them! Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests [sic], the labouring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: ‘You shall not press down upon the brow of labour this crown of thorns—you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold!’”

The Republicans chose William McKinley as their candidate and pledged themselves to maintain the gold standard. The ensuing campaign was one of the most bitterly fought in

American history. The Democrats accused the Republicans of sacrificing the welfare of the farmers and the labourers in order to advance the selfish interests of the capitalists. The Republicans attacked their opponents for advocating unsound financial policies and radical schemes in government.

The results of the election proved that the fears of the conservatives had been somewhat exaggerated. Bryan carried the "Solid South" and most of the Far West; but the populous East and the Middle West, together with the trans-Mississippi states of Iowa, Minnesota, and the Pacific Coast states of Oregon and California, gave McKinley an emphatic victory. Commenting on the campaign, Mrs. Henry Cabot Lodge, wife of the Republican Senator from Massachusetts, wrote:

"The great fight is won, a fight conducted by trained and experienced and organized forces, with both hands full of money, with the full power of the press—and of prestige—on one side; on the other a disorganized mob, at first, out of which burst into sight, hearing, and force—one man, but such a man! Alone, penniless, without backing, without money, with scarce a paper, without speakers, that man fought such a fight that even those in the East can call him a Crusader, an inspired fanatic—a Prophet! It has been marvellous. Hampered by such a following, such a platform . . . he almost won. We acknowledge to 7,000,000 campaign fund, against his 300,000 [dollars]. We had during the last week of the campaign 18,000 speakers on the stump. He alone spoke for his party, but speeches which spoke to the intelligence and hearts of the people, and with a capital P. It is over now, but the vote is 7,000,000 to 6,500,000."

The significance of the campaign was not lost upon contemporaries. The election of McKinley constituted a triumph for a big business, for a manufacturing and industrial rather than an agrarian order, for the Hamiltonian rather than the Jeffersonian state. But forty-eight per cent of those Americans who voted had gone on record as favouring the curtailment of "big business," and the vast majority of those who did not vote were definitely in the ranks of the liberals.

Unrest among the farmers was paralleled by discontent

among the industrial workers. Theodore Roosevelt, one day to be the dominant figure of the Republicans, put the matter with characteristic clarity:

"The old familiar relations between employer and employee were passing. A few generations before, the boss had known every man in his shop; he called his men Bill, Tom, Dick, John; he inquired after their wives and babies; he swapped jokes and stories and perhaps a bit of tobacco with them. In the small establishment there had been a friendly human relationship between employer and employee.

There was no such relation between the great railway magnates, who controlled the anthracite industry, and the one hundred and fifty thousand men who worked in their mines, or the half million women and children who were dependent upon these miners for their daily bread. Very few of these mine workers had ever seen, for instance, the president of the Reading Railroad. . . . Another change . . . was a crass inequality in the bargaining relation between the employer and the individual employee standing alone. The great coal-mining and coal-carrying companies, which employed their tens of thousands, could easily dispense with the services of any particular miner. The miner, on the other hand, could not dispense with the companies. He needed a job; his wife and children would starve if he did not get one. What the miner had to sell—if not sold—was lost forever. Moreover, his labour was not, like most commodities—a mere thing; it was part of a living, breathing human being. The workman saw that the labour problem was not only an economic, but also a moral, a human problem."

It was in response to this situation that labourers organized to secure not only their economic but also their simple human rights. Before the Civil War associations of workers were largely local. In 1869 a secret organization of national scope, the Knights of Labour, was founded. It proposed to unite all workers into one great national union. The Knights advocated the eight-hour day, workmen's compensation laws, workers' co-operative associations, an income tax, and government ownership of public utilities. As the organization in-

creased in size, it came under the domination of a radical group. Numerous strikes and increasing lawlessness aroused public indignation. Faced by the growth of a vigorous rival, the Knights of Labour declined rapidly after 1886.

A new organization, the American Federation of Labour, differed from the Knights of Labour in that it was a federation of trade and industrial unions rather than a general association of all kinds of workers. Each union member enjoyed a considerable amount of self-government in matters affecting its own particular trade. The aims of the Federation were entirely practical—higher wages, the eight-hour day, the Saturday half-holiday, restriction of contract labour immigration, a Federal child labour law, and the establishment of a Federal Department of Labour. Under the aggressive leadership of its president, Samuel Gompers, radical theories and political entanglements were avoided. His organization prospered. Despite the loss of the great Homestead strike against the Carnegie Steel Company in 1892 and the failure of the Pullman strike two years later, the American Federation of Labour weathered the hard times of 1893-97 and entered the twentieth century with a membership of over half a million. Meantime, it supported a policy of liberal character for industry and politics, but its full programme was not realized during the Republican administrations. Uncle Sam approached adulthood in a mildly conservative frame of mind, but with an innate sense of fair-play, and some liking for progressive action.

During the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century the doctrine that governments should not interfere with business enterprise found ready acceptance in the United States. The theory of *laissez-faire* was in harmony with the frontier spirit of sturdy independence and with the Jeffersonian distrust of too much government regulation. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, therefore, private capital was allowed to carry on its activities without restraint. The only exception made in favour of government regulation was the protective tariff, and in this instance the purpose was, of course, to assure control of the American market by the American manufacturer.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the American

Government was forced to modify its policy. Public opinion was becoming increasingly hostile to "big business" and its monopolistic tendencies, as well as to the unfair practices of railroads and other corporate enterprises. The railroad companies, by their unscrupulous methods, continued to draw upon themselves the scrutiny not only of the states but also of the national government. Exorbitant rates, pooling agreements between competitors, rebates to favoured shippers, and corrupt political practices such as outright bribery, the issuance of free passes to public officials, and the hiring of important legislators as legal advisers, all glaringly brought into the public eye, at last produced Congressional action. In one state after another laws and more laws had been passed to curb the unbridled power of the railroads. But by every means that highly paid law firms could devise, the spirit of these laws was violated. Many cases were carried to the courts and decisions favourable to the big corporations were won. There were nearly always loopholes in the laws.

When the Supreme Court by its decision in the *Wabash Case* of 1886 practically put an end to state regulation of roads and rates, the burden of guaranteeing justice was placed squarely upon the Federal Government. In spite of the strenuous opposition of the railroad interests, Congress responded with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which forbade excessive rates, pooling, and discrimination against localities or persons. An Interstate Commerce Commission was created to administer the provisions of the Act, but it lacked the power to enforce its decisions except by court action. The courts proved to be flagrantly partial to the railroads, so that the Commission was able to accomplish very little down to the close of the century.

Government regulation of railroads was followed in 1890 by an attempt to supervise other forms of business. The vicious practices employed by the trusts to eliminate competitors, their corrupt influence on politicians, and their attempts to secure monopolies in order to maintain high prices aroused public indignation. In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which declared illegal "any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade." This vague law was

hard to understand and easy to evade. Again, the corporation lawyer was called upon to produce; and the courts were dominated by conservative minds, bent upon interpretation of legal phrases rather than loosely handing down decisions in line with the spirit of the law. The result was that business consolidation continued on an unprecedented scale. "Trust busting" had to await another day. So did a downward revision of the tariff. While it is true that the trust form of organization was abandoned, the holding company, the merger and interlocking directorates, proved just as effective in promoting the growth of huge business combinations.

For a generation following the Civil War the immigrants from north-western Europe—England, Ireland, Germany, and Scandinavia—continued to predominate in the influx from across the Atlantic. Then after 1880 increasing numbers began to arrive from southern and eastern Europe. By 1890 Italian, Slav, and Jewish immigrants were in the majority. The changed character of this stream of immigration was creating new problems. The people from southern and eastern Europe were accustomed to lower standards of living; many of them were illiterates; and they crowded together in colonies forming alien "islands" or enclaves within the large cities. These enclaves were difficult to assimilate. So great was the influx of these "foreigners" that by the close of the century they were threatening to swamp the older American stock in some cities. This situation did not exist in the agricultural South, where the Negro labourer offered too much competition; nor did it exist in the nation at large, but New England and other eastern states underwent a decided change. Of course the concentration point of this whole movement was the City of New York, the most cosmopolitan city of the world. Jacob Riis thus describes New York City in 1890 when the new immigration was just beginning on a large scale:

"A map of the city, coloured to designate nationalities, would show more stripes than on the skin of a zebra, and more colours than any rainbow. The city on such a map would fall into two great halves, green for the Irish prevailing in the West Side tenement districts, and blue for the

Germans on the East Side. But intermingled with these ground colours would be an odd variety of tints that would give the whole the appearance of an extraordinary crazy-quilt. From down in the Sixth Ward . . . the red of the Italian would be seen forcing its way northward along the line of Mulberry Street to the quarter of the French purple on Bleeker Street and South Fifth Avenue, to lose itself, after a lapse of miles, in the 'Little Italy' of Harlem. . . . Dashes of red would be seen strung through the District, northward to the city line. On the West Side the red would be seen over-running the Old Africa of Thompson Street, pushing the black of the negro rapidly uptown. . . . Hardly less aggressive than the Italian, the Russian and the Polish Jew . . . is filling the tenements of the old Seventh Ward to the river front, and disputing with the Italian every foot of available space in the back alleys of Mulberry Street. . . . Between the dull grey of the Jew, and the Italian red, would be seen squeezed in on the map a sharp streak of yellow marking the narrow boundaries of Chinatown. Dove-tailed in with the German population the poor but thrifty Bohemian might be picked out by the sombre hue of his life as of his philosophy. . . . Down near the Battery the West Side emerald would be soiled by a dirty stain, spreading rapidly like a splash of ink on a sheet of blotting-paper, headquarters of the Arab tribe. Dots and dashes of colour here and there would show where the Finnish sailors worship their God, the Greek pedlars the ancient name of their race, and the Swiss the goddess of thrift. . . ."

This may be a good portrait of the racial strains of the great city of New York, but it is now not so of America as a whole. In contradistinction stood the Southern whites, who were almost wholly British in origin, Protestant, and agricultural. The combination was less true of the West and Mid-West, but it was the dominant stamp of Uncle Sam, and is today except for urbanization.

The earliest modification of the American policy of unrestricted immigration was occasioned by the Chinese, who had come to the United States to work in the mines and on

the railroads. Because of their lower standards of living, and their willingness to work for low wages, the Orientals aroused the antagonism of the native American workers. For years Californians waged a bitter campaign to stop Chinese immigration to the United States. Finally, in 1882, Congress adopted an Exclusion Act which was subsequently renewed every ten years until repealed in 1943. At the same time the government took action against certain undesired groups by barring the admission of anarchists and physical, moral, and mental defectives. It was not until the entrance of the United States into the World War, however, that the government inaugurated a policy of exclusion, which became increasingly stringent in the years that followed, until immigration was almost stopped.

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century the United States had been too busy with problems of internal development to pay much attention to events in the outside world. Then several factors combined to direct Uncle Sam's energies to world affairs. The elimination of the states' rights and slavery issues furnished the basis for political unity and for a more vigorous nationalism. The settlement of the Far West completed his continental expansion and gave him a new interest in the affairs of the Pacific. The advance of "Big Business" transformed the United States into an industrial nation eager for new markets, for sources of raw materials, and for fields in which surplus capital might be invested profitably.

During most of the nineteenth century the foreign policy of the United States had rested upon a strong desire for isolation. This was especially true after the fiasco of 1812. Uncle Sam's inclination toward isolation, though, was one thing. What actually transpired was another. He wanted to eat his cake and keep it too. He could not do both. As long as European immigrants were pouring in at a rate of half a million a year, while the Federal government was purchasing or acquiring more territory (2,845,000 square miles were added during the nineteenth century), as long as the Monroe Doctrine was a keystone of foreign policy (and it still is), as long as Democracy was a football on the playing field of Europe, Uncle Sam simply could not follow a rigid policy of

isolation, much as that was desired. Then after 1890, when the frontier disappeared, when all the prairie lands had been settled, when both manufacturers and mineral interests, both cotton and wheat farmers, both meat-raisers and packers all demanded foreign markets, the days of the vague possibility of isolation were for ever gone. The average American never stopped to reason this through in the nineteenth century. He liked the theory of "no entangling alliances" and talked it up on many occasions, but he knew full well that he was already moving into the foreign field with a policy of vigour and fearlessness.

This vigorous policy had begun with the purchase of Alaska. Late on the afternoon of March 29, 1867, the Russian minister to Washington informed Secretary of State William H. Seward that the Czar of Russia was willing to sell Alaska to the United States. Seward was immediately enthusiastic. He would not even wait until the next day to draw up the treaty, but kept the poor Russian minister up until four o'clock in the morning to sign the agreement. The Senate shortly afterward ratified the treaty, and the House of Representatives appropriated the money—\$1,400,000 for Alaska and \$5,800,000 payment for Russian naval expenses when Alexander II, at Lincoln's request, had demonstrated against Palmerston, who had threatened to back the Confederacy in 1861.

Enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine involved the United States on several grave international situations, inasmuch as the Doctrine plainly stated that the United States would permit no interference with the established governments of the Western Hemisphere. At the end of the Civil War the Federal government had forced the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico. Thereupon the Mexican people rose up, overthrew the puppet empire which had been founded by the Austrian Archduke Maximilian, with the military support of Napoleon III, and with American blessing the Republic of Mexico was re-established. Then in 1895 President Cleveland and Congress took action to end a long-standing boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela. The latter country pointed out that the British had taken territory in dispute, and in doing so had violated the Monroe Doctrine.

Since this was technically correct, Uncle Sam demanded that Great Britain arbitrate the matter. But Queen Victoria's ministers were not in the habit of taking orders from anyone. London replied that the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of international law and that, even if it ever had been, it was now obsolete. Furthermore, in this case arbitration was considered absolutely unnecessary, for Venezuela was clearly in the wrong. Nevertheless, Cleveland insisted. Britain hesitated. Meantime, all Latin Americans watched with keenest interest the controversy between Mother England and her strapping young offspring. It was a deadly serious moment. Finally, in disgust, Lord Salisbury agreed to arbitration. The decision of the special tribunal, fortunately, was favourable to Great Britain. Uncle Sam drew a sigh of relief. The Monroe Doctrine had been upheld. Europe raised an eyebrow and then frowned. Who was this young upstart nation across the Atlantic now dictating international law? It was then that Bismarck pronounced the Monroe Doctrine to be "international impertinence." Perhaps he was right, but the policy of arbitration of international disputes was certainly not a bad idea. Already in 1874 the two English-speaking nations had submitted the *Alabama* claims to an arbitration board. Then had followed arbitration of other disputes, such as those over fishing rights. The unfortified boundary between the United States and Canada is a monument to the successful use of arbitration plus the application of international good faith.

A new addition to nineteenth-century foreign policy was Pan-Americanism. The Doctrine was formulated by Secretary of State James G. Blaine, who in the 1880's was eager to unite the American republics into some sort of an association under the benevolent leadership of the United States, and to establish closer commercial contact between the United States and Latin America. In October, 1889, Blaine presided over the first Pan-American Congress. Latin Americans, however, were suspicious of American motives, and the sole tangible result was the establishment of the Pan-American Union to facilitate the interchange of commercial information.

Bismarck did not live to see how serious Uncle Sam really was about the Monroe Doctrine and the business of arbitra-

tion. Had he lived three or four years longer, although he would have scowled, he probably could also have given his young kaiser some sage advice. It is a coincidence that Uncle Sam's first serious brush with Germany was over these very questions, and again Venezuela was the scene.

This second Venezuelan affair occurred in 1902-1903. A dictator had seized the reins of government in the United States of Venezuela and showed no inclination to pay his nation's debts. A European coalition of Germany, Great Britain, and Italy dispatched a German fleet to the Caribbean, blockaded Venezuelan ports, and actually opened fire upon coastal fortifications. At first Uncle Sam looked on in amazement. There was a moment of trepidation, too, for this was the first time the young nation had been called upon to assert counter-policies before such a powerful alliance. Was this a violation of the Monroe Doctrine? This question was open to some argument. Who started all this, anyway? Why were German vessels sent to American waters? The answer to that was quickly ascertained as the doings of an ambitious Kaiser Wilhelm. Suddenly the new President, Theodore Roosevelt, went into action. He called in the German ambassador and demanded the withdrawal of the German fleet within four days. The next day the President asked the ambassador what Berlin intended to do. The ambassador had not learned yet. Teddy's face flushed. The ambassador was told to cable His Imperial Majesty that the American navy, under Admiral Dewey, was already steaming southward and that if within twelve hours the German vessels were not casting off the coast of Venezuela, they would be sent to the bottom of the Caribbean. The Germans withdrew. The second Venezuelan affair was arbitrated.

In the arbitration findings once again Venezuela was found to be clearly in the wrong. It was quite clear that she was trying to avoid payment of just debts. Those obligations had to be met. It was evident that if Uncle Sam would not allow others to collect, then he must become an international debt collector, perhaps even a sheriff. Venezuela agreed to pay her debts. Then the very next year (1904) the Dominican Republic defaulted on its debts. European creditors this time waited to

see what Uncle Sam would do. Immediately the President proclaimed the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine—that chronic wrongdoing on the part of nations of the Western Hemisphere would force the United States to exercise an international police power. Roosevelt, off the record, said something about "treading softly and carrying a big stick." Uncle Sam did just that. He put into effect the "Big Stick Policy," establishing customs receiverships in the Dominican Republic and later in Nicaragua and in Haiti. In each case, after placing the countries on a sound financial footing, the resident Marines were withdrawn. Europe thereafter stayed out of America, or at least that part of America not occupied prior to Monroe's promulgation of his Doctrine in 1823.

Meanwhile, the Latin Americans were watching the "Big Brother" with mingled feelings. Where was this Big Stick Policy leading? Was Uncle Sam sincere? Was all this just "dollar diplomacy"—an effort to promote an exclusive trade for Uncle Sam's "big business" interests? There seemed to be good reasons for an affirmative answer to this question, because American capital was already moving southward and buying up mineral concessions, banana plantations, and politicians. The "Big Brother" became known in Latin America as "The Colossus of the North." But this was but part of the story.

By this time two major events had taken place. Spain had been crushed in the Spanish-American War, and Uncle Sam was building the Panama Canal.

With all his good intentions about isolation and arbitration, young Samuel, as he entered adulthood, was a bellicose youngster. He had strong likes and dislikes. One of his chief dislikes was oppression of little nations or helpless peoples. The Cubans and the Puerto Ricans were being mistreated by their Spanish masters. The situation was not nearly so bad as William Randolph Hearst's newspapers indicated (there were financial forces behind Hearst's propaganda campaign), but the Americans of the 1890's were trusting enough to believe nearly everything they read. A crusading spirit swept the land—a determination to free Cuba and at the same time to end

Spanish misrule in the New World. And so both jobs were done quickly and neatly.

The excuse was provided in February, 1898, when the U.S.S. *Maine* was blown up in the harbour of Havana, Cuba. Hearst's papers clamoured for war. The public did not stop to argue that the battleship might have been blown up by Cuban rebels just to provide the spark of war between the United States and Spain. Hearst later admitted that it cost him a million dollars to bring about the war, but he made his money back many times as a result of increased circulation and advertising engendered by war news and spending. Neither President McKinley nor Congress had the courage to oppose an aroused public opinion, and on April 20 the United States declared war on Spain. As evidence to the world that the United States was not fighting a war of aggression, Congress passed a war resolution containing the so-called Teller Resolution, which pledged the United States to withdraw from Cuba as soon as its independence had been established and its political stability assured.

From a military point of view the war was extremely one-sided. Spain was no match for her vigorous New World opponent. One Spanish fleet was destroyed in the Philippine Islands in the Battle of Manila Bay by a squadron under Admiral Dewey.* Another Spanish fleet met the same fate in the Battle of Santiago, Cuba. These naval triumphs were followed by quick victories on land. While one American force captured Santiago, another took possession of the island of Puerto Rico, and a third land expedition seized the city of Manila in the Philippines. Utterly defeated, Spain sued for peace. By the Treaty of Paris of 1898 she agreed to withdraw from Cuba, to cede Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States and to give up the Philippines in return for \$20,000,000.

* It is a most interesting commentary on Anglo-American relations to note that nearly all of Europe sympathized with Spain in this war, but when a German fleet appeared in Manila Bay just before the battle and seemed ready to give aid to the Spaniards, suddenly at that moment a British fleet moved in between the Germans and Americans. Here is a world's classic example of arbitration, silent arbitration with decks cleared for action. Americans never forgot the little episode. Germans did, or, at any rate, ignored its significance.

The conflict with Spain marked the beginning of a new epoch in American history. Control over islands inhabited by alien and backward races created new constitutional and administrative problems. Possession of Puerto Rico and guardianship over Cuba increased American interest in the affairs of Latin America. Acquisition of the Philippines brought the United States into closer contact with the Far East. Uncle Sam, almost overnight, had become a world power.

The Hawaiian Islands had been peacefully annexed in 1898, after two decades of business penetration. In the same year, during the Spanish-American War, the Stars and Stripes were hoisted over Wake Island. Midway had been used as a coaling station since 1867. A storm and subsequent arbitration in 1889 had prevented armed conflict between Anglo-American and German naval units in the Samoan group of the far South Pacific. A treaty gave Uncle Sam the harbour of Pago Pago definitely in 1899. Germany took the rest of the Samoan Group. England had already annexed the lion's share of the South Pacific.

The Spanish-American War and the acquisition of these Pacific islands served to emphasize the military need for an Atlantic-Pacific Canal. In 1901 a new Anglo-American isthmian canal treaty was signed, recognizing the right of the United States to proceed independently in any canal undertaking. The United States promptly offered to lease the Isthmus of Panama, which was then a part of the Republic of Colombia. The President and State Department of Colombia agreed, but the treaty had to be ratified by the Colombian Senate. That body, believing that a hard bargain could be driven, rejected the treaty and hinted that negotiations could be reopened if Uncle Sam cared to offer more than the defunct De Lesseps company had agreed to pay. Suddenly there was a revolution in the Province of Panama and the establishment of a republic was proclaimed on November 3, 1903. Ten days later President Theodore Roosevelt of the U.S.A. acknowledged Panama's independence and interposed warships to prevent Colombia's reconquest. A generous treaty providing for the sale of the Canal Zone was quickly negotiated with the newly-established Republic of Panama. Some years

later Theodore Roosevelt confessed that he had taken Panama. The nation tacitly admitted this when Congress, at President Woodrow Wilson's suggestion, paid Colombia's claims of \$25,000,000. The story of the subsequent construction of the great Panama Canal is a twofold epic in the history of American engineering and organized medicine. The first steamship passed through its locks in August, 1914. By 1930 the total tonnage handled was 27,854,000.*

While American business was expanding in the Caribbean, it was at the same time reaching out across the Pacific. For years shrewd Yankee traders had visited the China coast. The acquisition of the Philippines accelerated American interest in the Orient. United States business men, hoping to find additional markets there, viewed with alarm the undignified rush of the European powers to acquire territories and economic privileges in the crumbling Chinese Empire. In an attempt to check this ominous trend, the American Secretary of State, John Hay, in 1899, asked the Great Powers to preserve China's independence and to adopt the policy of the "open door," that is, equal trading opportunities in China for the merchants of all countries. The Great Powers accepted the "open door" policy in principle, but unfortunately they did not always conform to it in practice.

Aroused by the continued aggression of the Europeans, a group of Chinese patriots ("The Fist of Righteous Harmony") made a desperate attempt to drive out the foreign devils, Americans included. This uprising, known as the Boxer Rebellion, was crushed by an international army and China was forced to pay a huge indemnity—\$333,000,000. Uncle Sam's share was \$13,000,000, which he promptly remitted. This amount was set up as a scholarship fund for Chinese students desiring to attend American universities. Only the determined stand taken by the United States in favour of the "open door" saved China from Russo-Japanese dismemberment.

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At the turn of the century Americans could look back with pride at their achievements during the past generation. The

* That of Suez in 1930 was 28,511,000.

continent was subdued, the frontier was gone, and the nation had advanced to the rank of a world power. The political foundations upon which the nation had been established had endured both foreign and civil war, prosperity and depression. In the half-century from 1850 to 1900 the population had increased from twenty-three to seventy-six millions. The growth of national wealth had been no less astounding. During the same half-century it had increased from seven to eighty-eight billion dollars. The standard of living for the common man compared favourably with that to be found anywhere on earth. In agriculture and industry the American people had advanced with giant strides, while progress in science and invention had also been spectacular. Moreover, the ideals of free public education, a free press, and religious freedom had been realized. Americans had made contributions of enduring value in literature, art, and science—science especially.

In foreign affairs Uncle Sam had demanded and received a place of honour among nations. His Monroe Doctrine had been observed even by Great Britain and Germany. With some hesitancy he had begun a programme of imperialism, but he never intended to be a party to oppression. His high tariffs, his "dollar diplomacy," his Big Stick policy in the Caribbean, and the dubious manner in which canal rights had been procured in Panama were policies of strength if not of finesse. His desire for cordial Pan-American relations was sincere. His championship of arbitration was deep-rooted; as he crossed into the next century his good offices brought to a close the Russo-Japanese War, and he immediately became a sponsor of the Hague Tribunal. His great weakness in foreign affairs lay in the foolish hope that he could play a rough trading game and still remain isolationist.

Uncle Sam had grown to manhood, but his body and mind were not yet matured. He was definitely at an awkward stage in his development and lacking in many of the more refined characteristics he would yet acquire. A tremendous continental expanse had been conquered, but the conquest had been attended by criminal waste of the nation's resources. The agricultural domain had grown tremendously, yet thousands of farmers were on the verge of peasantry. The industrial

revolution had made the United States a great manufacturing nation, but at the same time the process had brought child labour, poverty, and unemployment. The nation was one of the richest in the world, but its wealth was becoming concentrated in the hands of a small portion of the population. In the great cities were to be found the slums from which spread disease, crime, and vice. As the new century opened, the American people, led by crusaders like Bryan, La Follette, Roosevelt, and Wilson, set out to curb these evils.

Chapter X

APPROACHING INTERNAL MATURITY

THE History of the United States in the twentieth century falls easily under three large headings: the tremendous spurt forward in technological and social development, the wavering development of political economy, and the complete failure on the part of Uncle Sam to lead a life of isolation. There are many sub-divisions whose full treatment here space does not allow.

The most amazing developments of Man's history have been witnessed by several millions of Americans now living. They have seen the population of their country more than doubled, some have seen it tripled. (See population figures, p. 125.) They have seen vehicular speed records broken year after year. There was a time when telephones were a novelty; now there is one for every five Americans. Within eight years of the invention of the petrol buggy there were 4,192 automobiles manufactured in the one year 1900; in 1941, of the world's 45,000,000 motor vehicles registered about 33,000,000 of them were registered in the United States. To reach such a staggering figure, a veritable revolution had of necessity swept the United States of America. That industrial and scientific revolution has penetrated every phase of American existence. It shows no signs yet of having run its course or even of having approached its maximum speed.

United States Population (Official Census), 1790-1940

Source: United States Bureau of the Census

State	1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.	1850.	1860.
Ala.				127,901	309,527	590,756	771,623	964,201
Ark.			1,062	14,273	30,388	97,574	209,897	435,450
Calif.							92,597	378,994
Colo.	237,946	251,002	261,942	275,548	297,675	309,679	370,792	480,147
Conn.	59,096	64,273	72,674	72,749	76,748	78,085	91,532	112,216
D. of Col.		14,093	24,023	33,039	39,834	43,712	51,687	78,080
Fla.					34,730	54,772	87,445	140,424
Ga.	82,548	162,686	252,433	340,989	516,823	691,392	906,185	1,187,356
Ill.			12,282	55,211	137,445	476,133	851,470	1,711,951
Ind.		5,641	24,520	147,178	343,031	685,866	938,416	1,350,428
Iowa.						43,112	192,214	674,913
Kan.								107,208
Ky.	73,677	220,955	406,511	564,317	687,017	779,828	982,405	1,158,684
La.			76,556	153,407	219,739	323,003	517,703	708,002
Maine.	96,540	151,719	228,705	298,335	399,455	501,703	583,169	628,279
Md.	319,728	341,548	380,546	407,350	447,040	470,019	583,034	687,049
Mass.	378,787	422,845	472,040	523,287	610,408	737,699	994,514	1,231,008
Mich.			4,762	8,896	31,639	212,207	397,654	740,113
Minn.								172,023
Miss.		8,880	40,352	75,448	136,621	375,651	606,526	791,305
Mo.			19,783	66,586	140,455	383,702	682,044	1,182,012
Neb.								28,841
Nev.								6,837
N. H.	141,885	183,858	214,480	244,161	269,328	284,574	317,970	326,073
N. J.	184,139	211,149	245,562	277,575	320,823	373,306	489,555	672,035
N. M.								93,516
N. Y.	340,120	599,051	959,049	1,372,812	1,918,608	2,428,921	3,097,394	3,880,335
N. C.	393,751	478,165	538,325	753,419	937,903	1,518,467	1,980,329	2,339,511
Ohio		45,365	230,760	581,434	937,903	1,518,467	1,980,329	2,339,511
Oregon.							13,294	52,465
Pa.	434,373	602,365	810,001	1,049,458	1,348,233	1,724,033	2,211,786	2,995,215
R. I.	98,823	109,122	76,931	83,059	97,199	108,830	147,545	174,580
S. C.	249,073	345,591	415,115	502,741	581,185	594,398	668,507	703,708
S. D.								4,837
Tenn.	35,691	105,602	261,727	422,823	681,904	829,210	1,002,717	1,109,801
Texas.							212,892	604,215
Utah.							11,386	40,273
Vt.	85,425	154,465	217,895	285,681	280,652	291,048	311,578	315,098
Wash.	747,610	880,200	974,600	1,065,366	1,211,403	1,239,797	1,421,661	1,598,518
Wisc.							305,391	775,881
Total U. S.	3,929,214	5,308,483	7,239,861	9,638,453	12,866,020	17,069,453	23,191,576	31,443,321

State.	1870.	1880.	1890.	1900.	1910.	1920.	1930.	1940.
Alabama.	996,992	1,262,505	1,513,401	1,828,697	2,138,093	2,348,174	2,646,248	2,832,981
Arizona.	9,839	40,440	122,424	324,162	562,422	752,042	1,054,482	1,499,361
Arkansas.	486,477	804,323	1,128,211	1,311,564	1,574,449	1,752,204	1,854,482	1,948,387
California.	560,247	864,694	1,213,398	1,485,053	2,377,549	3,426,861	5,677,251	6,907,387
Colorado.	39,864	194,327	413,249	539,700	799,024	1,399,629	1,035,791	1,123,296
Connecticut.	537,454	622,700	746,258	908,420	1,114,756	1,380,631	1,606,903	1,606,903
Delaware.	125,015	146,008	168,493	184,735	223,003	262,003	317,863	366,505
District of Col.	131,700	177,624	230,392	278,718	331,069	437,571	486,869	663,091
Florida.	187,743	289,493	391,422	528,542	752,619	1,068,210	1,468,211	1,897,414
Georgia.	1,184,109	1,542,180	1,837,353	2,216,331	2,609,121	2,895,832	2,908,506	3,124,723
Idaho.	4,909	32,610	167,772	329,924	625,924	941,896	1,445,034	2,147,723
Illinois.	2,533,991	3,077,871	3,826,352	4,821,550	5,838,591	6,485,280	7,630,034	7,897,241
Indiana.	1,680,637	1,978,301	2,192,404	2,516,462	2,700,876	2,930,390	3,238,503	3,427,796
Iowa.	1,194,020	1,624,615	1,912,297	2,231,853	2,224,771	2,404,021	2,470,939	2,538,268
Kansas.	384,399	596,096	1,428,108	1,470,495	1,690,948	1,769,257	1,890,999	1,801,028
Kentucky.	1,321,011	1,648,690	1,858,635	2,147,174	2,289,905	2,416,630	2,814,589	2,848,677
Louisiana.	726,915	839,044	1,118,588	1,381,625	1,658,388	1,798,500	2,101,593	2,363,890
Maine.	626,515	648,936	661,086	694,466	742,371	768,014	797,423	847,226
Maryland.	780,894	934,943	1,042,390	1,188,044	1,295,346	1,449,661	1,631,526	1,821,244
Massachusetts.	1,457,351	1,783,083	2,258,947	2,805,346	3,666,416	3,862,356	4,249,614	4,316,721
Michigan.	1,124,369	1,639,517	2,093,890	2,490,982	3,668,616	4,442,940	5,442,940	6,116,066
Minnesota.	439,708	780,773	1,310,283	1,751,394	2,075,708	2,387,125	2,563,953	2,792,300
Mississippi.	827,922	1,311,597	1,289,600	1,551,270	1,797,114	1,790,618	2,008,821	2,183,796
Missouri.	1,721,295	2,168,380	2,679,185	3,106,665	3,293,335	3,404,055	3,629,367	3,784,064
Montana.	60,595	199,159	242,924	429,329	376,053	548,889	537,600	537,600
Nebraska.	129,991	452,407	1,062,556	1,068,400	1,192,474	1,296,372	1,577,877	1,315,834
Nevada.	42,481	62,266	47,355	42,335	81,875	177,407	91,058	110,247
New Hampshire.	318,900	246,991	376,530	411,588	430,572	443,083	455,293	481,524
New Jersey.	909,096	1,131,116	1,444,931	1,883,609	2,537,107	3,155,900	4,041,303	4,180,105
New Mexico.	9,374	119,565	180,262	195,310	327,301	360,530	423,117	531,818
New York.	4,382,739	5,632,571	6,002,174	7,268,894	9,113,614	10,355,257	12,588,064	13,479,142
North Carolina.	1,071,561	1,399,750	1,617,949	1,893,810	2,206,287	2,559,123	3,170,279	3,571,623
North Dakota.			190,983	319,146	577,056	646,872	680,645	641,935
Ohio.	2,865,260	3,198,062	3,672,829	4,157,545	4,767,121	5,759,394	6,646,697	6,907,612
Oklahoma.			255,657	790,301	1,657,155	2,026,258	2,648,648	3,016,416
Oregon.	90,623	174,768	317,704	413,536	672,765	763,389	953,786	1,039,684
Rhode Island.	3,521,551	4,282,291	5,258,113	6,302,115	7,665,111	8,720,012	9,631,530	9,980,160
South Carolina.	217,353	276,631	345,109	428,556	542,010	604,307	687,497	713,346
South Dakota.	705,606	995,577	1,151,406	1,340,316	1,515,400	1,683,724	1,738,765	1,899,804
Tennessee.	1,225,163	1,512,515	1,865,890	2,013,570	2,386,548	2,638,548	2,912,849	3,145,461
Texas.	1,258,520	1,642,359	1,767,518	2,020,616	2,184,789	2,327,885	2,616,550	2,918,841
Utah.	618,670	1,591,749	2,235,527	3,048,710	3,896,542	4,663,228	5,824,715	6,414,824
Vermont.	86,789	143,963	150,779	276,749	373,351	449,306	507,847	550,310
Virginia.	330,651	332,286	345,606	343,646	355,956	352,426	359,611	367,723
Washington.	23,955	75,116	357,232	518,103	1,141,990	1,356,621	1,543,396	1,736,191
West Virginia.	442,014	618,457	762,794	958,800	1,221,119	1,463,701	1,729,295	1,901,974
Wisconsin.	1,054,570	1,315,497	1,693,330	2,069,042	2,333,860	2,632,067	2,939,006	3,137,565
Wyoming.	9,118	20,789	62,555	92,531	143,965	194,402	225,566	250,743
Total U. S.	38,558,371	50,155,783	62,947,714	75,794,575	91,972,266	105,710,620	122,775,046	131,669,275

By 1940, highways (not including by-ways and city streets) had a total length of 550,000 miles. Hundreds of thousands of people had been employed in the engineering feats which made these transportation facilities possible. Thousands of others are still employed in highway maintenance and expansion. Giant cranes and shovels, mechanical road-builders, concrete mixers and layers, sweeps and snow-ploughs, tend increasingly to lessen employment, but add to efficiency and effectiveness.

Meantime railroad-building and improvement, which knew a heyday in the nineteenth century, continued, despite the coming of the petrol engine. By 1940 rail mileage in the United States totalled 240,000 miles, or a little farther than it is from Earth to Moon. River and lake boats by the twentieth century had lost their relative importance, but they still play an important rôle in moving heavy cargoes. The coming of the mail and passenger airlines and now of cargo transport planes bids fair to add to the accelerating revolution in transportation which is tending toward moulding ever more firmly the Union which is Uncle Sam.

Just as transportation has undergone a mighty change, so has communication. It was but a few decades ago when the Pony Express carried overland the mails. Then came the stage-coach, the railroad, and the air mail service. Meantime the railway telegraph lines were augmented by Western Union and Postal Telegraph service. Suddenly came commercial broadcasting in 1922. In 1920 radio station KDKA, Pittsburgh, had broadcast for the first time. Its programme consisted of election returns of the Harding-Cox presidential campaign. Five years later twenty-four radio stations broadcast simultaneously the inauguration ceremony of President Coolidge.* Some 80,000,000 Americans heard President Roosevelt broadcast before Congress a declaration of war speech on December 8, 1941. There were at that time nearly 60,000,000 radio receiving sets in 31,000,000 of the 35,000,000 American homes. There were twelve and a half million radios sold to Americans in 1941. Some 10,000,000 automobiles are equipped with receiv-

* The word "radio" in America refers to verbal and musical broadcast. "Wireless" is interpreted as those broadcasts in signal code.

ing sets. A thousand broadcasting stations are distributed among hundreds of cities and towns in America.

The effect of radio upon America has been revolutionary. It has lifted the isolated farm community and the tenement district to a state of enlightenment upon national and international affairs. It has added the equivalent of several years' formal schooling to the education of the average American. It has gone far toward breaking down provincialism and thus, like transportation development, has added its share to the welding processes which are making sure an indissoluble Union. Finally, it is lifting the tone of political speeches from the stage of emotional appeal to that wherein the politicians find reason and logic demanded by an audience which is becoming increasingly critical.

All this has been made possible by a capitalist system which allows high-pressure advertising. It is, of course, often irritating to be forced to listen to the "commercial," but Americans know that they are receiving full compensation, and in return the advertiser finds radio an excellent sales medium. Types of articles advertised for sale number thousands. They themselves are an index to the technological revolution which is sweeping the land, making life easier and longer and yet far more complex.

During the past few decades America has seen the development and perfection of the "assembly line" for mass production. There has been the forward march of chemistry, physics, and metallurgy. In the mines, old-fields, and steel-mills there has been a procession of new types of machinery and continuously improved processes of extracting, refining, and moving metals, minerals, and gases.

During the past two generations barber-shops have developed from the straight-chair stage to luxurious parlours; the dentist's office has moved from the torture chamber era through the period of laughing gas to the age of novocaine and X-rays. The drug-store has developed from the old-fashioned apothecary or chemist's shop through the stage when prescription filling was combined with patent medicine and cosmetics sales, to the day when the public demand made profitable the pharmacist's dispensing; also, soft drinks, sandwiches, and plate lunches as

well as light hardwares. Accompanying this development the general store evolved in cities into giant department stores.* Mail order houses eventually reached the stage where whole homes (pre-fabricated) with all furnishings could be selected from catalogues, ordered, erected, and paid for over a reasonable period of time.

A list of other indices to twentieth-century America would necessarily include: streamlining, Diesel engines, scientific stock-breeding, rural electrification, jazz music, water power, consolidated rural schools, commercial airlines, irrigation, insurance, automobile trailers, scientific laboratories, farm machinery, giant circuses, world's fairs, automatic vending machines, skyscrapers, baseball and football, Wall Street, the lumber industry, extension of hospital facilities. A full chapter here could well be devoted to any of these topics, and then the story of twentieth-century America would be but partially told.

These would not tell the story of how the tobacco industry reached the point where 200,000,000,000 cigarettes were manufactured in 1942; of how Hollywood produces 70 per cent of the world's cinema reels, of how 95,000,000 American admissions are normally collected by 20,000 cinema houses and theatres each week; of how 2,000 daily newspapers have a combined circulation of over 42,000,000; of how such magazines as *Time*, *News-week*, *Life*, *The Readers' Digest*, *Harpers*, *Fortune*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Colliers*, the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, and hundreds of other magazines and still more thousands of weekly newspapers are read by millions of Americans; of how over 9,000 new books are published in America each year besides 2,000 new editions of old favourites.

Nor would that brief summary show the development of American education. Suffice it briefly to state here that each state has created its own school system. Generally the young American enters the First Grade when he is five or six years of age. Through the first six or eight grades he learns to read, and to write, to spell and to figure. He studies geography, poetry, prose, higher arithmetic, history, government, music, and general science. Having finished these Elementary Grades

* Selfridge was an American.

he moves to High School. The first two or three years are Junior High, the second two or three are Senior High. The older system of seven years elementary and four years secondary are being supplanted by the 6-3-3 system: six years Grammar School (elementary), three years Junior High School, and three years of Senior High School. In the latter two he is taught algebra, geometry, chemistry, physics, history, government, mechanical sciences, languages, domestic science and business. Nearly every state has a compulsory education law wherein the child is required to attend school until he is at least fourteen years of age. Some laws require school attendance until the student has reached sixteen years; a few require attendance until eighteen years of age, but allow exceptions. There are private and parochial schools supported by tuition or church appropriations, but the vast majority of American boys and girls attend the "Public Schools," so called because they are supported out of public funds. School books are paid for in most states from public funds; milk and lunches are supplied to under-privileged children. Regular medical examination is also free. In recent years the proportion of students finishing the higher grades has been steadily enlarging. Graduates of High Schools are increasing in numbers and the total of those pursuing higher education in 1,579 American colleges and universities by 1940 had reached 2,250,000. Total school attendance for that year was more than 28,000,000. Of the 29,000,000 boys and girls aged five to seventeen, 25,000,000, or eighty-eight per cent, were enrolled in schools. About fourteen per cent of all Americans between twenty-five and thirty-four years of age have been to college.

All this is still but part of the story of Uncle Sam in a rapidly moving technological age. There is the ugly side too. Capitalism has made possible this great age, but it has also made inevitable much individual hardship. There are some 50,000 new peace-time inventions patented every year. Thousands of these are of the labour-saving variety. Every time one of these inventions or a new method is applied to factory production it brings heart-ache to those unfortunates who are thereby rooted out of their old skills. Often re-employment and re-adjustment are impossible. This in turn means the

retrogression of a minority to allow the prosperity of a few, but at the same time it means progress for the majority.

Here was at work one of the most tremendous forces in human history. In America it was superimposed upon three other factors carried over from the nineteenth century. That century saw the rise of the giant trusts. The last decade saw the disappearance of the frontier. After that it was no longer possible for the unemployed simply to push out into the West and quickly find new opportunities for livelihood of self and family. The other great factor was that of immigration. Nearly 40,000,000 people have come to America since 1789. They have come in waves—waves engendered by sociological and international conditions abroad and the prospects of a bright future in America. In the 1860's, 2,000,000 new Americans arrived mostly from Europe. During the 1870's nearly 3,000,000 found new homes in the States. The 1880's saw the figure pass 5,000,000. Then ended the frontier and the news of the hard years after the Panic of 1893 was spread abroad. Even so, immigration in the 1890's numbered more than 3,500,000. After that, in the first decade of the twentieth century the figures began to approach a million a year. For the fifteen-year period 1900-1914, 13,388,089 refugees from Old World conditions swelled the ranks of American interests. Most of them were seeking employment.

Suddenly came World War I and a new factor was added to the revolution in the history of labour—women entered the field of competition with men as never before. Then the war was over and soldiers were demobilized and immediately sought to return to their old jobs, but millions of women, naturally enough, were not inclined to surrender this new-found status of economic independence. The great revolution had come with its mighty forces of good. It had also brought its evil—its complexities, its intricacies, its international complications. Meantime another element of American society had moved into the field of industrial labour. The Negro who for nearly three centuries had been engaging almost entirely in agricultural pursuits already had begun to leave the farm for the cities. Tenant farming was an evil system generally. It was, though, a necessary step in the movement of the Negro

from slavery toward economic equality with the whites. The abolition of slavery, the gradual recovery of the South from the carpet-bag regime, the beginnings of free and compulsory education of Negro children, and the failure of the tenant system to provide the means or incentive for widespread farm ownership by Negroes and finally the taste of city life during World War I all combined to promote the urbanization of the Negro. He, too, then, is being added to the industrial labour market.*

Monopolistic combines, the disappearance of the frontier, and the arrival of millions of new workers from abroad, then the coming of thousands of labour-saving devices and methods, and finally the entrance of white women and Negroes into the fields of employment—all tended to cheapen the value of labour and thus to hinder a relative advance in the standard of living for wage-earners. This does not mean that during the early decades of this great technological era there was wholesale retrogression in the social scale. The contrary is true. The American standard of living was the highest on earth and was rising with every decade. Even so, that advance was accompanied by much evil and need for reform. One may correctly point to the libraries and museums and art galleries and educational opportunities, but one must also mention that there are in 1944 some 3,000,000 Americans who have never learned to read and write.† One must, of course, notice the skyscrapers, elegant apartment houses, and suburban mansions if he is to acquire a well-balanced perspective, but one needs to see also the tenement houses in northern cities and unpainted cabins in Southern rural districts. The world at large is cognizant of the fact that a goodly number of Americans are millionaires or well-to-do, but it should know, too, that poverty also exists in scattered places throughout the land. One may well recognize that the United States is a great Democracy rich enough to engage in lend-lease and other such international undertakings, but the nation must devote vast amounts of its wealth and

* It would be a mistake to accept the thesis that Southern whites oppose the progress of the Negro toward economic and educational equality. They balk only at ideas of social equality which might lead to amalgamation of the races.

† The number of illiterates in 1900 was 6,180,069.

energy to caring for its own poor and cleaning its own house.

The idea that the Federal government actually should become a paternalistic agency has evolved quite slowly in America. To be sure, the philosophy of Democracy goes far back into the roots of constitutional history. The people have always done lip service to such lofty expressions as "establishment of justice," "promotion of the general welfare," "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Most Americans subscribe to the utilitarian philosophy that government should exist for "the greatest good of the greatest number," and the idea that "all men are created equal," but the majority until recent years subscribed to these concepts only in the abstract.

The concrete political philosophy which has operated during most of Uncle Sam's history may be summarized thus: The Federal government should exist to preserve the Union, to regulate inter-state affairs, to present a united front in foreign affairs, to preserve national order, and to allow all people the right to make honestly all the money they can. That the Federal government should ever be given the power to obstruct "rugged individualism," to impose such heavy income taxes as to eliminate the probability of becoming a millionaire, to enter business in competition with private enterprise, to move toward other socialistic ends—these things to Americans of the nineteenth century simply were abhorrent. Indeed, millions of Americans even today consider these leftist moves as distinctly sacrificing the cardinal principles of the Declaration of Independence.

Under the older conservative philosophy the great business houses of Gould, McCormick, Morgan, Harriman, Hill, Cooke, Drexel, Ford, Mellon, and dozens of others were built while thousands of lesser fortunes were amassed. Dozens of rich men and widows spent their old age giving away millions. The great Rockefeller Foundation, the Guggenheim, Bok, Rosenwald, Hayden, Russel Sage, and Spelman Funds were all established by millionaire philanthropists. They made possible the work of many fine universities such as Leland Stanford, Chicago, Vanderbilt, and Duke. Tuskegee Institute, Fisk University, and Atlanta University are among the Negro

colleges thus endowed. There are 150 American universities with endowments totalling more than \$2,000,000 each. Andrew Carnegie, the Scottish immigrant boy who built a mighty combine of heavy industry, lived out what he considered to be a great and useful life when he established libraries throughout the nation. He loved the system of government which allowed him to dominate vast interests in coal, iron, copper, timber, and railroads and the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans and then to give away some \$200,000,000 and still die one of the world's richest men. He loved that system and called it "triumphant Democracy." Horatio Alger made a fortune by writing imaginary tales about poor boys who "succeeded," that is, became millionaires. Conservative Americans shudder to think that the day when those were the great ideals is rapidly fading into the past.

Such, though, was inevitable. The almost overwhelming problems of a mighty industrial revolution, the arrival of millions of immigrants too rapidly to be absorbed immediately, the abnormal development of cities with their inevitable slums and saloons, the increasing plight of farms and ranches whose economy was becoming intricately tied to that of industry and high finance, and the rise of pressure groups attempting to dominate politics, local, state, and national—all these things, so big, so all-embracing, so utterly confusing, and all the while coming to be more and more closely tied into the international complications of a new day—all these things forced upon the American people a conviction that if their Democracy were to live, then the Federal government must be allowed to move into nearly every phase of economic and social existence. They did not like this idea and resisted it for many years. They do not like it now, but apparently have become resigned to it as the least of many evils.

As the century opened, charitable organizations like the Salvation Army and the American Red Cross, and religious and fraternal "Homes" like Hull House in Chicago, and Masonic Orphanages, and eventually Community Chests in all the larger cities, tried to wrestle with the problem of caring for the needy. Needless to say, they hardly scratched the surface.

State governments meantime had entered the field. Insane

asylums, reform schools, and public education had from the beginning been their province. Then came state attempts at prison reform, prohibition or regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages, regulation of factory and mine, and eventually of hours and wages. Here and there some states came close to succeeding with these problems. "Fighting Bob" La Follette in Wisconsin did a magnificent job from 1900 until World War I. He put an end to dirty politics and corporation domination in his state. He carried through the Wisconsin state legislature and to the people the direct primary, initiative and referendum, civil service, and other political reforms. He introduced workmen's compensation laws, child labour laws, and other social reforms. His farm demonstration agents and experiment stations, his state university, and other government-supported organizations went farther than simple reform. They moved into the realm of "dynamic progressivism."

Wisconsin was unique. Other states did undertake in less degree the solution of social problems, but it was eventually all too apparent that these things were too big even for state governments. It was too easy in most cases for local machine politics to be bought up by vested interests. There were too many segments and groups to cater for. There were too many things which one state just could not do unless its neighbour states did also.

And so the nation was forced to turn to the Federal government for respite and guidance. Strangely enough, it was a Republican president who made the first significant move toward reform on a national scale, even though the Republican was the traditionally "big-business" party. Naturally the more liberal Democrats voted for the measures he proposed. They could hardly refuse to do so, even though the Republicans gained the political credit.

* * * * *

Theodore Roosevelt came to the presidency by accident. It is unfortunately true that nearly always the party conventions choose as candidates for the vice-presidency second-rate men. In the case of President McKinley's Vice-President, though, such was not the case. When the Old Guard McKinley, who

had just defeated William Jennings Bryan, was assassinated by an anarchist in September, 1901, Teddy Roosevelt became Chief Executive. The new President was not quite forty-three years of age. He had learned to fight when as a young man he had overcome a physical weakness. He had been reared in an aristocratic New York environment, but had lived with and learned to love and appreciate the people of the Wild West. He had made something of a reputation as a soldier in the war with Spain. The new President recognized the changing age in which he lived. Significantly he remarked: "The great development of industrialism means that there must be an increase in the supervision exercised by the Government over business enterprise."

Theodore Roosevelt was President from 1901 to 1909. Reform was in the air. The Republicans caught the spirit. Their leaders knew that once they failed to obey the will of the majority here the nation would swing to the Democrats, whose leader was William J. Bryan. And so it was that Uncle Sam, now approaching physical maturity, turned seriously to the business of housekeeping. It was a tremendous undertaking—greater because too long neglected. He found that there was plenty to be done. It was an adult's job—a task which required strength as well as courage and patience. He began his chore slowly but steadily. In the light of all that already needed to be done as the great twentieth century was getting under way—in the light of these things, the early reform legislation is rather disappointing. But when it is considered that these acts were Federal acts and comprise a revolutionary departure from the *laissez-faire* attitude toward "big business" and the so-called "laws of economics," they were mighty ice-breakers indeed.

The two major bills of Roosevelt's reform programme were directed toward railroad regulation, but they were given a wider application by the courts. The Elkins Act of 1903 put an end to shady and discriminating practices in granting rebates to favoured corporations. All transportation companies were required henceforth to publish rates. These rates were to be followed strictly, honestly, impartially. When it was seen that the Inter-state Commerce Commission (established in 1887)

was not strong enough to carry into execution the full spirit of the law, the Hepburn Act was adopted in 1906, and in 1910, the Mann-Elkins Act. These laws gave the I.C.C. real authority to regulate rates, storage, and terminal facilities. Under its jurisdiction were brought not only freight and passenger railroads but steamship lines, express companies, telegraph, cable, and telephone companies, electric companies, pipe-lines, and any organization which sold commodities of any kind across state lines.

These acts, when added to the rather ineffectual Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and supplemented by the far more effective Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Law of 1914, did not put an end to monopolies, but they forced "big business" to accept the principle that the public interest and not freedom to exploit had become a fundamental American political principle.

The trusts did not give in to this new radical philosophy without a great fight. Many millions of dollars were spent in attempts to have the acts repealed, to influence politicians, to contribute to campaign funds, and to forestall the 1914 legislation. There had already stalked upon the stage a new actor, the corporation lawyer, whose business (a well-paid one) was to find loopholes in the laws, to invent new "legal methods," to lobby, to defend, and to plead hundreds of cases in the courts. His efforts were not in vain. When such great trusts as Standard Oil and American Tobacco were broken up, the fragments were still held together through "interlocking directorates" or other "legal" devices. Had the nation deeply desired to do so, it could have put an end to this practice.

It would be an error to assume that the American people ever had wanted to destroy corporations or even giant combines or trusts. But the creation of monopolies so that "big business" could dictate prices at artificial levels—levels not regulated by competition among several producers or carriers—these were the evils frowned upon, and the will of the people here was not entirely unheeded.

Meantime, other unethical practices had come in for their share of disapprobation. In 1905 Congress passed a "Pure Food and Drug Act" and a "Meat Inspection Act." When

loopholes were found in the former a new "Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act" was adopted, but this was not until 1938. Meantime, patent medicine companies and other advertisers were forced to desist from outright lying about the value of their products. Even so, slick advertising corporations were usually able to couch unfounded claims of the magnificence of their clients' products in such glowing and insinuating terms that careless listeners or readers quite easily jumped to the desired conclusions; yet the letter of the law had not been broken.

If the Republican Party under Theodore Roosevelt had been inclined toward "trust-busting" this did not mean for a moment that it had been opposed to the fundamental desires of vested interests. To win votes in 1908 it promised the nation more reforms and a lower tariff. Uncle Sam nodded his head, forgave past broken promises and patiently awaited a day of real reform.

When "Teddy" Roosevelt had finished out McKinley's term (1901-1905) and was completing one in his own right (1905-1909) he was powerful enough to select his successor. He probably could have had a third term had he desired it, but he decided not to attempt to break the tradition set by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson that no President should serve more than two terms. His choice was a learned Ohio Republican, William Howard Taft. The social accomplishments of Taft's administration (1909-1913) were greater than those of his predecessor—they should have been, now that Roosevelt had broken the ice. But his accomplishments did not keep pace with the growing needs. Taft continued Roosevelt's "trust-busting" with some favourable results (mostly successful prosecutions), and he expanded the activities of the Post Office Department to include postal savings banks and a parcel post system. Roosevelt had launched campaigns of forest conservation and irrigation. These Taft continued. He improved the Civil Service system which had been established in 1883. He successfully sponsored two constitutional amendments, one providing for direct popular election of Senators rather than election by State legislatures, the other authorizing a Federal income tax.

These were acts of liberalism, but actually Taft was not liberal, else he would not have opposed the entry of Arizona into the Union because its people had adopted an unusually liberal constitution; he would not have relied so heavily upon a party machine which was dominated by "big business" interests; and he would have advocated a Federal programme of social and political reform. In 1908 he had promised the voters a lower tariff, but in 1909 he signed the Payne-Aldrich Act, which raised the tariff walls to a higher level than at any previous period of the nation's history.

When the people realized how the Republicans had flouted the national desire on the tariff question, they turned toward the other party and elected a Democratic majority to the House of Representatives in 1910. Taft, of course, remained President for the two remaining years of his term. Most of the reforms of his administration, then, were not Republican-sponsored, though not necessarily Taft-opposed. Because Taft had the good sense not to oppose them he appeared by 1912 to have been their sponsor.

When in that year Roosevelt, having returned from big-game hunting in Africa, decided to take advantage of this favourable turn of events and run for President again, the Old Guard Republican machine, fearing Teddy's dynamic urge to do big things, decided to renominate the far less popular Taft. They did, and the result was that the Republican Party was split wide open. The Progressives (mostly liberal Republicans) held a separate convention and nominated Roosevelt.

Here was a tough break for the Republicans. For many years, indeed since the inception of the Republican Party, the Democrats had known tough sledding in the national elections. During the Reconstruction era the mass of southern Democrats had been denied the franchise and the Republicans had carried every election until 1844, when Grover Cleveland finally had carried the Democrats to victory. He was defeated in 1888 because he favoured tariff reform, but the vote was close. He led the Democrats to victory again in 1892. As Cleveland's second term came to a close it was easy to observe a radical change beginning to take place in American party politics. Lord Bryce, who as a great British ambassador to

the United States had studied Uncle Sam with a keenly critical eye, wrote that political parties in America were entirely different from those in Europe because the line of cleavage was horizontal rather than vertical—that is, up and down through all social classes rather than crosswise, separating the conservative well-to-do elements from the poorer reformers. Topographical and sectional desires seemed far more important than the forces engendered by social differences. This was quite true and the reasons for this are not hard to see: the frontier existed until 1890; the nation was still predominantly agrarian; and the great technological revolution had not then swept across the nation.

By 1896, though, a mighty change had set in and one of the two traditional parties was going to have to become the champion of reform or some third party would arise to challenge both. Indeed, new political entities had already appeared: the Farmers' Alliance, the Greenbacks, the Silver League, and then the powerful Populists. Labour unions too were beginning to have some small voice. Most of these elements at different times had begun to split away from the two major parties. President Cleveland, a conservative Democrat, had been unable to control his party after 1894. Because he believed in lowering the tariff he lost his popularity with the moneyed interests among the Democrats. Because he was not inclined to debase the national currency he lost the favour of the left-wing Democrats. Into this changing picture had stepped the colourful figure, William Jennings Bryan. This champion of reform appeared to the "Gold Democrats" (at least so they proclaimed) to be a wild advocate of socialism, disorder, dishonesty, and anarchy.

Bryan's attempt to carry the disaffected elements to victory over the conservative elements in 1896 failed and the Republican McKinley was elected and then re-elected in 1900, but the vertical line of cleavage had turned at least forty-five degrees. Then the line straightened up again under Theodore Roosevelt, the progressive Republican; and the Democrats, who had side-tracked Bryan and had nominated Alton B. Parker (an anti-free silver New York conservative), were again decisively defeated in 1904. The Republicans had stolen the

Democrats' thunder, which was barely more than a rumble, and though Bryan in 1908 had been nominated a third time, the Democrats had certainly not been much more liberal than had been the Republicans. The nation had voted overwhelmingly for Taft, Roosevelt's nominee.

Then came the Republican split in 1912 and the Democrats suddenly, accidentally in fact, found a leader—not a colourful figure like the silver-tongued, shaggy-haired Bryan, but a tough scholar, a dignified and polished lecturer, an honest strait-laced reformer. Woodrow Wilson was the son of a Virginia Presbyterian minister. He was highly educated, a lawyer, student of government, college professor. He had been persuaded to leave the presidency of Princetown University to become the Democratic candidate for Governor of New Jersey. To the astonishment of most observers, Dr. Wilson proved to be an excellent campaigner and having been elected governor he went to work with a vengeance cleaning up state politics and carrying through much-needed reforms.

When the Democrats sent their delegates to the nominating convention at Baltimore, Maryland, in 1912, there were several powerful candidates for the party nomination. It was not until the forty-sixth ballot that William Jennings Bryan, unable to win the nomination himself, threw his support to Wilson and saw his choice nominated.

The three-cornered campaign of 1912 was one of the most thrilling in American political history. When the votes had been counted, the conservative Republicans had cast 3,484,956 votes for Taft. Roosevelt had received 4,119,507 votes of the liberal Republicans now known as Progressives. Wilson had polled 6,293,019 straight Democratic votes. This latter figure was not a majority, but it was a good plurality. When the electoral votes were counted by Congress they totalled: Wilson, 435; Roosevelt, 88; and Taft, 8.*

* Each state is entitled to the same number of electoral votes as it has Congressmen (each state elects two U.S. Senators and at least one U.S. Representative). New York has 47; Pennsylvania 36; Illinois 29; Ohio 26; Texas 23; California 22. Little Delaware and Vermont, sparsely-settled Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming have three each. Actually the people cast their ballots for these Electors who have been selected because they are avowed supporters of the party presidential nominee.

Woodrow Wilson was one of the greatest Presidents Uncle Sam had ever elected. He had his shortcomings, to be sure, and died a grief-stricken, horribly disappointed man. He was an idealist who found it impossible to carry into execution some of his theories. His two administrations (1913-1921) saw a succession of inconsistencies and contradictions, but these were in large part the result of national and world conditions evolving at a dizzy pace. His final failure was a combination of poor politics on his part and a tragic inertia, a let-down from war tension which seized Uncle Sam, a reaction which followed the emotional enthusiasm of the war years.

Though Wilson's international policy ended in failure, it can never be maintained that internally his first administration was not one of strength and accomplishment. During this term of office more constructive legislation was enacted, there was more rigid execution of existing laws, more badly-needed juridical decisions were rendered, more real social welfare was advanced than may be shown in the sum total of all the accomplishments of the preceding two decades. Furthermore, the national spirit of progress was reflected in the political reforms and enactments of state, county, and municipal organs throughout the land.

During his first term Wilson awed the old-line politicians.

Election day is the Tuesday following the first Monday of November of the election year (every leap year). In recent years the people have kept their ears glued to their radios on that night listening to the "unofficial" election returns. Before they retire they usually know who will be the next President. Quite often the defeated candidate speaks to the nationwide radio audience, conceding defeat and congratulating and promising loyalty to the President-elect. State election boards, having received the count of the various local election boards, at last officially announce the names of the Electors who have received pluralities in the state-wide election. These successful electors assemble in the state capitol and go through the empty formality of casting their votes for President. These votes are mailed to the President of the U.S. Senate, who finally, on the following January 6th, opens them in the presence of the two Houses assembled. They are counted and the result is immediately announced. If no presidential nominee has received a majority (266 votes), the House of Representatives then elects the President from one of the three leading candidates. Each state, here, has one vote. If no candidate receives a majority (25) by Inauguration day, January 20 (since the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment in 1933), then the Vice-President-elect is inaugurated as President. This has never happened, and probably never will.

His beautiful diction, his personal appearances in presentation of regular and special messages to Congress, his absolute confidence in himself and his ideals—together these things amounted to something brand new in American politics. They somehow seemed to lift the whole system of government from a rather drab plane wherein politicians and vested interests had been constantly jockeying for selfish position, to one of lofty statecraft, wherein the national government, including Congress, now assumed a position which appeared to be approaching true greatness. The Federal government seemed at last to be an agency really striving to bring about "the greatest good of the greatest number." Wilson had pledged a reduction of the tariff. That pledge was fulfilled in the Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913, but not until the President had given the lobbyists a tongue-lashing which the nation rousingly applauded. Wilson had advocated financial reform. The result was the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which placed the whole banking system on a more solid footing. Note has already been made of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914. To study international commerce and to make recommendations to the President and Congress there was established in the same year the Federal Trade Commission.

Wilson was a friend of the farmer and as such initiated a far-reaching policy of co-operation among the Department of Agriculture and the various land-grant agricultural colleges. Farm extension schools for the purpose of disseminating scientific findings of an agricultural nature were established. New experimental stations and farms were created, and information relative to improved agricultural methods was distributed directly from the giant Department of Agriculture. A Federal Farm Loan Act plus a Warehouse Act made possible loans at low interest.

Wilson was a friend of education and aided in the creation of agencies which offered to match, dollar for dollar, moneys appropriated by the States. Unfortunately, the relative poverty of the southern states and the reactionary ideas concerning States' Rights forbade the full success of this Wilsonian programme. Wilson was a powerful opponent of child labour, but only an amendment to the Constitution could have given

the national government the requisite power to end this practice, and the poorer agricultural states needed child labour on the farm, and again the States' Rights theory blocked a programme to that end.*

Woodrow Wilson's social programme was destined to be pushed aside in the rising tide of war and the economic upheaval resulting therefrom. His last two years in office were devoted to an unhappy fight with a reactionary Republican Congress, while striving in vain to carry his apathetic people into the League of Nations. Uncle Sam had tired of the professor who seemed to believe that he knew all the answers even before the questions were put. (Foreign affairs are summarized in the next chapter.) In the election of 1920 a Republican, Warren C. Harding of Ohio, was chosen President.

From 1921 until 1933 the Republicans dominated all three branches of the Federal government, Executive, Legislative, and, at least, in spirit, even the Judiciary. President Harding, until his death on August 2, 1923, showed no vestige of statesmanship, while corruption in politics ran rampant. The Prohibition Amendment (the Eighteenth) had been adopted on January 16, 1920. Already the Volstead Act had been passed over Wilson's veto the preceding October. The outlawing of the sale of alcoholic beverages, with a resultant wholesale violation of national, state, and local laws, the lowering morals attributable to the disruption of family life during the war, the reaction against the idealism of Wilson, the wild spirit of speculation sweeping the country—all combined with a corrupt and indolent political atmosphere to bring about one of the low tides in Uncle Sam's history.

The Roaring Twenties* was an evil decade. It was the era of the bootlegger, the Chicago and New York gangster, the wild fling of youth now turned loose unchaperoned in automobiles. Uncle Sam was entering a period of sickness—not so much

* A proposed amendment to allow Congress to regulate child labour needs adoption by eight more states before it may become part of the Constitution. An equalization bill, to appropriate \$300,000,000 as an educational fund to aid the poorer states (which have a larger proportion of children than do the wealthier states), was defeated in October 1943 through political manoeuvres of a decidedly unsavoury nature.

physical as spiritual. Externally he was growing by leaps and bounds. The great corporations and their satellites had received a mighty shot in the arm. Business was booming. There seemed to be nothing to worry about. Of course, Europe had slumped into a great depression, but that was Europe's problem, not America's. To be sure, there was a little economic slump in the United States in 1921, but except for the farmers, the nation easily snapped out of it. The automobile business was tremendous and along with it, all heavy industry and manufacturing saw the financial curves mounting higher and higher.

Harding's Vice-President, Calvin Coolidge, succeeded him in 1923 and the next year easily won a term in his own right (1925-1929). Coolidge's foreign policy (except for ridiculously high tariff and the negative mismanagement of international finance) had a minuscule amount of merit, but his internal policy came as near to nothing as that seen in any administration in American history. Yet he rode to the end on a popularity engendered by an unsound urban prosperity buoyed along upon a wave of mounting speculation and a programme of mass buying on cheap and unsound credit.

Meantime, the farmer, while trying desperately to keep pace with the city cousin, was sinking more and more deeply into debt. The cessation of hostilities in Europe, the return of European and American soldiers to the farms, meant overproduction of foodstuffs and other farm commodities. Then, too, improved farm methods, new machinery, and the expansion of agricultural lands all added to excessive supply. That meant, of course, declining farm prices all over the world. The American farmer saw depression setting in in 1920. He tried to beat the game by buying more machinery and producing still more. He mortgaged his farm in hundreds of thousands of cases and then found that he had only increased his burden. It was a vicious spiral downward. It was too big a problem for him to handle himself. It was too big for his state to solve. Neither Harding nor Coolidge was much interested in the farmer's plight. There was passed in 1923 an Intermediate Credit Act to extend credit, but that provided little relief. Coolidge vetoed two bills designed to aid the farmer.

It was not until 1929 that Hoover saw created the Federal Farm Board, which was supposed to promote marketing. It tried to cope with a situation which was far bigger than it appeared, and failed. The farmer had to await another day, even though the American rural population by 1930 numbered 53,000,000 or 43.8 per cent of the American public.

Here, then, during the first thirty years of the twentieth century in America there was being enacted a story involving the most contradictory anomalies imaginable. That story was approaching a climax, an ugly, tragic climax.

The people adopted a prohibition amendment and entered into an era of comparatively heavy drinking. While millions suffered in rural depression and slum conditions, other millions watched in carefree glee the giant spectacles at the speedways, air carnivals, football stadia, baseball parks. They read with interest the news accounts of dancing marathons, flag-pole sitters, and silly endurance contests. It was an age of jazz, and "speak-easies," and speed.

The people talked about raising educational standards and yet allowed school-teaching to remain the most poorly paid of professions. They forced political parties to adopt tariff reform platforms and then shrugged their shoulders when the tariff was raised. The complications of the industrial revolution surely dictated strong reform legislation, including repressive measures toward unbridled vested interests. The people at the polls often demanded such, yet they allowed their voice to be largely unheeded. It was as though they wanted the wool pulled over their eyes. They did not like the methods of the corporations in principle, but they loved capitalism as an institution. Before their eyes they allowed eight-five per cent of incorporated wealth to fall into the hands of five per cent of the population. Without batting an eye they themselves—the great middle class—launched into a gambling spree which saw watered stock approach dizzy heights.

Uncle Sam was too obviously passing through that period of wild youth where in the red danger signals were blinking—unheeded.

Suddenly there was a shrieking of violently applied brakes, a crash, the sound of shattering glass, and then—a pitiful

moan. It happened in October, 1929. The stock market had collapsed, and with it confidence in all financial institutions. Within a few weeks the value of investments had dropped more than \$40,000,000,000. Within a year the national income was cut in half.

Herbert Clark Hoover, the hero of Belgian Relief, former Secretary of Commerce, was the President when it happened. Apparently it came as a complete surprise to multi-millionaire Andrew J. Mellon, his Secretary of the Treasury (whose giant trust, Aluminium Corporation of America, had secured an almost complete monopoly in its corner). Almost pathetically the people raised their eyes to these two men for succour. Surely this was so tangled a mess that only a strong Federal government could drag the nation to its feet again.

Hoover's efforts were conservative and in vain: 1930, 1931, 1932 saw the nation sinking, sinking ever more deeply into despondency, and the world at large seemed to be dragged down behind. The foreign market, already shrinking, shrank still further. Cancellation of contracts meant closing of factories. Unemployment meant less purchasing power for the masses. Still more unemployment resulted, and the depression grew sickeningly in intensity.

A complete analysis of the causes of the Great Depression would involve more discussion than space allows here. There were many external factors of equal importance with those strictly American and in each of them Uncle Sam was vitally concerned, though he apparently did not fully realize it. In most of them he shares blame with the Great Powers of Europe. In one—the tariff—he was still more to blame than they were. In others he was an innocent victim of circumstances.

There was a great revolution in international finance during World War I and during the decade which followed. Here for the first time the United States became a creditor nation. Actually, in 1914, the value of American bonds owned by foreign interests was far in excess of the value of foreign securities held in America. The world's monetary standard was then dictated by Threadneedle Street, not by Wall Street. Suddenly this old-established order was turned upside down. The

American people were called upon to aid in financing the greatest war in history to that date. Uncle Sam became the world's greatest creditor. In this process he moved from a position in which he owed about \$2,500,000,000 to outsiders in 1914 to the status wherein his net investments and credits to others by 1930 amounted to nearly \$30,000,000,000. This is without doubt the most significant revolution in financial history. Its full import was beyond the grasp of the ordinary man. Added to this set of figures must be noted the fact that the American national debt in 1914 was less than \$1,000,000,000. Four years later it stood at \$26,500,000,000. When the Depression came only \$10,000,000,000 had been paid back to the people, and the European debts, already scaled down, were nearly all in default or arrears with little prospect of payment.

This financial revolution had also entailed a greatly contradictory thing. While America was lending huge credits to foreign governments and buying big blocks of foreign investment papers, the world's monetary gold began to flow toward the United States. Uncle Sam lent money abroad while he grew gold-rich. The tariffs, of course, allowed no real exchange. The over-all result of this contradictory circumstance was to lower prices of commodities manufactured abroad and to raise prices at home. Had labourers' wages and farmers' earnings gone up in proportion to prices of manufactured goods a relative balance might have been maintained. Actually that relative balance prior to the financial revolution was already awry. By 1929 the scale was so far out of balance that the purchasing power of the masses was not nearly great enough to absorb the goods for sale. The huge advertising costs had, of course, been added to the selling price. And on top of that situation the foreign market had dried up.

In 1922 the manufacturers, alarmed already by the fact that foreign manufacturers could undersell the Americans even within the United States, had forced through Congress the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. Here was the highest import duty in history. For a while it accomplished its objective. The tariff wall was so high that it effectively kept out of the United States all but a few imports. But as the years wore on, the American prices rose and the foreign prices fell, and currency values with

them moved in the direction which American interests abhorred. One after another European nations repudiated the gold standard. Foreign goods were soon able once more to scale the American tariff wall. Suddenly in 1930, as the world was following Uncle Sam down, down into depression, there was proposed in certain financial circles a sure remedy. Why not raise the tariff wall still higher? The Fordney-McCumber Bill had started the price spiral upward in 1922, had it not? Who could say but that another such layer added on top would not stop this nose-dive? The Republicans immediately took this bright idea to President Hoover. He resisted them. They applied pressure and he called a special session of Congress and dumped the problem in the legislators' laps. The Democrats, completely ineffective since the fall of Wilson, apparently had no worth-while counter-proposal. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff was adopted. Hoover, with misgivings, signed it on June 14, 1930. It raised the rates on some twenty-five per cent of the articles listed in the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922.

Here was one of the most pathetic delusions in the history of Democracy, but who could say so positively in 1930? Economists did, or at least the majority of them. So did most historians, political scientists, and those more enlightened Americans generally who were looking at the world at large. But their combined voices were not large in the noise of politics and organized pressure groups. Big business was paving the way to its own doom and those who cried out a warning were shouted down as prophets of gloom.

And what of the rest of the world? By 1932 more than twenty nations had retaliated and even American musicians were forbidden entrance to certain foreign countries. Everywhere close neighbours began to erect tariff walls against each other. Britain called together representatives of the Dominions at the Ottawa Conference in 1932 to stop this high tariff business among His Majesty's subjects. World trade was becoming stagnant. Uncle Sam, along with the whole world, was becoming sick, very sick, and Hoover knew not what to do. As big-hearted and well-meaning as he was, he failed completely in the hour of dire need.

Meantime, American banks were failing—five thousand of

them failed—people's life savings were being wiped out. Depositors everywhere began to withdraw their money from banks and investment houses. Still others borrowed on life insurance policies and salted away their capital. Deeply and more deeply the nation sank. Millions more were unemployed and there was no unemployment insurance. Bread lines were lengthening. Malnutrition among a generation of young Americans was stalking upon the stage. Uncle Sam, the richest nation in history, was approaching what amounted to poverty—a poverty engendered by fear. The wheels of industry of the great technological giant were grinding to a stop.

Suddenly the people heard a voice on the radio—a calm, cultured, completely assured voice. "My friends," it began—the people listened enthralled—"What this nation needs is a new deal, and I propose to give it to them." It was the famous "Forgotten man" speech at the Democratic National Convention in 1932, spoken by New York's Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt, younger cousin of the dynamic "Teddy." Quickly and enthusiastically the Democrats nominated him as their standard-bearer and revived the popular song, "Happy Days Are Here Again."

Mr. Roosevelt was soon swinging around the country, drawing throngs to him as a huge electro-magnet attracts scrap metal. Some twelve million of those "forgotten men" and women, all unemployed, and their loved ones listened in great anticipation to his subsequent radio talks—talks presented in a dignified yet down-to-earth style.

Roosevelt was already widely known. He was a wealthy aristocrat, educated at Groton and Harvard, who had early decided to become a master of politics. He did. Successively he had become a New York Assemblyman, Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Wilson, and Democratic candidate for the vice-presidency in 1920. Then he had been stricken with infantile paralysis and for a time completely lost the use of his legs. It may well be that this personal misfortune was a mighty god-send. Here had been a brilliant, enthusiastic young politician who had almost reached the top run of public life. Now he had been forced into retirement—a retirement which gave him time to reflect, to study, to acquire a broad perspective, to

move from the narrow viewpoint of politics for politics' sake out into the realm of statesmanship. He had always been dynamic and unafraid to depart from tradition. He was now forced to fight his way back to health and usefulness. He would make a come-back. He would go farther than he ever could have gone had he not had this enforced period of meditation and maturity.

Five, six, seven years had passed. He had not wasted them. No self-pity ever had seized him; on the other hand, he had developed an extroversion which enhanced his political proclivities. He never for a moment had allowed his relative confinement to sever his political connections. Indeed, he had broadened those contacts. He had written, had telephoned, and eventually had visited thousands of friends, important friends, and soon had found that he was a focal point of political—indeed, statesmanlike—influence.

By 1928 he was back in the political spotlight. In that year he had run for the governorship of New York. He had been elected and immediately had begun to apply his recently-matured political thought. He had been re-elected in 1930 by an overwhelming majority. Then, in 1932, he easily carried the Democratic National Convention and was nominated for the presidency of the United States.

Herbert Hoover had established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a good solid organization to help business to get on its feet. This is as far as he had been inclined to go. He still maintained that state and local governments and philanthropic and charitable organizations were the proper agencies for general sociological work. This was the general philosophy of the Old Guard Republicans and, quite naturally, he was re-nominated for the presidency in 1932, but not without loud protests from such progressive Republicans as Senators Norris of Nebraska and La Follette of Wisconsin. He now stumped the country with a thesis akin to the belief that the Depression was just another business slump and that prosperity was just around the corner. "F.D.R." snowed him under—472 electoral votes to 59.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt shattered several precedents during his first week in office. He continued to shatter prece-

dents as he proceeded along his path of reform. His Congresses until the 1940's were awestruck. He asked for and received the most enormous powers, the most gigantic appropriations, and the most radical reform legislation of any Democratic executive in history. He created scores of new government agencies, some good, some bad, some later declared to be unconstitutional. He fully realized that the depression would be supplanted by prosperity only when money was again being spent. He had no desire to see much artificial inflation; he therefore undertook to pour money into the country through public works. In this he tried, with some success, to get state and local governments to match Federal funds. The Civil Works Administration was formed to give employment to those who were willing to work on roads, bridges, dams, public buildings. The C.W.A. was succeeded by the P.W.A. (Public Works Administration) and the W.P.A. (Works Progress Administration), each in turn undertaking additional relief work for the middle classes as well as those not of the "white collar" categories. Some forty thousand millions of dollars were poured out of the public coffers for this work and the country saw unemployment drop from 12,000,000 in 1931 to 9,000,000 in 1936, to 5,000,000 in 1940. In that year only about 2,380,000 of the 53,000,000 employed were "on relief," that is, engaging in Federal emergency work. The gradually increasing purchasing power of labourers and the artificial measures designed to raise prices soon made possible the absorption of surplus goods and created a demand for supply which saw a slow but steady increase in the manufacturing world.

Meantime, the Federal government undertook to help the farmer to solve his problems. Through the Agricultural Adjustment Act (Triple A), until declared unconstitutional in 1936, and through other acts the government undertook to reduce agricultural and livestock production on the theory that a reduction of the surplus of farm commodities would increase prices and thus increase the purchasing power of the farmer and at the same time aid him in paying his debts. In some cases the farmers were penalized severely for disobedience; in other instances surplus goods were bought by government

agencies and distributed among the needy; in others, farmers were paid cash for not planting certain crops and required to sow soil-building cover-crops instead. There were rewards to farmers who diversified their crops, who controlled erosion, who aided the reafforestation programme. From the onset, though, many farmers questioned this "economy of scarcity," but all generally agreed that it was in the 1930's an enervating "shot in the arm."

Meantime, everyone was urged to pay up debts, to lower mortgages, and to cease extravagant buying of unnecessary commodities on unwarrantable credit, but healthy spending for things really needed was encouraged. Tenant farmers, through the Resettlement Administration, were lent money at easy interest to purchase farmsteads, while urban as well as rural people were encouraged through the Federal Housing Administration (F.H.A.) to make a fair down-payment and to borrow money at low interest from government-backed financial houses with which to build new homes constructed under government supervision. The Rural Electrification Administration financed the building of almost 250,000 miles of power lines in forty states. Old hydroelectric dam projects were completed and new ones undertaken, much to the disgust of privately owned power companies and people generally opposed to socialistic measures of the so-called "New Deal." The Tennessee Valley Authority (T.V.A.) not only built great power plants in several southern states, but by 1939 was supplying electricity to forty thousand farms and homes at one half the ordinary rate, but upon conditions in contracts which moved quite deeply toward farm management by government agencies.

Meantime, the U.S. Housing Authority was aiding the financing and construction of low-cost housing projects on the sites of old slums and tenements.

President Roosevelt has been proclaimed the friend of labour and the enemy of "big business." This evaluation is open to qualification. Surely it is true that labour unions have thriven under the Roosevelt regime as during no other period in American history, but the President has frowned upon strikes and the increasing power of certain labour leaders. John

L. Lewis, who split his United Mine Workers of America from the more conservative American Federation of Labour and formed the Committee of Industrial Organization (later Congress of Industrial Organization), in time became as bitter an enemy of the President as there was in the nation. Yet the Roosevelt regime has made possible the C.I.O. Labour unions during the New Deal have seen their paid membership increase fourfold to more than 12,000,000 in 1943. The N.I.R.A. (National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, declared unconstitutional in 1935) provided that workers should have the right to collective bargaining and that employers should recognize their elected representatives. This act undertook to shorten hours and raise wages, to spread employment and to put an end to child labour. Its best features were incorporated in the National Labour Relations Act (1935) and the Fair Labour Standards Act (1938), which respectively established the N.L.R.B. (National Labour Relations Board) to settle fairly labour-capital disputes and limited the normal work-week to forty hours and a minimum wage of forty cents an hour. Needless to say, as Uncle Sam approached entry into World War II, much of this pro-labour programme had to be deferred. Actual participation in the war dictated sacrifice on the part of all segments of society, regardless of the clamourings of those who put class and personal interests before unstinted patriotism.

"Big business" has undoubtedly suffered tremendously at the hands of the New Dealers. Many capitalists hate Mr. Roosevelt with a consuming passion. This was an inevitable result of his reform programme. There are solid grounds for their opposition, chief among them being the fact that the New Deal has been horribly expensive. The national debt jumped from \$22,500,000,000 in 1933 to over \$40,000,000,000 in 1939. Meantime, some forty billions had been spent, but the national income had increased from \$42,000,000,000 in 1933 to \$65,000,000,000 in 1936, to \$71,000,000,000 in 1939. To help pay for the New Deal, corporations were heavily taxed. Taxes on individual incomes far surpassed anything theretofore envisaged. Naturally the burden of these greatly increased taxes fell upon the rich and those who were approaching that status, who had to pay income and corporation taxes to state govern-

ments as well. Many states instituted sales taxes, which fell upon everyone, including the poor. These were necessary to meet educational and other expenses.

The President, quite early in 1933, together with Congress, established the Securities Exchange Commission and put an end to unbridled speculation and evil practices in stock exchange centres. The Banking Act of 1935 forced most banks into the Federal Reserve System and established strict regulatory supervision. By 1937 many big business enterprises had been helped to their feet by loans (totalling \$6,500,000,000) from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Others were now returning to healthy business because of the steadily increasing purchasing power of the masses. Then, but not until then, did the President's fist come down when he expressed determination that the anti-trust laws should be strictly enforced. In June, 1938, Congress established the Temporary National Economic Committee to look into the whole matter of monopolies and make recommendations. The coming of the Second World War slowed down the anti-trust programme and brought to heavy industry a mighty flood of government contracts on a "cost-plus" basis. "Big business," despite taxes and restrictions, flourished as never before. Thousands of smaller enterprises found it quite profitable to change over to war production, but still more little business establishments, geared only to peace-time activities, were forced out of existence. Their owners and employees henceforth found employment either in uniform or in war work. From a sociological point of view, perhaps the most enduring contribution of the New Deal may have been its launching of the programme of Social Security. Here paternalism entered the picture of American life, to remain. There had been a number of excellent state and local programmes as well as investors' syndicates and insurance companies, all attempting to provide savings schemes for maternity expenses, for child-care and education, for health benefits, for orphans, widows and old age pensions, for burial insurance, and for general charitable activities. But these had not moved deeply into the American scheme of things before the coming of the New Deal. Unemployment insurance was not known in the United States in 1929-33.

Franklin Roosevelt in 1935 proposed an almost breath-taking Social Security Act. It was adopted and expanded in 1939. Among its many provisions are those calling for old age benefits after the age of sixty-five, a system of unemployment compensation, and Federal aid for the crippled, the blind, the indolent, and even for maternal care and child-health. To meet the expenses of this wide programme compulsory payments are taken from employer and employee, and the Federal government makes its contribution.

There were other important peace-time contributions of the Roosevelt administrations which surely bear mention in passing. The Civilian Conservation Corps gave highly useful employment to some three million young men in reafforestation and control of forest fires. Incidentally, under Army supervision they were prepared, in body and spirit, for later service in uniform. The National Youth Administration offered financial aid to millions of high school and college boys and girls during the lean years and put them to more or less useful work in their spare time. The Federal Writers Project and other government-sponsored relief undertakings for actors, artistes, and musicians were of some value to the academic and cultural life and provided relief to the distressed among these classes, but they easily provided targets at which the anti-New Dealers fired huge volumes of invective. Among legislation not necessarily Roosevelt-sponsored was the Hatch Act of 1939, which put an end to government civil service officials using their executive powers for political purposes.

Politically, the President took one serious beating. After some five or six of his most important programmes had been nullified by Supreme Court decision that the establishing acts were unconstitutional, Mr. Roosevelt, in 1937, attempted to "reform" the Court, that is, to bring about the retirement of justices over seventy years of age. Here the nation balked and Congress refused to pass the necessary legislation. The President insisted and attempted to bring about the defeat of several Senators who were blocking his iron will. The people did not like this attitude on the part of their President and flatly told him so by promptly sending back to Congress every one of the Senators in question. Mr. Roosevelt took his defeat

gracefully and the people smiled in some satisfaction and then continued to smile as the President was enabled, one after another, to place more liberal men on the Bench as the older men died or retired voluntarily. The Grim Reaper and Father Time gave the New Deal a Supreme Court which was able "to accommodate itself to American democracy."

Much of the New Deal is not permanent. Many of its agencies, at one time great, have died a violent or natural death. Others are rapidly disappearing. Few of the original relief agencies have any reason longer to exist, though some may be revived in the post-war era of adjustment. But the reform legislation and the national debt and the higher income taxes and the more equitable distribution of wealth, and the great public works, and new forests and new houses and reclaimed land, as well as a host of government employees, appear at this hour to have become permanent things.

It appears, at this writing, that the pendulum has already begun to swing back towards the right, but it is extremely doubtful that it will ever return to the position of *laissez-faire* known in the "Roaring Twenties." Mr. Roosevelt triumphed over Alfred M. Landon, the Republican Presidential nominee in 1936, by an unprecedented 523 to 8 votes in the electoral college; but in 1940, when he broke the third term's tradition and faced the extremely liberal Republican Wendell Willkie, though he carried the election by 449 to 82 votes in the electoral college, the popular vote was 27,000,000 to 22,000,000. Many believe that had the President not already proved to be a great leader in international affairs the vote would have been much closer. It may be held that he would never have run for a third term had he not known that he was in the best position to guide the destinies of the nation as it marched closer and closer to the brink of another great war.

No one may say with certainty just when the New Deal was dealt, or just when the artificially stimulated prosperity became a self-propelled organism. It seems that the Great Depression was over by 1940. Even before the coming of war contracts American industry had learned that it must temper its steel in the crucible of the public weal or it would not be tempered. American labour had arrived in the foreground, organized and

strong, but still somewhat inexperienced in the handling of its own finances and its responsibility to the nation. The farmer was plugging away as usual, but beginning to organize and to become politically vocal, gaining in strength and learning. The great middle class, the white-collared groups, the professional people, the salaried people, who found themselves during the depression out of jobs or struggling to make ends meet—they too had learned that they bore a great social and political responsibility. They too were still growing, gaining in knowledge, gaining in experience, gaining in determination to wield a statesmanlike influence—an influence the greater because it was neither pro-capital nor pro-labour nor oblivious to the farmer, whose prosperity was essential to the national interest. Perhaps, after all, they did control the balance of power. They determined to use that position well.

Perhaps the New Deal, as such, had been dealt by 1940, but its influence upon the philosophy of Democracy appears at this writing to have been permanent. To be sure, there will continue to be class interest, but there seems also to be rising above the din of politics an overtone of sober statesmanship.

The trend in the autumn elections of 1943 was definitely back toward the right. Even Kentucky, a normally Democratic state, elected a Republican governor. The fact that the President had not more forcefully demanded of labour unions that they forget their class objectives before the requirement of their national war-interest; the inability of the administration to hold the line against inflationary tendencies; the confusion and intricate problems facing the farmer in having to forsake an "economy of scarcity" for one of full-scale production; the fact that certain leftist elements helped alienate southern whites in their championing the cause of social equality for the Negro; and the natural disaffection of all those elements of society including little business, which had been forced to contribute to the New Deal or to make supreme sacrifices to the war effort—all those forces, plus a general optimism toward the actual prosecution of the war and a tendency to let up and retrench, came to bear upon liberalism in general and seemed to forecast a continuation of

the swing toward the right. Perhaps it was a healthy swing—perhaps not.

As one looks back over the dozen years leading up to the 1944 Presidential election, one cannot escape one vastly important conclusion.

In an hour of great internal emergency in the early 1930's the people—all of them—had thrown themselves into a unit and had come forth strong. In an hour of great external emergency in the early 1940's the people—all of them—had thrown themselves into a unit and had come forth strong.

One may also philosophize thus: When it is necessary, Democracy as exemplified in the forty-eight United States can bring forth as solidly unified a national or even international force as any other type of government. Then, when the crisis is over, once more, if it should choose to do so, it can revert to a leisurely, less stringent way of life, and wait for the next great emergency.

Chapter XI

UNCLE SAM RESISTS FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES

THE turbulent twentieth century was ushered in on a rising tide of international jockeying for economic power. Uncle Sam came of age fully conscious that he lived in a world dominated by the rule, "survival of the fittest." He knew this, yet even then he tried to fool himself into believing that his geographical position made it possible for him to live and let live—that he could remain free of entangling alliances—in short, maintain a desired isolation from peoples and arguments and conditions that lead to war.

Yet at that moment, just as he crossed the threshold into adulthood, he himself was busy fighting a war with Spain and gaining control of the Isthmus of Panama. Coincidentally and without much thought as to consequences, he was also absorbing the European spirit of imperialism and building something of an American empire. In this programme he received the support of England, while Germany and Japan scowled.

And what of the rest of the brotherhood of nations as the twentieth century dawned? Great Britain was engaged in extending her empire; at the moment she was finishing the conquest of South Africa and establishing herself in the Sudan, while continuing her programme of imperialism in the Far East and playing the old game of balance of power in Europe. The new Kaiser of Germany was playing his own game; at the moment he was following up Bismarck's programme of the Triple Alliance, Prussianizing Alsace-Lorraine, dominating the Emperor of Austria-Hungary, lying to the Czar of Russia, and planning the Berlin to Baghdad Railroad, while building a beautiful system at home and a mighty trade programme abroad and a navy with which to back it up, and all the while becoming more and more obsessed with grandiose ideas of spreading Prussian *kultur*. France was playing her own game in Africa, in the Middle East, in Indo-China, all the while waiting for the day of vengeance when her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) might be wiped out in her own programme of "blood and iron." Nearly all of the little states of Europe, too, were jockeying for position at the world's economic and territorial hog-trough. And Japan was about to seize Formosa and Korea and, if possible, Manchuria and Siberia, the Philippines, the rice-fields of China, perhaps Indo-China and the East Indies and whatever else she could get her yellow claws into.

What sort of world was this in which young Sam had grown up? Was his energy to be spent in this cut-throat game or should he seek friendship with some of his fellows and try to make some workable system where law and order and prosperity would be the pattern of existence, and in which humanitarianism should take precedence over nationalism? He did not know which to choose. He needed very little in the way of raw materials and therefore he was not really very interested in imperialism. As far as selling his own produce was concerned, though, he would definitely play an aggressive role, but he fully intended to give his customers their money's worth. He did not realize then that this was not enough.

At any rate he decided to promote a friendship wherever possible. That should be easy, he hoped. He looked around

him and decided that of all his fellows, except for Canada and maybe the Latin American states, the United Kingdom was his best prospect for cultivating a sincere and lasting friendship.

For eighty-five years, since the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, although there had been many grievances which a few hotheads on either side might have used as excuse in urging war, public opinion in the two English-speaking Democracies had demanded arbitration. There had been clashes of commercial interests between Americans and Englishmen already and there had been a number of serious international arguments. There had been loud and discordant carpings and criticisms from unenlightened individuals, such as Americans' discourteous remarks about monarchy and ruling classes and Britishers' sneers at money-madness and *nouveaux riches*. Each nation had recognized in the other a basic honour and decency in international affairs. Both peoples loved sports and they played by rules. To be sure, England had a great navy, but Americans never even contemplated that it would be used against them. Somehow, there was always a subconscious feeling that the British fleet was in part their own. When Uncle Sam began to build a navy of his own there was no English revulsion to that programme, for Englishmen, too, unconsciously knew that this would be no enemy fleet afloat, rather that it was somehow destined to play a complementary role to Her Majesty's Navy. How different was the feeling in England when, a few years later, just after the turn of the century, the Kaiser, Victoria's grandson, began to construct a German navy.

All during the period from 1901 to 1914, while Europe was building up tension and distrust and actually engaging in preliminary skirmishes, the United States was promoting Pan-Americanism as an adjunct to the idea of "Hemispheric Solidarity," European creditors who wanted to collect debts by force from Latin-American debtors were denied that privilege by threat of war with the U.S.A. It was surely one contribution toward ideas of international justice and law and order when the United States undertook the highly unpopular business of the "Big Stick Policy." When certain politically immature Caribbean states were forced by U.S. Marines to stand aside while American officials established for them sound fiscal

systems, there was aggravated in the Americas a suspicion of the United States which still endures. In this policy Uncle Sam gained little except a certain satisfaction that he had shown the Old World that he could back up the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and the obligations assumed in its wider interpretation ("The Roosevelt Corollary"). Here was an assumption of a responsibility which surely carried with it a large measure of altruism. Here was at least one instance of an impartial application of international police power.

In the game of international commerce, though, there was little altruism anywhere, and American business interests were soon showing the world that they knew well how to play a hard driving game. The opening decade of the twentieth century found Uncle Sam out to get his full share of the world's trade. Apparently he had no idea that this programme, involving high tariffs, international investments, and allowing American corporations to meddle in Latin-American politics, was really far more than a big boy's rough game. He should have realized it, but he did not.

When the World War broke in 1914 the real test of that latent British friendship came. The early months of the conflict saw the American people go through a period of some indecision. They were not at all sure where the guilt lay—the guilt of starting that war. They vaguely understood that France was seeking revenge for the defeat of 1870-71. They felt that Germany had a right to build an empire if others had. They did not like the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary, but they loved the music and culture of old Vienna. As for the Czar of all the Russians and his desire to "open his southern window," there were mingled feelings. For Belgium there was nothing but sympathy as that little country was crushed under the iron fist. But most important of all was the flagrant violation of a treaty and the German attitude toward a "scrap of paper."

Suddenly, England, too, was found guilty of violating an obligation. His Majesty's Government, almost from the start of World War I, once more conveniently discarded "freedom of the seas" for a complete blockade of Germany. The British Navy was interrupting American merchant vessels on the high seas. American mail and cablegrams were censored. American

firms, trading with Germany, were black-listed. England gave an almost unlimited interpretation to the term "contraband of war," regardless of protests from Washington. Americans did not like this situation at all, but there was no rupture in Anglo-American relations. Britain's violation of Uncle Sam's neutral rights was deeply resented, especially among the Irish and German elements in America, but that resentment was eventually superseded by revulsion toward German use of new weapons of warfare—weapons which sportsmanlike Americans considered to be in the realm of foul play.

Why did the Americans finally forsake isolation and plunge into the European war on the side of the Allies? It is true that American heavy industry and New York bankers were destined to derive huge profits from American participation in World War I, but the thesis that they carried Uncle Sam into that conflict is false. Unrestricted submarine warfare shocked and angered the American public far more than did the British stories of "Hun" atrocities. The fact that the Kaiser ignored the American protests and seemed to believe that the effect of successful submarine attacks would far outweigh the entry of the United States into war against the great German Empire infuriated the Americans. The German use of poison gas, the shelling of Paris, and the bombing of London aroused the American ire far more intensely than did the arguments that the Kaiser intended to dominate the world. It is true that British propaganda and skilful treatment of American diplomats in Washington and London played a large part along the road to war, but President Wilson's war message to Congress in 1917 and the overwhelming vote to go to war "to make the world safe for Democracy" found their roots deep in the Anglo-American concepts of reason, "cricket," and basic friendship.

It was on April 6, 1917, that powerful young Sam, now grown to full manhood, found himself at last completely united with Mother England against a common set of enemies. Even that large element of Americans of non-British stock absorbed the predominant spirit, and across the sea there was some lasting reciprocation. It was not just good politics when King George V made an attempt at playing American baseball and when he ate and rather liked American buckwheat cakes.

The Americans fully believed that Britain was not just making a polite concession when the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack were displayed side by side in Westminster Abbey and in the Houses of Parliament. No stronger affirmation of real respect and admiration of the British Tommie may be found than in the fact that the bellicose Irish Americans of New York, Boston, and Chicago virtually gave up their name-calling of the English across the Atlantic. Nor did they resume that delightful pastime to any great extent when the war was over. It was World War I, too, which gave the majority of Englishmen their first introduction to Uncle Sam. No longer was he to exist vaguely in their minds as a sort of rebellious and uncouth offspring. Here, suddenly, England found that the United States of America was flesh and blood and muscle and actually was capable of independent and intelligent action—a new world power and a friend worth having, especially in times of stress. Thus it was that the climatic and bloody struggle on the battlefields of France brought to firm realization an alliance which might have come years sooner had the advanced thinkers of the two peoples been heeded.

That war brought to fruition or realization other friendships for Uncle Sam—those of Canada and the other Dominions, of most of the Latin-American states, of France, and the other Allies.

Since 1817 there have existed no fortifications of any kind along the long border between Canada and the United States. Here is a circumstance which simply could not be duplicated in Europe. Some cynics might dismiss this fact as inconsequential and explain that the populous States surely had no fear of sparsely-settled Canada, and that the Dominion, after all, was a possession of His Majesty, that the U.S.A. would hardly attack, and that if such an attack were made, a fortified border would be no deterrent.

It may not be held that Uncle Sam has never toyed with the idea of adding Canada to his huge bulk, and it must be accepted as cold fact that if he ever determined to conquer Canada he would most certainly succeed. That, though, is a most unpleasant thought which Americans simply never discuss, and Canadians try to keep out of mind. And so it is dis-

missed—with the result that Canadians and Americans are the closest of friends. To be sure, there have been disagreements—boundary disputes (Maine and Alaska), arguments over seal-hunting, quarrels over Newfoundland fishing rights, and other points of issues—all of which have been settled by arbitration. There have been, and will yet be, clashes of economic interest—lumber, grain, meat, minerals, financing, manufacturing, waterways, electric power, railroads, tariffs—but the competition is not vastly different from that between Iowa and Illinois farmers or between Yorkshire and Lancashire woollen manufacturers.

Beside new friends and old, then, millions of strapping young Americans went to war. They and their parents watched with approval as Congress conferred upon President Wilson enormous powers and voted huge sums of money that there might speedily be brought about a decent peace. They saw the ranks of men in khaki swelled by conscription to a total of 3,634,000 men. They watched or participated in the building of thirty-two great cantonments where these men were trained. They saw their navy and merchant marine vastly expanded, and expanded for the purpose of aiding the British and French fleets as they bottled up the German navy and went after the U-boats to the end that American men with their supplies might be convoyed across to the lands of their ancestors, there to throw into the scales, fairly balanced, the weight necessary to win a world war. The people willingly watched Congress appropriate the stupendous sum of \$35,000,000,000, a third of which was collected by taxation and most of the remainder floated by four Liberty Loans and the final Victory Loan.

Needless to say, the equipping of an army and navy with a total personnel approaching four million men was up to that time the biggest manufacturing job ever undertaken by the American people. The internal transportation problem, wherein the coal, steel, oil, chemicals and, of course, the lumber and food, were properly distributed, was in itself a huge problem, involving so many intricate details and such dovetailing as to force the centralizing of control of railroads, contracts, and wages in the hands of the President and his efficient Secretary of the Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoo, and the

Chairman of the War Industries Board, Bernard Baruch. Those men and their colleagues did a magnificent job.

All the while that American men were being trained and equipped, the Allies were struggling to hold the Central Powers within bounds, waiting for the arrival of fresh and enthusiastic young men from across the Atlantic.

Eventually they began to come—into France, into the trenches, and finally over the top. Their arrival was of tremendous, psychological importance. By June, 1918, there were 700,000 of them in France. Three months later that figure had been doubled. Suddenly, when it was all over, the 2,000,000 mark had almost been reached.

The war ended too soon to allow the full might of Uncle Sam to be thrown into the conflict. Vast amounts of equipment, guns, ammunition, quartermaster supplies, and thousands of aeroplanes never left American shores. Forty-five per cent of the Army saw no foreign service, and when it was suddenly over the Army in training was then increasing in size at the rate of half a million per month. What might have been demonstrated on the battlefield and especially in the skies were things about which speculation is only academic. What the ultimate potential of America was at that time no one then really knew, and too few among prospective enemies of another generation cared to consider.*

Not all American soldiers who reached France saw front-line duty, but those who did distinguished themselves despite their lack of experience. They fought well at Belleau Wood, Montdidier, Cantigny, Bouresches, and Vaux. In July 85,000 of them were in the front lines in the Marne-Champagne, Soissons, and Château-Thierry sectors. By late autumn two full American armies had been formed at the front and then came an opportunity to show what they could do alone. The Germans at St. Mihiel were the first to feel this fresh blow. They cracked. Then came the Meuse-Argonne drive, and the German line from Metz to Sedan was broken. This onslaught on the German left flank, coupled with the magnificent drives

* When the historian Ambassador William E. Dodd later told Adolf Hitler that he needed to study some history, *Der Führer* flew into one of his neurotic rages.

of the French and British in the centre and north, along with news of hardships back home, was too much for Fritz. Germany suddenly gave up on November 11, 1918, much to the disappointment of millions of young Americans.

But the Armistice was wildly celebrated back home. The tumultuous scenes of joy enacted at both ends of the Champs-Élysées, in Trafalgar Square, and along Fifth Avenue and Broadway were re-enacted in different settings in hundreds of cities throughout the United States. Then, the next day, people began to think a little about the peace settlement.

Woodrow Wilson was a mighty war leader. At home there was absolute confidence in him. Abroad he was the most highly respected statesman in the world. In diplomacy he had made a number of mistakes, but they were errors caused by a false belief that other men were as high-minded, as honest, as he himself was. Lloyd George and Clemenceau were apparently quite satisfied to let Dr. Wilson do most of the talking. The thesis that he was the Allies' minister of propaganda—deceitful propaganda—does not hold up under careful scrutiny. When in his message to Congress on January 8, 1918, he submitted the famous Fourteen Points he was utterly sincere. The fact that they were not carried into full effect after the war does not mean that he knew that they would not be and that therefore he was baiting the Germans—giving them something concrete upon which to propose a negotiated peace. In the last days of the war, in October, he twice announced that he would not negotiate with "military masters and monarchical autocrats." He meant that, just as he stated it. It was the touch which tipped the scales toward dismissal of Ludendorff and the institution of democratic reforms in Germany. It is quite true this helped produce the abdication of the Kaiser, and Wilson was delighted that it hastened the end of hostilities. It was not his intention to denude the Germans of empire and commerce or to saddle upon the German people under the Weimar Republic a guilt clause and burdensome reparations. It is quite true, though, that the war to him was for one big positive purpose—not a defensive one, but one of hard aggression to the end that the world should be made safe for Democracy.

In that spirit he threw himself into the business of trying to make a decent and lasting peace. His enthusiasm and almost blind optimism were disappointingly childlike. He just knew that all the Allies believed as he did. He somehow seemed to forget the old game of power politics—basic local politics—of which he had once been a master. It seemed not to have dawned upon him that the old pendulum was swinging everywhere back toward the general pursuits of personal and national selfishness. He did not fully appreciate the reaction of 1919 in his own country—a reaction from unselfish patriotism and general idealism, a reaction based upon a desire to get back to normalcy, upon a feeling among men as individuals, especially among returning soldiers, that they had done enough for a while. There was a rising tide of indifference in America to things foreign. Wilson, in his enthusiasm, seems to have failed to grasp the significance of that reaction, nor did he give full weight to the French desires for revenge, and European and Asiatic determination to get as much out of the spoils of war as possible. Perhaps he realized the existence of these counter-forces and chose to ignore them—to drive through and force upon the peace-makers and politicians what he, the great student, knew was best for mankind.

Into the maelstrom of ugliness at the Paris Peace Conference Wilson threw himself, unmindful of the lack of dignity in his so doing, caring not one whit for the personal abuse aimed at him from at home and abroad. The Republicans had just won the election of 1918 and both Houses of Congress were anti-Democrat, not necessarily anti-Wilson, but anti-Democrat. Yet Wilson, a Democrat, failed even to take to Paris with him the leaders of the Republican Senate. That was bad politics—very bad politics. But ex-President Theodore Roosevelt was hardly correct when he announced to the world: "Mr. Wilson has no authority whatever to speak for the American people at this time." He did speak for the people—the people of all nations.

At Versailles the President immediately found himself faced with almost overwhelming forces of hatred and greed. That he was able, through compromise and pleading and force of personality, to save some of his Fourteen Points and, with the

aid of Jan Christian Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, to bring forth a League of Nations was a great personal victory. That the proposed League was shot through with so much of nationalism, that the Treaty contained so much invective along with idealism that his own people rejected it, was a result destined to be a travesty in the annals of mankind.

That his own people rejected the Treaty of Versailles is not quite a correct statement. The majority actually did not care greatly. The majority of those who did any solid thinking about it enthusiastically favoured adoption, hoping and expecting with the President that the ugly parts of the Treaty would in time be obliterated. The fact must not be overlooked that during the long debate in the United States Senate there was never a time when Wilson did not have a majority, even though there were fifty-nine Republicans and only thirty-seven Democrats in the upper House. But it requires a two-thirds majority of the Senate to adopt a treaty. That proportion probably could have been carried had Wilson been willing to compromise, but compromise involved taking the teeth out of the League and he refused. He toured the country, making one final mighty effort to stir public opinion to force Senators Lodge and Borah and Johnson and other irreconcilables (the "little band of wilful men," the President called them) to change their minds. On that tour Wilson was suddenly stricken with partial paralysis of his left side. He was carried home a broken man—broken in body but not in spirit. The whispering campaign that he had lost his mental faculties was not only utterly false but was one of the lowest tricks to which Isolationists ever stooped.

It was not until March 19, 1920, that the Senate finally rejected the Treaty of Versailles, and with it the League of Nations, by a vote of fifty-seven ayes and thirty-nine nays. Had only four Senators voted aye instead of nay, the history of the twentieth century would have been vastly different. Had there been less meanness, hatred, and deceit at Versailles, more than four additional Senators might have cast their votes for and not against Wilson's League of Nations.

Eventually separate treaties were signed with Germany, Austria, and Hungary and were ratified by the Senate.

Then came the Roaring Twenties and the irresponsible administrations of the inconsequential Harding (1921-1923), "Silent Cal" Coolidge (1923-1929), and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933). The foreign policy of Uncle Sam during this period was as ineffectual as the domestic policy was haphazard. Its ineffectualness was the result of futile attempts to follow false gods. Uncle Sam was self-satisfied, bent upon pleasure, luxury, and speculation. He tried to play a game of isolation while engaged in aggressiveness in international commerce. He insisted upon the payment of foreign debts while refusing to buy bread. He failed to take full cognizance of the great revolution in his own status in the world of finance when he moved from debtor to history's greatest creditor. Important Republican statesmen like Charles Evans Hughes, George Norris, Elihu Root, Frank B. Kellogg, Henry L. Stimson, and even Justice William Howard Taft raised their voices in loud protest against the obviously contradictory and dangerous policy of playing both ends against the middle. But the "Old Guard" was in the saddle. Isolation and *laissez-faire* had taken the place of Wilsonian internationalism—a strange policy to be followed by business men who were supposed to be able to follow good business principles. The great weakness in their thinking was that each was playing his immediate self-centred game—not even thinking as a member of a class, not looking beyond his own immediate programme, not interested in broad horizons.

The business man was not alone in this short-sightedness. Labour, too, was easily led to believe in high tariffs. The worker naturally fears and resists competition, whether it be imported commodities, labour-saving machinery, or immigration. The farmer, excluded from tariff benefits—indeed, suffering from rising prices of manufactured commodities while prices of farm products steadily declined—meekly opposed the tariff but favoured other by-products of the spirit of Isolation. He was naturally conservative and had little desire to stray very far from the beaten path unless he should be thoroughly convinced that in another direction lay essential progress. He generally believed in Wilsonian principles, but not strongly enough to be greatly aroused.

There were other contributing factors which revived in the 1920's the old spirit of Isolation. The majority of Americans are Protestants, and while tolerant of Catholics and Jews, they want the majority to remain Protestant. They are white, of Celto-Teutonic origin, and while tolerant of Slavs, Jews, and Latins, as well as of Orientals and Negroes, they want the majority to remain Celto-Teutonic. When, therefore, the Old World began to drop into economic depression in 1920, the cry went up that "the world was preparing to move to the United States." Closely allied to the revived spirit of Isolation, then, perhaps another by-product of it, there was a determination to restrict immigration. Congress in 1921 passed an act providing that no European country might thenceforth send to America annually more than three per cent of the total number of its nationals resident in the U.S.A. as shown in the census of 1910. When the southern whites and farm elements generally saw that the proportion of those who were thus admitted was heavy with Poles, Russian Jews, Italians, and others, the old basic Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic snobbery arose. Congressmen examined the Census Enumerations and found that the 1880's saw a far heavier entry of the Nordic type than had been true in the years just preceding World War I. Therefore, in 1924 immigration was further restricted, and selected by setting the quota at two per cent of foreign nationals resident in the United States in 1890. Canadians and Latin Americans (with some exceptions) may enter at will.*

Far more important in the history of mankind than negative restriction of immigration into America had been the positive restriction of world trade resulting from the high tariff policy which accompanied post-war Isolation. Wilson, in vetoing a tariff bill in 1920, offered his last sage counsel: "If we wish to have Europe settle her debts—governmental or commercial—we must be prepared to buy from her." That was too much for the Old Guard. Then came the Fordney-McCumber Tariff in 1922 and the world champion Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930, which back-fired with its series of shattering explo-

* From 1882 until 1923 Chinese immigrants had been excluded. In 1924 Congress forbade immigration from any Oriental country. Japan was furious.

sions in the years which followed, until Cordell Hull, Secretary of State under Franklin Roosevelt, finally, with Congressional consent, lifted this business of tariffs out of the realm of domestic politics and, at least temporarily, lodged it in the State Department (Foreign Affairs), where it might well have been from the beginning. Hull immediately undertook a programme of reciprocal low-tariff agreements with "Good Neighbours" to the south and east, and at last Uncle Sam showed signs of real statesmanship in international affairs. Too bad that this came too late to repair a terrible world-wide damage.

It must not be assumed that the majority of Americans actually favoured the high tariff policy. But that majority was too much interested in domestic affairs to pay much attention to foreign policies, too much involved in home life to become concerned about the possibility of repercussions in the world at large.

Each of the Old Guard presidents favoured American entrance into the World Court, each did lip-service to the policies of the League of Nations, but there was never during these years a public opinion strong enough to be reflected in Congressional action. Even President Roosevelt during his first two terms did not find the national temperament such as to allow a revival of Wilsonian principles on a wide scale.

As though his conscience was hurting him, Uncle Sam did make some international concessions and definitely advocated World Peace as an admirable principle. In 1922 Congress created the World War Foreign Debt Commission, which scaled down war debts and interest and spread payment over a period of sixty-two years. In 1924 the Dawes Plan was formulated, whereby German reparations were reduced and more American money apparently made possible the revival of German industry so that France could collect from Germany and pay England, who in turn could make payments to the United States. But Germany did not pay. Again, in 1930, the Young Plan was supposed to aid this process by setting up the Bank of International Settlements. But again somehow Germany did not find it possible or feasible to meet her obligations even to the United States. Financial affairs again drifted from bad to worse; no one seemed to know why. The Weimar

Republic, it was said, was heading straight toward internal collapse. The Germans again appealed to the United States for aid. Hoover's Moratorium of 1931 once more "saved the day." Here it was agreed that for one year no nation was to pay any other nation anything. In 1932 several governments defaulted on their international debts, and thereafter only little Finland met obligations.

All the while poor, poor Germany was being allowed to borrow large sums in America. When, within a year or two, Germany was found to be launched already upon a great national programme of internal spending, some Americans wondered whether or not they were not allowing themselves to become the world's greatest dupes. When, about six or eight years later, they saw more clearly what actually had become of their money, and how paltry a sum the Germans had ever paid by way of reparations, they at last knew that they had let themselves in for the greatest swindle in history. Many a Nazi must have laughed up his sleeve.

In 1921 Harding entertained the Washington Conference which drafted nine treaties, the chief of which limited naval expansion and established the 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 warship tonnage ratio among Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively. The first four of these great powers agreed upon arbitration of any dispute which arose in the Pacific. All nine nations, invited by Harding to send representatives to Washington (including China, Belgium, and the Netherlands and Portugal), guaranteed Chinese integrity and the "open door" for Chinese trade.*

By 1927 all these nations were beginning to be somewhat suspicious of each other. Coolidge suggested another meeting. It was held in Geneva and the results were bad. So bad were they that the delegates returned home with seeds of distrust now past the stage of germination. Three years later in London there was another conference in which the United States, Great Britain, and Japan came to some tentative agreements, but two years later still (1932), at Geneva, Japan let it be known that she was scrapping the whole disarmament programme. A

* The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not recognized as a nation by the United States until 1933.

new naval building race was on. Meantime, in 1928, Coolidge had sent his Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, to Paris to try to stem the tide of distrust which offered dangers to the programme of world peace. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was eventually signed by fifty-nine nations. Therein they all renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed to settle all international disputes by arbitration. Here was a propitious moment for some great nation or combination of nations to sponsor not only the League and the World Court of International Justice but also the establishment of an international police power. That moment slipped past into history.

Three Americans sat on the World Court, but the U.S. Senate had refused to allow the United States to become a litigant before that tribunal. The Senate thus refused to allow the court to decide when Uncle Sam is wrong. The whole series of international conferences listed above, as well as the various Pan-American conferences and the World Economic Conference in 1933, saw American participation, but these were extra League affairs. Lip-service was not enough. Isolation remained in the role of a false god, confusing the minds and consciences of most Americans, until one Sunday in December, 1941, when Uncle Sam was smacked squarely in the face while still talking peace.

Late in the 1930's Americans became conscious of the fact that there were three great ideologies vying with each other for dominance in the affairs of mankind. One was the old idealism of Democracy which since before the days of Henry IV of France had been marching on the road toward Internationalism—a Democratic Internationalism wherein all classes and nations voluntarily should pool their holdings and strength to the end that a well-ordered commerce might prevail in a peaceful world, to the end that there might be brought about that greatest good of the greatest number; but without ignoring innate and cultivated differences among individuals and peoples or wiping out private enterprise and healthy competition. A second ideology was the revolutionary idea of Communism, wherein all capital assets should be held in common regardless of birth, intellect, or diligence, wherein the

state should dominate all economic and social life. This concept was not new, but the fact that the government of one great nation decided in the twentieth century to adopt as its national programme the spread (by any means) of Communism on an international scale was new. This Third International was most alarming to all more conservative men. The third hardly deserves to be called an ideology. It was a conglomeration of national and class interests welded into a so-called Axis, and international only in the sense of its following a programme of gangsterism on a limitless scale. Internally its advocates—variously called Fascists, Falangists, Nipponists, and Nazis—robbed, murdered, and enslaved opponents. Its autocratic dictators resorted to all the lowest tricks of demagogues, rabble-rousers, liars, cheats, and utterly unscrupulous militarists. Externally it would stop at nothing. It chose to corrupt the minds of its youth as to facts and interpretations and then went so far as to preach a philosophy that decency and fair play were but signs of weakness.

As the end of the decade neared, it began to appear that one of these three ideologies was going to succeed on an international scale. International Democracy, the Third International, and Fascism was each in opposition to the other two. The first two, however, did hold some things in common—they at least both aimed toward a utilitarian objective. There was always the possibility that some day they might reach a compromise, so long as Democracy was not called upon to sacrifice the philosophy of the Freeman—the individual citizen as the fountain of government rather than the totalitarian concept of state first, individual afterwards. Even the Nazis talked about a good and great social order—a New Order in Europe—while the Japanese, for lack of an original slogan, proclaimed themselves champions of a New Order in Asia. The Germans and Japanese had nothing in common except a common set of enemies. In this international scheme of things they were slated to become enemies of each other, for there would never have been possible a delineation between the two sets of thieves. Poor Italy and other German satellites never did have any chance in the international aspiration of the Nazis. Mussolini ranted about a revival of the Roman Empire

while the Germans sang a song about "Germany Over All."

Uncle Sam had a good look at Communism during the Great Depression. He saw it later, too, when its cells were promoting strikes during the time when there was a Soviet-German non-aggression pact and America was becoming the "Arsenal of Democracy." He saw the American Communists reverse form suddenly on June 22, 1941, when Hitler attacked Stalin. He saw fewer strikes; he heard far fewer rabble-rousers. In one great mass a large segment of misguided souls had immediately become rabid interventionists. They had, only a few months before, helped throw Dorothy Thompson (Hitler hater) out of an isolationists' rally when she had dared to utter the word "Bunk!" Uncle Sam looked at these subversive tactics and frowned. In unbounded admiration he later watched the Russians in magnificent battle protect their homeland against the Fascist horde, but he disliked Communism none the less.

Uncle Sam will never be a Communist. Everything in his history points to that conclusion. He is still close to the soil and he loves his property. He is a rugged individualist and he is personally ambitious. He is capitalistic and proud of it. It was capitalism which produced steam power, electric power, petrol power. It was capitalism that gave mankind mass production and made the world a more comfortable place in which to live. It was capitalism that rose to meet national enemies in 1917-1918 and in the 1940's. Even so, Uncle Sam is not blind to the fact that Capitalism has its evil side. He saw Franklin Roosevelt force those who had the money to contribute a great share of it to the New Deal, and as a whole he rather liked the idea of "big business" having to pay a large part of the bill. But he was far happier when he saw the wind taken out of Communists' sails once the "Forgotten Man" and his children were no longer hungry. To be sure, Democracy was forced to move to the left in that emergency, but it was Democracy which did it. Many thoughtful Americans, though, argue that most of the basic causes of the depression, in which Communism thrives, remain untouched—that recovery from the most recent stagnation was found only in an orgy of war spending. These thinkers saw the Great Depression in the light of

international economies. Such Americans cannot be Isolationists. They are not Communists.

Hitler and Franklin Roosevelt came to power within a few hours of each other in March, 1933. One spent \$40,000,000,000 on public works and in enterprises to prime the engines of American industry. The other spent \$90,000,000,000 in the same period, and the wheels of German industry eventually were made to whirl at a mighty pace. To be sure, Hitler built some highways and public works too, but they were for one purpose—war. He took men out of bread lines too, but instead of being put to peaceful and worth-while work they were made to fill the ranks of Storm Troopers, or the *Wehrmacht*, or war plants. Hitler ended his depression all right, but in so doing was furthering a programme which could not be stopped short of war. Roosevelt reached the point where he could ease off his New Deal as private enterprise reached up to absorb the unemployed. Had Hitler called an end to production of munitions at any time after 1935, Germany immediately would have sunk again into depression. There was nothing for the German people to do but follow blindly—or, perhaps it was enthusiastically—goose-stepping, “heiling,” and chanting *Deutschland Uber Alles*.

Long before the rise of the *Führer* the American people had watched the Japanese carefully. The Isolationists joined those who were simply anti-imperialist in promulgating the idea of withdrawing from Asiatic affairs. But when the thought kept presenting itself that, should America withdraw from the Philippines, Japan might move in, Uncle Sam determined to maintain a navy of greater strength than that of any other Pacific fleet. The Isolationists somehow never were able to influence American policy in the Far East. When the Japanese attacked China in 1931 and seized Manchuria the State Department, with good public backing, spoke. Secretary Stimson appealed to London, offering joint action to put an end to Japanese aggression in China. His offer was rejected. There were good reasons, to be sure, but his offer was rejected. The League of Nations did nothing but protest. Britain had come to think of Uncle Sam as a sort of British alter ego in the Pacific—that whatever was done out there should be an

American responsibility. In that attitude Britain appeared to assume a similar responsibility in the Atlantic. Both nations were guilty of negligence in their responsibility one to the other and to mankind at large. Both, too, were thinking of sea power and grossly guilty of overlooking air power.

Even before the rise of the *Führer* the American people had watched with disgusted amusement the antics of Benito Mussolini since 1922. They saw him begin to beat the ploughshare into a sword, but shrugged their shoulders until in 1935 he attacked the poor Ethiopians, spear-carrying warriors, with machine-guns, bombs, and poison gas. Then the American amusement turned into revulsion, but when the Democracies of Europe showed no inclination to take strong measures the Americans once more shrugged their shoulders.

If Americans were guilty of foolish isolation, the Democracies of Europe were playing an ostrich game of monstrous irrationality.

It was now Hitler's turn. With tongue in cheek he violated the Versailles Treaty and re-occupied the Rhineland. He stopped, looked around, heard a great deal of protesting from France, but saw no real threat of action. Indeed, two weeks later, on March 25, 1936, France, Great Britain, and the United States signed a naval limitation treaty! The *Führer*, in his glee, planned the next move and audaciously published new editions of *Mein Kampf*.

Meantime trouble had started in Spain. General Francisco Franco, backed by Fascist elements, proclaimed the Republicans to be Communists and announced that he was head of a Nationalist Government. Immediately it was suspected that this rebellion had been inspired by Hitler and Mussolini. The Loyalists appealed to the Democracies and the Soviet Union. Only the latter sent aid. The Democracies decided not to ally themselves with the Communistic U.S.S.R. It was an easy decision and a natural one, but it was wrong. The issue of aid to the Spanish Loyalists tore France asunder politically and rendered Britain impotent. But Italy and Germany had a field day. This Spanish civil war was just what they needed to try out new weapons and tactics. Spice was added to the bloody

struggle when the U.S.S.R. also engaged in a little preliminary practice.

Uncle Sam watched all this as though in a stupor. The Isolationists, still led by Hiram Johnson of California and William E. Borah, "the Lion of Idaho," in 1934 had forced upon President Roosevelt an act forbidding the sale in the United States of foreign securities (except those of Finland and any other non-defaulting debtor). This was primarily to stop any possible entangling alliance or commitment. Then followed three Neutrality Acts wherein the President's power in foreign affairs was restricted. When in 1939 Mr. Roosevelt saw war looming on the European horizon, he begged the leaders of Congress to repeal the 1937 Neutrality Act (which he had signed) so that Uncle Sam's voice might be heeded by the sword-rattlers. The Congressmen flatly refused. Borah said that there was going to be no war in Europe. To the amazement of intelligent people he even deigned to tell Secretary Hull that he had as good sources of information as the State Department had. Johnson approved this strategy. So did the members of a new crop of Isolationists led by Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat from Montana. From the first they received strong support from several powerful newspapers, including the *Chicago Tribune*, and in time from the popular hero Charles A. Lindbergh, America's most publicized aviator. Many raucous groups and subversive agents lent loud support.

Meantime things were moving rapidly toward war in Asia and in Europe. Japan, Italy, and Germany were turning their full national economies toward militarism. So was the Soviet Union, though that was being done behind the most magnificent bit of camouflage in history.

Hitler formally repudiated the Versailles Treaty in January, 1937. The Japanese struck China again in July, bombed the "daylights" out of Shanghai and raped Nanking. Mussolini finished the year by withdrawing from the League of Nations, which was terribly embarrassed when Haile Selassie offered to pay Ethiopia's League dues. All the while Spain was being torn to shreds.

Then in 1938 King Carol of Roumania allowed his parliamentary government to be overthrown by the Fascists. Hitler

marched into Austria and annexed it to the Third Reich, proclaiming peace on earth, good-will to men. Stalin cleaned his house, ridding the U.S.S.R. of Nazi agents, while Hitler almost finished pillaging the German Jews. Then came Munich, at which Hitler threatened to bomb Paris and London out of existence unless Daladier and Chamberlain agreed to German acquisition of the Sudetenland. Stalin, naturally, had not been invited to the conference. Apparently nobody wanted him there.

Three great ideologies were facing each other, each an enemy of the other two. How would they line up? It appeared to many, all during the later 1930's, that Stalin wanted the Democracies and Fascism to fight it out and that the Democracies wanted the Fascists and Communists to destroy each other. But the big issue was lost in the news that Hitler had again broken his word and was destroying Czechoslovakia as a nation, while putting to his use the great Czech Skoda Iron Works. The year 1938 ended with the signing of a pact between strife-torn France and power-mad Germany. This pact sweetly proclaimed pacific and good neighbourly relations between two of history's most consistent enemies. Meanwhile, ex-Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was telling the Americans that the Democracies shared common purposes and perils. The Isolationists easily dismissed this as British propaganda. Other Americans, especially in the South, did not.

Then came 1939. The Spanish Loyalists were finally crushed. Hitler took Memel from Lithuania and again proclaimed that that was all he wanted. Mussolini took Albania and said that that was all he wanted. Japan did not say. Then Britain authorized conscription. Here was the first strong move taken by any of the Democracies. It came too late. Joseph Stalin had already decided that the Soviet Union must play a game entirely its own. Litvinov, friend of the Democracies, resigned as Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and few people in the Democracies guessed what that meant. In time they were to learn. It was finally decided in London and Paris to send military missions to Moscow—not very important diplomats, but missions just the same. In May, Italy and Germany entered

into an open military and political alliance. That same month the Japanese in Manchuria stepped over the northern border on to Siberian soil. Their feet were badly mangled before they could step back. The Soviet and Japan glared at each other in silence. It was a moment of tense confusion. No one exactly knew who his major enemies were or who might be lined up as allies. Even the gangster powers could not put trust in each other.

On August 21, 1939, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, rubbing his hands in glee, announced a ten-year non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. It was signed on August 23 and the military missions from London and Paris decided that it was time to return home.

All the while Uncle Sam was watching from a safe distance. Would England and France fight if Hitler seized Danzig and the Polish Corridor? The Isolationists and others answered: "No, there's going to be no war in Europe." Still others knew better. Apparently von Ribbentrop and Hitler did not.

It happened on September 1, 1939. Luftwaffe bombers without warning plastered the airfields of Poland while the *Wehrmacht*, led by Panzer Divisions, stabbed across the border toward Warsaw. The American people quickly learned several new words—one of them: *Blitzkrieg*.

Though unprepared physically, Great Britain and France could not resist the repeated call of honour. On September 3 they declared war with Germany. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada instantly followed the mother country. South Africa in time followed suit. Uncle Sam held his peace.

It took but three weeks to destroy Poland. The carnage was terrible. So was the finesse with which it was done. When it was quite evident that Poland was toppling, Joseph Stalin sent his troops westward. The eastern and south-eastern portions of Poland were taken and Germany was cut off from immediate access to Roumania. It was a tense moment. Would Hitler declare war on the Soviets for this act? Stalin apparently guessed correctly. Hitler, it seems, also guessed correctly—that Stalin would keep quiet and allow the *Führer* to save his face by pretending that the whole thing had been prearranged. Perhaps it had been. We do not know at this writing. But

the fact remains that Stalin created at least a small buffer against the day when he knew Hitler would strike out into the east, and Hitler at that moment dared not deny him such.

The *Führer* decided to make a speech on October 6. It was mostly for home consumption; perhaps, though, the warped brain of Hitler conceived the possibility that it might be effective abroad. "Germany has no cause for war against the Western powers," he screamed; "they have recklessly provoked a war on the flimsiest grounds."

The American people listened in disgust. They had a Neutrality Act, yes. But many remembered Woodrow Wilson's statement: "You cannot legislate neutrality." Uncle Sam was not neutral. A Gallup Poll taken shortly after the war began showed eighty-five per cent of the people admitting that they were pro-Ally. That proportion grew larger as time marched on, but other Gallup Polls showed a majority from the beginning until December, 1941, opposed to American entrance into the war. Other surveys, one especially taken by *Fortune Magazine*, showed the American people frankly admitting the inconsistency of this position. Uncle Sam was restless in spirit, thoroughly unhappy.

When Stalin attacked Finland (the only nation which had continuously met her financial obligations to the United States) Americans were confused. Emotionally they were terribly angry with the U.S.S.R. and with the American Communists who were joining Borah and the Isolationists in the cry: "This is a phony war." A few pointed out that Stalin was building another buffer against the day Hitler should attack Russia. Even so, Uncle Sam cheered for the little fellow and, like the Germans, believed that the U.S.S.R. was pathetically weak from a military standpoint. At least one radio commentator stated his belief that Stalin, in the weak prosecution of this Finnish war, was purposely pulling the wool over Germany's eyes and, incidentally, also over those of the Allies!

The dilemma of Hitler, during the period of inactivity from October until April 9, 1940, when without warning he attacked Denmark and Norway, was never fully understood in America. Why Hitler waited so long to attack France the radio commentators and columnists were unable to explain, though there

never was much doubt that it would come. Was it that Hitler was trying to decide whether or not to attack the Soviet Union before turning to the West? When the *Wehrmacht* finally in the months of May and June rolled through Holland, Belgium, and then France at least a part of the reason for the delay was apparent. The Fifth Column had needed time to do its work.

When Italy attacked poor France, Mr. Roosevelt, who had consistently gone just as far toward allied support as public opinion seemed to allow, made his famous "stab in the back" speech at the University of Virginia on June 10. The nation cheered. Uncle Sam was committing himself to a programme which should surely lead him to war with Hitler some time, somewhere.

The retreat from Dunkerque had taken place. Britain was alone, and Americans had been shocked. What if the Nazis should invade England? What if Hitler should gain the British Navy? Uncle Sam, in something of a cold sweat, had suddenly realized that this was after all his war, that his fate was hanging in the balance and that he was completely unprepared for war. Should he do as France and Britain had done—declare war even though unprepared? Did wisdom not dictate that he be strong enough first to back up words with deeds?

A solid answer to those questions was provided on September 16, 1940, when Congress adopted a Selective Service Act, and soon thereafter over 16,000,000 men had registered for the draft.

On September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed a pact to "assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." If the Axis nations thought that this pact, loudly proclaimed, frightened the Americans, they were sadly mistaken. It did have the effect, though, of making quite clear to the majority that Uncle Sam was living in a world in which he might possibly be squeezed between two great unified segments of mankind with himself in the Western Hemisphere as a probable focal point of determination to eliminate all opposition.

With brow furrowed, young Sam went to the polls on

November 5 to select the man who as President would lead the American people through as dark and dangerous a period as they had ever faced. Despite the fact that reaction against the New Deal had set in and despite the fact that no President in American history had ever dared to run for a third term, Franklin D. Roosevelt was an easy victor in the election of 1940. His opponent, Wendell L. Willkie, had waged a strong fight against the New Deal, but he was forthright in his support of the President's strong foreign policy. The Old Guard Republicans had been overruled in the selection of this anti-Isolationist. Uncle Sam was not ready yet for war, but he had given Mr. Roosevelt the go-ahead sign as far as all-out aid to the Allies was concerned.

All the while Britain had been knowing "her finest hour," as her magnificent Prime Minister put it. Between the characteristic fortitude of a great civilian population and the beautiful fight of the R.A.F., the Americans hardly knew which to choose as the real heroes of the twentieth century. They gave full credit, too, to His Majesty's Fleet and the pugnacious tenacity of the men of the merchant marine. It may be held that all anti-British sentiment in America melted away during "the blitz" and the days when Mr. Churchill called out across the sea: "Give us the tools and we will finish the job."

Already before his re-election Mr. Roosevelt on September 2, 1940, had made a deal with Mr. Churchill whereby for fifty over-age destroyers Great Britain leased to the United States a series of western Atlantic naval bases. It was a good bargain, especially in that it was shrewd strategy on the part of two shrewd men. During those days and afterwards the two leaders were in frequent consultation with each other by telephone. It is said that they called each other by their Christian names, though they might have used "F.D.R." and "Winnie." One day the world learned that the cronies had met "somewhere in the Atlantic and had drawn up a joint declaration of peace aims"—this, months before Uncle Sam was to become a declared belligerent. This Atlantic Charter, patterned somewhat after Wilson's Fourteen Points, announced the Anglo-American determination that neither party sought to gain any territory in this war, but rather that both stood on the common

principle that peoples everywhere should have freedom to choose their own forms of government; that they should have access to raw materials; that they should see war abandoned and a system established wherein the men of all lands should be assured that they might "live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." That was on August 14, 1941.

Long before that, Uncle Sam, step by cautious step, had moved closer to John Bull. Nor was sympathy for China's cause to remain forever unexpressed. In October, 1940, the President had imposed an embargo on scrap metal destined for Japan and about the same time had lent Chiang Kai-shek's government \$70,000,000 with which to purchase sorely needed supplies.

Back in January Mr. Roosevelt had presented to Congress a proposal which would by-pass the provisions of the revised Neutrality Act. As a sop to the Isolationists and those timid souls who opposed goading the Axis into attack, the nation's statute book still carried the foolish word "Neutrality," but everyone, including Hitler, Mussolini, and Japanese war-lords, knew this was a farce. The President's January proposal had been a request that Congress give him the money and power to lend-lease any defence article or service to any nation whose defence was vital to the future of the United States. A howl went up from the Isolationists. There was a long debate in Congress and throughout the land. The measure finally passed on March 11, and immediately a stream of war essentials, weapons, planes, food, and ships were on their way from the "Arsenal of Democracy" to the places where they would do the most good, while British vessels wounded at sea found haven and repair facilities in American harbours. American vessels, of course, aided in the transport of these lend-lease goods across the seas.

In May the Germans sank the U.S. freighter *Robin Moor* off Brazil. In June the President ordered frozen all German, Italian, and overrun national assets in the United States. There was Axis retaliation. The President ordered German consulates (spy nests) closed. Without warning, and despite the ten-year non-aggression pact of 1939, on June 22, 1941, the German *Wehrmacht* struck out toward the heart of Russia. As

Britishers drew something of a sigh of relief, Churchill and Roosevelt immediately pledged all possible aid to the Soviet Union.

In July, U.S. Marines accompanied British forces to beat the Germans to Iceland. Greenland had already been occupied in early April. During August more U.S. tankers entered British transport service. In September a U.S. Government-owned ship was sunk off Iceland. Americans were ashamed to learn that it had been sailing under the flag of little Panama. The next month saw the U.S. destroyer *Kearney* torpedoed off Iceland. Then in November the U.S. Navy tanker *Salinas* was torpedoed south-west of Iceland. Already the President had ordered American seamen to shoot on sight any enemy submarine. Thus the enemy had been declared and Uncle Sam had step by step entered a "shooting war," and the nation approved, but still said it was opposed to a formal entrance into war.

If some modernistic artist were seeking a theme for a picture of distorted confusion, he might easily choose the American scene during the summer months of 1941. He would have to show the people conscious of war in Asia and Europe, their attention focused principally on the smouldering of London after the horrible May 10th raid, the sensational arrival in Britain of Rudolf Hess, then the war in Russia. The drafted boys in American training camps would have to be portrayed. Deprived of the opportunity to go to school, or to make money like the boys back home, they were becoming more and more disgusted with their fate. It made them sick to be drilling with wooden guns and driving milk delivery lorries designated "Tanks" while American materials were being sent abroad. This was the period, too, when prices were rising at an alarming rate as war plants were being built and the curve of unemployment was doing a nose-dive.

The nation, whose attention had been switched back and forth between Europe and domestic problems, suddenly in November, 1941, became aware of the fact that there was another part of the world which should bear some attention. For many years there had been prophets of doom talking about the "Yellow Peril" and predicting a great war some day be-

tween the United States and Japan. They had been almost completely unheeded. To be sure, there had been some belated strengthening of garrisons in the Philippines, and the Navy had concentrated its strength in the Pacific. But Japan was bogged down in China, and though she had taken French Indo-China and had gained political control of Thailand, it seemed completely outside the realm of reason that Nippon would be so foolish as to go to war against the powerful United States.

As 1941 drew toward a close, however, the Japanese militarists faced a terrible dilemma. They had counted heavily upon a German defeat of Russia and then a Nazi invasion of Britain. Neither had occurred, and as month by month passed the relative strength of the two sets of enemies was not only approaching a balance, but the gradual entrance of the United States into active belligerency saw the scales begin to tip toward Axis defeat. The gathering strength of Uncle Sam in the Pacific, the failures of the Italians and Germans in Africa, the growing support of Indians in Britain's fight against the Axis, the pro-Ally turn of events in the Middle East, and in time an increasing flow of lend-lease materials up the Burma Road all brought Japan to the realization that unless she should succeed in some daring enterprise her defeat would be inevitable. Which should it be—an attack upon Siberia or a drive into the South Pacific? An attack upon the U.S.S.R. would be far more feasible from a standpoint of supply, but such would involve two great dangers. One of these was the prospect of an immediate bombing of Japanese centres of production by Siberian-based Soviet planes, along with the strong possibility of actual defeat on land. There could be no victory over the huge U.S.S.R. unless Hitler should succeed in the west, and he was not doing any too well. The other danger was a continuous and uninterrupted growth of American strength in the Pacific, with China's increasing receipt of supplies from the Allies—all while Japan would be devoting her full time in a war against the almost boundless Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Japanese war-lords decided to risk the other alternative. They would catch the Americans off guard in Hawaii, destroy

the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour and the planes on Hickam Field; they would simultaneously bomb American fields in the Philippines, and before recovery from those blows would be possible they would move great armies to the south. They would take Hong Kong from the British, dash across Thailand into Burma, shoot one prong down Malaya and take Singapore overland. Their land-based bombers would teach the Allied brass-hats a much-needed lesson in air-power. Meanwhile another army would occupy the Philippines. These moves succeeding, the Dutch East Indies would easily be occupied, and from them Japanese forces would step across to New Guinea and the Solomons to Australia and New Zealand. Meantime, they would take Guam and Wake, and, if possible, they would even take the Hawaiian Islands, and finally move into India to join hands with the European Axis partners, who by that time should have closed their pincers from Africa and the Balkans on the Middle East.

To be sure, it was a daring programme and shot through with improbabilities, but it was now or never—perhaps even now it was too late. Further delay, reasoned Tojo and his clique, would only lessen the chances of success.

All this programme, including the significance of air power and even the possibility of an assault on Hawaii, had been thoroughly thought out by many Americans, but the whole thing seemed so utterly preposterous, so suicidal, that the majority simply would not heed the warning of commentators and columnists.

Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, and President Roosevelt were fully aware of these possibilities. A foreign policy of strength had been instituted toward Germany. That spirit of 1941 was translated into action also in dealing with Japan. More aid was sent to China. American experts worked on engineering and traffic problems on the Burma Road. An American Volunteer Group of aviators with American-made P-40's was allowed to enter the employ of China. Finally, the programme, including the scrap metal embargo, was extended to include a complete boycott of Japanese commerce. Secretaries Stimson of the War Department and Knox of Navy were in thorough accord. More planes, bombers and fighters, were

sent to Hawaii and the Philippines, though not many, because only a few had been built. A few regiments of infantry and artillery were shipped to the west. More ships were being rushed to completion. The heavy warships were nearly all in the Pacific, but the lighter ones were busy in the Atlantic. Japan knew all this and much more. The Jap spy system was among the world's best. Japanese "fishermen" were everywhere in the Pacific—from the Aleutians, down the Alaskan and Canadian coasts to Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego to Panama, the Galapagos, and out into the middle and south Pacific. They had mapped the whole south-west Pacific from Tasmania to Ceylon. They knew even the Saturday night habits of admirals and yeomen, of generals and privates—British, Dutch, and American, Polynesian, Moor, and Burmese.

Just before the blow fell, in order to throw the Americans completely off guard, the Japanese announced the coming to America of a high ranking official. This envoy was advertised as a man of peace and long friendship for the United States. This man, Saburo Jurusu, and the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Admiral Nomura, saw to it that nice stories were fed to the American newspaper boys about good will and how the Son of Heaven hoped powerful Uncle Sam would try to understand poor little Japan's position and stop this silly drift towards war.

The envoy and the ambassador were received by Mr. Hull on November 17 and immediately the Secretary got down to brass tacks. He soon caught the Japs off guard, saw through their pretence. The representatives of the Son of Heaven stalled for time and in honeyed words continued to plead for peace. Their war lords needed just about one more week. They had decided on a Sunday morning as the most unguarded moment for the attack on Pearl Harbour. Already their carriers were at sea steaming eastward with planes ready for the take-off. They drew closer. At that moment the radios of the world were repeating the message which President Roosevelt had sent to Emperor Hirohito appealing over the heads of the war lords, begging Japan to stop before it was too late. The war lords never let the Son of Heaven read that message.

The full story of the damage done at Pearl Harbour and at

Hickam Field on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, and almost simultaneously on December 8 (across the International date line) in the Philippines has not yet been told. Needless to say, the Americans were shocked; stunned for a moment, they suddenly bounded into action.

The great debate between Isolationists and Interventionists, the old clashes between labour and management and between C.I.O. and A.F.L., the fight between Democrats and Republicans, all were instantly shoved into the background. There was something far bigger now at hand.

The next day Congress assembled and Americans sat or stood around their radios listening as the President read his war message. Then the nation in breathless silence heard ring out across the land the *Star-Spangled Banner*. Never had that national anthem meant so much as it did at that moment! Never in history had a nation made so fatal a psychological blunder as Japan had made on that Sunday morning in December, 1941.

For once in his life Adolf Hitler kept a pledge. For once in his career he actually made a formal declaration of war. So did Mussolini. Thus at long last could Uncle Sam draw a full, honest breath; a great weight had been lifted from his conscience. It had come. The Congressional declarations of war were unanimous except for one Congresswoman who afterwards in tears said that she had believed the whole thing to have been just another of "that man Roosevelt's tricks."

This telescoped narrative must end soon. The war is still in progress, most of the statistics are yet military secrets, the perspective is not detached enough to allow unqualified interpretations. These few observations are in order:

After the beatings at Pearl Harbour, on Bataan, and in the East Indies, Americans reached Australia in time to help stop the Japs and then to begin to push them back—back up the Pacific—all the while playing a hard, rough game of attrition. Meanwhile, the Eighth Army Air Force began to take its place beside the British-based R.A.F., and then came the steadily increasing business of daylight precision bombing to complement the mighty R.A.F. night area bombing. Germany lost her supremacy in the air over Western Europe and, then and

there, any prospects of Nazi victory ended, unless that supremacy could be regained.

Already had come the mighty battle of Stalingrad and the German Army had been bled white. The oil of the Caucasus was almost within Hitler's grasp. He could not quite make it. Mighty, magnificent Russians! Britishers and Americans who had made the dangerous run around Scandinavia to Murmansk and those who had ploughed the seas around Africa into the Persian Gulf to deliver American- and British-made materials to Russia—those men were proud to have played an indirect part in that gallant Volga stand.

Meantime came American support of the British in Egypt, followed by the full-scale landings of American armies in north-west Africa. The campaigns of Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy followed, while other American forces moved into position elsewhere. In the Aleutians the Japanese were defeated. In the Atlantic the U-boat campaign, upon which Germany had counted heavily, gradually was doomed to failure as British and American air-power joined the surface vessels in their hunts to the death. Thus the way was being cleared for the trickle of materials from the "Arsenal of Democracy" to become a stream, with the stream scheduled to become a mighty avalanche.

Uncle Sam, having at last grown to full-blown manhood, was presenting to his enemies (those whose minds were allowed to absorb a measure of truth) what must have been an awe-inspiring spectacle. In less than two years he had wiped out the world's mightiest industrial machine, the automobile industry, and in its stead had erected an aircraft-production system which reached and then surpassed a production rate of 100,000 planes a year. Those aircraft were superior planes, with mechanisms and precision instruments of highest order. To man those planes and "keep 'em flying" there were created the Army Air Forces of nearly two and a half million men. To move with those planes, to take and hold bases, and then to occupy conquered territory there were the Army Ground Forces nearly twice the size of the total army of 1918. To plan and move supplies, to maintain communications, and do a thousand other important jobs, there were the Army Service

Forces. To make those supplies there was one mighty army of millions of men and women working steadily in shifts around the clock, pouring forth from their mines, shops, factories, and plants, billions of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of thousands of guns, and tanks, and vehicles. To move those men and materials and food to places far away, to keep their production centres and their Allies going, there was a great Merchant Marine growing at a stupendous rate. To keep the sea lanes open, to assume at last a powerful naval offensive, there took to the oceans a series of fleets whose total number of warships was by the autumn of 1943 more than four times that of November, 1941, and whose striking power was vastly more than such figures can portray.

In the first twenty-one months after the attack on Pearl Harbour, the "Arsenal of Democracy" produced 110,000 airplanes, 60,000 tanks and tank chassis, 170,000 pieces of artillery, 1,500,000 machine-guns, 6,700,000 submachine-guns and rifles, 26,000,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 21,000,000 deadweight tons of merchant shipping, and 3,000,000 displacement tons of naval vessels.

To pay for all this (including thousands of millions of dollars' worth of lend-lease materials) the American people were pouring out of their pay cheques into the Treasury, through direct taxes and through purchase of war bonds, about half the twelve hundred millions of dollars they were spending on the war effort each week. They watched, of course, with great concern the mounting national debt, which grew from \$1,000,000,000 in 1914 to \$25,000,000,000 in 1919; from \$20,000,000,000 in 1933 to \$40,000,000,000 in 1939, to reach \$200,000,000,000 in 1944. They did not like that, even though they knew the national income in 1943 was over half the total national debt.

To co-ordinate all this gigantic programme the President was assisted not only by the ten regular Executive Departments (State, Commerce, Justice, Post Office, Labour, Navy, War, Treasury, Agriculture, and Interior) and the twenty-three major and eleven minor permanent agencies, but also by twenty-eight "Emergency Agencies." There were also seventeen Allied Boards.

In this highly complex system it would have been most unusual had there not arisen some jockeying for position, an occasional outburst of temper, and other evidences of friction, including an occasional strike. These were the things which made the headlines and thus provided material for the enemy propagandists. It was natural, too, that the necessary programmes involving rationing, equitable opportunity and distribution, anti-inflation, curtailment of personal and class interests, should now and then have produced sensational headlines.

It has always been the unusual which gains the most publicity. The steady pounding away, the monotonous whir of machines, the constant pouring forth of the fruits of activity, all in crescendo, these things—these important, vital processes of accomplishment—were the forces which characterized a great young nation just beginning to hit its full stride.

Uncle Sam during the first years of World War II was not playing a game of propaganda. He was a novice at that business and did not like it. He was conceited enough to believe that he did not need to stoop to it. He hated it even among his Allies. He loved Winston Churchill because of his blunt frankness. It was the quality he loved most to see portrayed occasionally in Joseph Stalin, whom he admired and respected yet still suspected a little. The lack of deceit in Chiang Kai-shek endeared the President of China to the whole American people. Uncle Sam's was a straightforward, hard-hitting, sometimes exasperatingly over-confident game. It was well portrayed in the expression "Unconditional Surrender," an expression first used by General U. S. Grant in the later period of the War Between the States. Uncle Sam hated war and wanted none of it, but once having been committed to it, he asked no quarter and gave none. In the winter of 1943-44 he did not want the war to end until the aggressor nations had realized the full weight of his immense power. It was not a spirit of conceit. It was not a desire for vengeance. It was rather a spirit of finality. He wanted the silly business to end—this business of nations periodically going to war. He was fighting first because he had been forced to protect himself. He was fighting also to teach his enemies and, he hoped, any prospec-

tive enemies that to ignore the potentials of America when war was contemplated was somewhat stupid. He thought it was about time the world learned that Uncle Sam had some pretty basic ideas about honour and decency and respect for the rights of the other fellow.

Whether or not he himself had learned some basic lessons about international affairs, about his own place in family relationships, was a question which remained to be answered. In the spring of 1944 he was pretty sure he had.

Chapter XII

UNCLE SAM LOOKS AT THE FUTURE

IT was stated in Chapter I that Uncle Sam is a little perplexed. Perhaps this is an understatement. He has suddenly realized his power and responsibilities in the new age of science. He wants the power but not the responsibilities. He would like to share those responsibilities, but he is not sure whom he may trust.

Millions of Americans now living have seen the development of the electric light, the automobile, the airplane, the radio. Nearly all of them have seen the old ice-box supplanted by the electric refrigerator, the old-fashioned trolley car by streamlined buses, the home-made mustard plaster by the magic sulphur drugs. Until the gigantic automobile industry was transformed into part of a machine which produced scores of thousands of warplanes in a few months, Americans every year saw every automobile manufacturer produce a new model car, always with improvements. It is common knowledge that over 60,000 new American inventions are patented every year.

America is just beginning to enter a great new technological era. Plastics are coming forward in increasing bulk. Television is already broadcast in large cities. Before the end of the century the commercial airplane may supplant the passenger train, maybe even the truck (lorry) in interstate commerce. The atom has already been exploded, and before many decades there may be combustible engines weighing only a few pounds

but generating thousands of horse-power and carrying enough energy in a gallon container to propel a vehicle across a continent. Electronics, synthetics, ceramics are all magic words holding untold possibilities. And when coupled with the words "mass production" and "private initiative" they not only stir the imagination but fire Uncle Sam with ambition to get on with the job of making the world a better place in which to live.

With all the wealth and comfort and prospects of more, there is still much ugliness in the United States. There are slums to be cleared; there is poverty on worn-out farm lands; there is economic maladjustment in every section of the nation; and the education system has been sadly neglected in more than one locality. Moreover, the old game of politics is often tainted with corruption—not so much, perhaps, in national politics as in local; but Washington has its professional lobbyists and its pressure groups, and class interest and sectional jealousy more than often rise above the national good in the thinking and acting of politicians and constituents. There is, though, a consciousness that these conditions exist and a determination that something shall be done about them. The knowledge that there are great problems at home crying for solution has tended to make America isolationist, and this fact may easily carry Uncle Sam back into that condition if depression follows this war.

There would be other reasons for reversion to the position of Isolation. One surely would be the feeling of individual national strength. To be sure, the American people know that they owe a powerful debt of gratitude to the English people for bearing up in their finest hour, and they know that every Russian and Chinese soldier and civilian who laid down his life in World War II has done so to the great good of America. But many Americans never were thoroughly convinced that Hitler could have invaded the Western Hemisphere even if he should have gained the British Navy. This was a narrow view and now freely admitted to have been such, but the major premise here is that those Americans mistook potentials for power or were ignorant of the actual strength of the Axis. Furthermore, they were overlooking the objectives and

methods of Nazi geopolitics and the whole system of Axis propaganda. They were overlooking most of the elementary factors in international affairs, for that matter. The Jap attack upon Pearl Harbour shocked Uncle Sam beyond measure. It simply was unthinkable that the leaders of any people could be so foolhardy. Once having pinned the Japs' ears back for it, Uncle Sam may well be convinced that no other people will ever try such a stunt again. To be sure, this would be unsound reasoning, and, moreover, would smack definitely of conceit—but it bears noting that knowledge of power more than once has produced among nations an unwarranted self-confidence which has allowed a weak foreign policy to develop.

There are many things for Uncle Sam to think about as he surveys the problems of international affairs. Since Jamestown was founded in 1607 the American people have, at one time or another, fought American Indians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Mexicans, Canadians, Chinamen, Filipinos, Germans, Rumanians, Hungarians, Croats, Bulgarians, Turks, Italians, and Japanese, besides fellow-Americans. They have fought the French five times and have fought beside them thrice. They have fought the English twice and beside them eight times, twice within the whirling twentieth century. Prussia was their ally when as colonials they fought in the French and Indian War. Several times since, Germans have been their deadliest enemies. Spain helped them gain their independence, yet more than once Spaniards and Americans have been enemies. There have been times when Dutchmen and Filipinos were enemies and another time when they stood side by side in the South-west Pacific.

How do the Americans know, then, that their present set of friends will always be their friends or that they will always be enemies of the Japs and Germans? They cannot forget that not long ago, because of the presence of Communist cells in depression-ridden American cities, they had little use for Russians, yet the day came when their admiration for the defenders of Stalingrad was unbounded.

As Americans look back upon all their wars they wonder why they have to be dragged into conflict so often. Uncle Sam knows the tremendous importance of nationalism in inter-

national politics and economics. Surely he has been intensely nationalistic and he will probably remain so. Uncle Sam may have sprung into being from the womb of the British Empire, but his body has been built up, fattened by the returns from a rich soil, and many times over strengthened by good transfusions from many blood-donors. Set permanently on a solid physical base, fused in the concrete of amalgamation, welded in the fire of rugged individualism, and tempered in the democratic tradition, the so-called "Melting-pot of the Nations" has become quite individualistic. To be sure, there are various seams and rifts which call for qualification of this analogy; but the fact remains that the United States is one nation, and as one nation the people look out into the foreign field with a selfish and critical eye.

Americans like Englishmen—especially those Americans who have been to Great Britain. They don't like England much—the climate, the left-hand traffic, the different type trains, and taxicabs; but Americans do like Englishmen. They like to find under the veneer of reserve the warm heart which is characteristic of Englishmen. They like their decency, their sense of fair play, and their quiet strength. Having been comrades-in-arms twice within a few years they have developed an intimacy which permits freedom to direct such quips as, "the reason the sun never set on the British Empire is that the Lord is afraid to trust all Englishmen in the dark at the same time." In return they do not object to cartoons about themselves or fun poked at them, so long as these things are rendered with a smile.

Americans like Chinamen—they always have. They like their deep-water philosophy, their patience, tenacity, and courtesy. Their hearts go out to China—mostly because Uncle Sam always has been for the underdog. But some Americans don't overlook the fact that there are 450,000,000 Chinamen now being crystallized into one nation and being taught occidental militarism, nor can they overlook the fact that in the public schools of San Francisco Chinese children quite often outstrip the whites in Intelligence Quotient tests. Even so, Americans know that they are living in a technological age when inbred individual initiative and superior mechanical

acumen combine to give them a strength which is capable of standing before tremendous numerical odds. Americans like China and her ambitions to achieve sociological advancement. Uncle Sam always has wanted to help China along the path toward Christianity and Occidentalism. Maybe this is an indication of national or racial conceit, but it is honest big-heartedness at the same time.

Americans like Russians now. They didn't know much about them before 1941. They do not know a great deal now—but they have the highest admiration for their forthrightness, their rough strength, and their perseverance. They don't like Communism, however, any more than they like Fascism. They do not trust dictatorship in any form. The American people wish they knew that Russia really intended to give up the programme of the Third International. Down underneath they just cannot overlook the fact that the Russian people are following a powerful realist dictator. They like that dictator now, but they do not like the system of government. They wonder what the policies of the next dictator will be. They would be drawn vastly closer to Russia if they knew that the constitution of the U.S.S.R. was actually being put into effect, for that constitution seems to provide for true Democracy.

Americans like all the Latin Americans, including Argentinians. They like Indians and Egyptians and many others whom they do not know. They do not dislike Italians nor Spaniards nor people of the Balkans and the Baltic countries. They like Belgians, Portuguese, Dutchmen, and Scandinavians. They like Greeks and South Africans. Canadians perhaps they like best of all, but Scotchmen easily hold second place in their affections, and Australians are not far behind; Englishmen and Irishmen as individual types come next. They like Frenchmen for the most part. But they do not appreciate some things about the French, especially their emotional extremes. Even so, they respect France for what she has been, and they want to see the Republic re-established.

What all these people think of the Americans in turn is very important and sometimes disturbing to Uncle Sam. They know that many Europeans think of the Americans as sentimental extroverts. That is in part correct. It would be more

correct to state that many Americans are still enjoying an unusually exuberant youth. They are not being extroverts, though, when they rush medical supplies, clothes, food, and cash to peoples anywhere when catastrophe strikes, whether it be in Tokyo, or Turkey, or Chile. That is sentimentalism, to be sure, but it is plain basic humanitarianism.

The truth is that Americans like humanity in general, and the day will come when they will like the German people again—that is, if the Germans can get over their *Herrenvolk* idea. There was a time even when Americans liked the Japanese—when they were “quaint people.” Right now there is a considerable respect for the fanatical bravery which allows few prisoners of war. But the rape of Nanking, the two-faced diplomacy of 1941, and the bestial mistreatment of conquered peoples and prisoners of war have left an indelible impression which may never be erased. They have been unable to pick out any Japanese Hitler or Mussolini upon whom to focus their wrath. Nomura, Tojo, and the Son of Heaven are all too symbolic.

Even so, the majority of Americans, in a spirit of fair play, would desire that the Japanese people be given the opportunity for economic security; but any old-fashioned imperial programme by future Japanese, either on the continent of Asia or in the islands of the Pacific, will be met by stern resistance. So it has been decreed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, and Americans intend to see that decree enforced.

Uncle Sam had a little fling at imperialism himself at the turn of the century and he has built up something of an empire: Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, the Philippines, the Panama Canal, and a few islands here and there. He practised dollar diplomacy and the “big stick” corollary of the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean region of Latin America. But Cuba was completely released from all obligations, and an American statute of long standing proclaims that the Philippines are to become independent in 1945. Puerto Rico has its own government, its people are American citizens, and many Puerto Ricans want their island to be admitted to the Union, but if the majority of Puerto Ricans, in time, vote for complete inde-

pendence, the American people eventually will accept that verdict. Hawaii may soon become the 49th State. Alaska was almost uninhabited when acquired. Its few Eskimo natives have greatly benefited under American control. Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and other Latin American republics have all been strengthened and their citizens' standard of living raised by Uncle Sam's foreign policy. Only in the matter of hemisphere protection does Uncle Sam show a determined influence.

There was a time when other American nations distrusted and feared "The Colossus of the North"; gradually, though, it has become understood that there was a definite limit to American imperialism. Having filled out his own borders, having prevented possible foes from acquiring territories in the Western Hemisphere, having got a few strategic Pacific bases and the Panama Canal, he was through with imperialism. The "Big Brother" concept has grown apace with the Rooseveltian "Good Neighbour Policy."

Imperialism, then, as the word is generally used, has really never had a place in American transoceanic policy; but Uncle Sam has exploited other peoples through the championship of "big business." In this respect some Americans have been guilty, as some British, French, or Dutch have been, but never dirty and unprincipled, as have been the policies of Japan and Germany.

It is through the tariff policy that Uncle Sam has played his toughest and meanest role. Refusing to allow foreign business interests to undersell American at home, yet through the cheaper methods of mass production (plus many admittedly superior or more attractive commodities) crashing into the internal markets of other nations, Uncle Sam has played a hard game during the past half-century. To be sure, it was the custom of all world traders to try to sell more than was bought. And if amassing gold is the criterion of a favourable balance of trade, then Uncle Sam beat them all. By 1943 nearly ninety per cent of the world's monetary gold was deposited in the U.S.A. It does not all belong to America, of course, but it is in America and the result has been detrimental to all concerned. This whole American fiscal policy helped produce a

world-wide depression which hit the citizens of history's "richest nation" squarely in the face and sent them reeling. It was surely a contributing factor in the rise of Hitler, and thoughtful Americans know it now. They do not excuse themselves when they point out that other "Have" nations were playing the same cut-throat game.

Suddenly, when Uncle Sam comes around to thinking in terms of international economics he is far more than a little perplexed. The average citizen of that great Democracy, like those of other nations, does not know much about international finance. Neither does his Congressman. For that matter the best American economists are at great variance upon this subject. It is a tremendously big subject—it is the biggest problem in the world today, and upon its solution hang the peace and prosperity of the human race. Uncle Sam knows this. He really believes in the Four Freedoms—freedom of worship and expression, freedom from want and fear—but how to apply a system to eliminate want is something beyond the grasp of the American people—or of others, for that matter.

Even so, the average American is anxiously hoping for a decent peace settlement. He is listening to the radio forums and the dozens of excellent commentators. He is reading good editorials and thought-provoking magazine articles. He is listening intently to the men of public affairs—to Mr. Willkie, the leftist Republican (liberal conservative), and to Mr. Wallace, the leftist Democrat (radical liberal). He has listened carefully to every word of Franklin Roosevelt. He raised high an eyebrow when Winston Churchill, in September, 1943, called for a continuance in peace-time of the pooling of Anglo-American military and economic resources. He was then straining his ear to catch some clear-cut pronouncement on post-war policy from Joseph Stalin. In the winter of 1943, even though military restrictions prevented his knowing the full plans, he was extremely pleased to learn that the Big Three had met in Iran, had ironed out their differences and then had presented to the enemy a solid unbreakable front. He then wanted very much for that cordiality, that unity of purpose in war and peace to endure. That average American was watching with a critical

eye, too, his own Senators into whose lap the framers of the Constitution unwittingly dropped the fate of twentieth-century mankind.

Uncle Sam agrees with Anne Lindberg that "Something new and beautiful is trying to push through the crust of custom." He rather likes the way Milo Perkins has put it: "We are engaged in a struggle that transcends the present war. This is a long, long fight to make a mass-production economy work. . . . The battle will be won when we have built up mass consumption to a point where markets can absorb the output of our mass-production industries running at top speed." Uncle Sam had to read that twice. He scratched his head and then said: "By George, it makes sense."

"If that is the way to win the peace—that mass consumption and mass production must be made to dovetail—then," reasoned many Americans, "there must be established a powerful international government. There must be international law. There must be an international police power. There must be an internationalizing of colonial empires and air routes and bases. There must be an international department of commerce, an international currency, and an international exchequer. Details must be left to the province of boards of international experts. There must, finally, be an international legislature (chosen upon some sound sportsmanlike basis), for continuous efforts at reform will have to be made—as in all governments. Nothing is born perfect. We are in the midstream of history." Thus reason idealistic Americans.

But sceptical Americans question: "Do you want to ask Great Britain to give up her empire? Do you want to ask Russia really and permanently to forsake the Third International? Do you want to ask the United States to give up its hard-earned gold and forsake its tariff policy? If you do, you'll be sadly disappointed."

Here is the idealistic reply: "That is not true. Russia, or at least Joseph Stalin, has already dissolved the Comintern; Uncle Sam, or at least Franklin Roosevelt with Cordell Hull, has already taken the first steps toward abolishing tariffs and internationalizing gold; and the whole tendency of recent British Empire policy has been toward decentralization—the

British Empire, in large part, already has become the Commonwealth.

The sceptic has a reply to each of these observations, but he cannot reply to the argument of the majority that "If these enlightened programmes are not fostered and furthered by the English-speaking peoples as well as by the Russians, the Chinese, the Latins, and others, then we'll go right on having depressions and wars and mounting taxes and debts, and World War II shall have ended with just another negative victory."

And so the debate goes on while the Yank occasionally lifts his head from battle, strokes his young chin (minus the goatee), looks about him and says: "Boy! We've got two Big Jobs to do and I mean with a capital B. and a capital J. Period."

